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Free Speech for Lawyers
BYW. BRADLEY WENDEL*
L Introduction
One of the most important unanswered questions in legal ethics
is how the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression ought to
apply to the speech of attorneys acting in their official capacity. The
Supreme Court has addressed numerous First Amendment issues in-
volving lawyers,' of course, but in all of them has declined to consider
directly the central conceptual issue of whether lawyers possess di-
minished free expression rights, as compared with ordinary, non-
lawyer citizens. Despite its assiduous attempt to avoid this question,
the Court's hand may soon be forced. Free speech issues are prolif-
erating in the state and lower federal courts, and the results betoken
doctrinal incoherence. The leader of a white supremacist "church" in
* Assistant Professor, Washington and Lee University School of Law. LL.M. 1998
Columbia Law School, J.D. 1994 Duke Law School, B.A. 1991 Rice University. The assis-
tance of the Frances Lewis Law Center, Washington and Lee University is gratefully ac-
knowledged. Thanks to Jack Chin, Teresa Collett, Ron Krotoszynski, Betsy Malloy, Ju-
dith Maute, Pam Metzger, Irma Russell, and Barry Sullivan for their comments. A version
of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Southeastern Conference of the
AALS. I am grateful to the organizers and participants in the young scholars workshop
for their assistance and helpful discussion. Finally, I would like to thank my research assis-
tants Cameron Garrison and John Kalinger for their valuable contributions.
1. The Court has considered First Amendment issues relating to attorney advertising
and solicitation, see Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995); Shapero v. Ken-
tucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S.
626 (1985); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350
(1977); pretrial publicity, see Gentile v. Nevada State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991); admission
to the bar, see Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S.
154 (1971); In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971); Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1
(1971); In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New
Mexico, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); In
re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945); and contempt of court and other sources of discipline for
making critical comments about lawyers and judges, see In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634 (1985);
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959).
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Illinois was denied admission to the bar because of the incompatibil-
ity of his beliefs with the principle of racial equality to which lawyers
as professionals ought to be dedicated. This decision reveals the ten-
sion between the First Amendment principle, established after the
agonizing struggles of the McCarthy era, that no one may be denied
membership in the bar because of his or her beliefs, and the plenary
authority of bar associations to make predictive judgments about the
ability of applicants to function as lawyers.
The Court ducked the constitutional issue presented in the Hale
case, but did grant certiorari in a case involving restrictions on the
types of cases that could be handled by legal aid lawyers who received
federal funding.2 This case, which is in one sense another iteration of
the debate over whether the government may restrict speech by selec-
tively funding it, implicates the fundamental question of the ethical
duties of lawyers: is challenging the status quo a core aspect of their
role, so that the analysis of whether the government may fund legal
service corporations with strings attached differs from the question of
government funding for family-planning clinics3 or artistic expres-
sion?4
Finally, bar associations have asserted the power to restrict rac-
ist, sexist, and "uncivil" speech by lawyers, to make the profession
more welcoming to people of color and women, and to reduce the
cost and delays associated with obnoxious pretrial behavior. These
civility and antidiscrimination codes, however, may run afoul of con-
stitutional limitations on vague, overbroad, and content-based restric-
tions of expression. Although similar content-based restrictions on
speech have been rejected by courts considering university hate-
speech codes, remedies for hostile work-environment sexual harass-
ment under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act have uniformly
been upheld against constitutional challenges. Are antidiscrimination
and civility codes for lawyers more like the hate speech regulations or
the right of action for sexual harassment?
Courts that have considered these issues are badly split on
whether these regulations violate the First Amendment. This uncer-
tainty is due in part to the multiplicity of constitutional rules impli-
cated by any restrictions on speech, but also by the categorization
problems presented by lawyers' speech. Are lawyers like soapbox
orators in Hyde Park, or are they more like government employees,
2. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2000).
3. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
4. See National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
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whose expressive rights may be limited? Is lawyer speech "political,"
and therefore entitled to the highest degree of First Amendment pro-
tection, or in a category of lower constitutional value, like commercial
speech? Do lawyers surrender a portion of their expressive freedom
when they become members of the bar, "officers of the court," as
judges are fond of labeling them? How should courts reconcile the
solicitude of the First Amendment for unorthodox points of view and
spirited dissent with the regulatory interests of the bar, which may not
necessarily be furthered by antiestablishment speech by lawyers?
These are typical of the questions which confront anyone trying to
reason through the collision of ethical, constitutional, and regulatory
norms governing lawyer speech.
The arguments of this Article are synthetic in structure. I do not
aim just to criticize reported cases, but rather to show how the regula-
tion of lawyers' speech fits within the various doctrinal complexities
that characterize First Amendment law and within the ethical norms
that govern the practice of law. This synthesis has three features:
First, although the focus is on the application of free speech principles
to the legal profession, the issues considered here are also implicated
in other contemporary constitutional debates, such as the regulation
of hate speech on college campuses and elsewhere, and the applica-
tion of the First Amendment to "hostile environment" sexual har-
assment claims under Title VII.7 First Amendment law has tended to
5. See, e.g., Calvin R. Massey, Hate Speech, Cultural Diversity, and the Foundational
Paradigms of Free Expression, 40 UCLA L. REV. 103, 174-77 (1992); Richard Delgado,
Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 NW. U. L. REv. 343
(1991); David F. McGowan & Ragesh K. Tangri, A Libertarian Critique of University Re-
strictions of Offensive Speech, 79 CAL. L. REV. 825 (1991); J. Peter Byrne, Racial Insults
and Free Speech Within the University, 79 GEO. L.J. 399 (1991).
6. See, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS?
HATE SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE NEW FIRST AMENDMENT (1997); Martha Mi-
now, Regulating Hatred: Whose Speech, Whose Crimes, Whose Power? - An Essay for
Kenneth Karst, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1253 (2000); Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy,
and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 267 (1991).
7. See, e.g., Deborah Epstein, Can a "Dumb Ass Woman" Achieve Equality in the
Workplace? Running the Gauntlet of Hostile Environment Harassing Speech, 84 GEO. L.
J. 399 (1996); Suzanne Sangree, Title VII Prohibitions Against Hostile Environment Sexual
Harassment and the First Amendment: No Collision in Sight, 47 RuTGERS L. REv. 461
(1995); Linda S. Greene, Sexual Harassment Law and the First Amendment, 71 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 729 (1995); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the
First Amendment Dog That Didn't Bark, 1994 Sup. CT. REV. 1; Eugene Volokh, Freedom
of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1791 (1992); Nadine Strossen,
Regulating Workplace Sexual Harassment and Upholding the First Amendment - Avoid-
ing a Collision, 37 VILL. L. REV. 757 (1992); Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship:
Hostile-Environment Harassment and the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. LJ. 481 (1991).
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fragment into discrete, context-specific bodies of law,8 with the result
predictably being doctrinal confusion. I am aware of the dangers in-
herent in searching for a grand unified theory that can be made intel-
ligible in application only by Procrustean contortions, and I do not
wish to diminish the importance of the social context9 in which speech
acts occur. In fact, many of the arguments in this Article criticize
courts for not giving sufficient weight to the ethical and disciplinary
context that informs lawyering activities. At the same time, however,
First Amendment law has been impoverished by its division into an
ever-increasing number of contextual pigeonholes, which exist in
hermetic isolation from one another. This discussion, therefore,
draws together the constitutional reasoning from expressive-rights
cases involving lawyers and those arising in analogous contexts.
Second, this Article integrates constitutional principles that bear
on lawyer-speech cases, but which have their origins outside the First
Amendment. For instance, regulation by courts of "offensive person-
ality" or "conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice" impli-
cates due process, vagueness, and overbreadth concerns. A court that
considers only the First Amendment in analyzing a case arising under
one of these standards risks overlooking significant constitutional is-
sues. Similarly, the Supreme Court's periodic flirtation with the
right/privilege distinction in procedural due process cases is another
constitutional theme that recurs in lawyer-speech cases.
Finally, I consider not only the constitutional dimension of law-
yer-speech regulation, but also the ethical and disciplinary context
that informs the practice of law. Being a lawyer means participating
in a social practice which has its own unique traditions, history, and
conceptual difficulties. For example, one frequently encounters the
claim that the lawyer's role is to serve as a zealous advocate within
8. A glaring example of the process of categorization run amok (and also of infelici-
tous language by a law clerk) is Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
In that case, the Court said: "Each method of communicating ideas is 'a law unto itself
and that law must reflect the 'differing natures, values, abuses, and dangers' of each
method. We deal here with the law of billboards." Id. at 501 (footnote omitted). There is
no such thing as the "law of billboards," which is somehow distinct from the law of print
advertisements, handbills, or websites. Naturally each medium will display unique charac-
teristics, but what makes legal rules law is that they may to some extent be generalized be-
yond the particulars of a given dispute. If it is not possible to harmonize the law of bill-
boards with the law of television broadcasts in a principled way, the Court has not
performed its function adequately. Cf Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 436 (1989) (Stev-
ens, J., dissenting) (unpersuasively arguing that First Amendment principles applicable to
wearing black armbands in protest do not carry over to flag-burning).
9. See generally STANLEY FISH, THERE'S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH (1994);
Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249 (1995).
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the bounds of the law; this motto points to the lawyer's function as
both a representative of clients and an "officer of the court," charged
with responsibility for conforming the conduct of individuals to the
law. This tension has obvious implications for the analysis of the free
expression rights of lawyers. Speaking out on behalf of a disfavored
position or an unpopular client may put the lawyer at odds with pow-
erful government actors. On the other hand, restraining one's speech
in order to stay well within the boundaries of permitted expression
may have the effect of muzzling one's client's voice - an illegitimate
act of private domination. This clash of principles plays out in cases
like the recent dispute over whether a divorce lawyer could accept
only women as clients."0 In that case, the lawyer's personal moral
agency and her ideological commitment to serving women conflicted
with the norm of formal gender equality (although her decision ar-
guably advanced substantive gender equality by providing women
with effective counsel). Although this case is more a matter of First
Amendment associative, rather than expressive rights, it shows nicely
how the ethical obligations of lawyers may create treacherous cross-
currents in constitutional doctrine.
A theory of free speech for lawyers must achieve a satisfying fit
in two directions: with broader constitutional and ethical principles,
and with the results of particular cases.11 In many First Amendment
cases involving the expressive activities of lawyers, the result seems
obvious, but is difficult to justify in terms of constitutional doctrine.
For example, it seems intuitively correct to extend First Amendment
protection to the speech of an experienced defense lawyer who ar-
gues, at a meeting arranged by a labor union, that the government's
prosecution of suspected Communists in organized labor is overzeal-
ous and threatening to civil liberties." But does this decision entail a
requirement that an avowed white supremacist must be admitted to
the bar, despite the compelling constitutional value of racial equal-
ity? 3 Or, does it protect the speech of the newly elected judge of a
10. See Steve Berenson, Politics and Plurality in a Lawyer's Choice of Clients: The
Case of Stropnicky v. Nathanson, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (1998); Bruce K. Miller, Law-
yers' Identities, Client Selection and the Antidiscrimination Principle: Thoughts on the
Sanctioning of Judith Nathanson, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 93, 94-95 (1998).
11. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 48-50 (1971); Norman Da-
niels, Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics, 76 J. PHIL. 256 (1979).
12. See Sawyer, 360 U.S. at 628-29.
13. See Ann Woolner, Barring Bigots: Should the Privilege to Practice Law Depend on
One's Politics?, LEGAL TIMEs, July 26, 1999, at 15 (reviewing story of Matthew Hale, dis-
cussed in detail infra notes 25-76 and accompanying text). See also OWEN M. FIss, THE
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state court of last resort, who addresses an anti-abortion rally and
thanks advocates for their support in his recent election campaign?14
In other cases, established constitutional law challenges some visions
of ethical lawyering. The popular understanding of the First
Amendment celebrates outcasts, iconoclasts, and dissenters - which
is why the scrofulous Larry Flynt is occasionally mistaken for a moral
hero - and well known judicial decisions protect all manner of offen-
sive communications, from hate speech to flag burning. This extraor-
dinary constitutional solicitude for speech seems to doom the efforts
of bar associations and courts to enforce civility codes in an attempt
to control perceived obnoxious behavior by lawyers. Certainly one
strand of our professional tradition idealizes colorful lawyers, such as
William Kunstler and Johnnie Cochran, who flout conventions of
decorous speech or respect for courts. But another, equally powerful
part of the ethical heritage of lawyers emphasizes their subordination
to public interests such as the expeditious and fair resolution of dis-
putes. This Article seeks to accommodate these crosscutting tensions
within a constitutional and ethical framework.
In this Article I do not propose some variation on the ubiquitous
balancing tests that have multiplied in constitutional law, in which the
interests of the client, the lawyer, the court system, affected third par-
ties, and society are generally weighed against one another on some
miraculous multidimensional scale. 5 A significant camp of First
Amendment scholars contends that flexibility and "thinking small" is
the hallmark of free speech doctrine, and courts should not be preoc-
cupied with the search for rules that apply without sensitivity to con-
textual variations. 6 There is a great deal of truth in this position, but
the response to the diversity of circumstances of individual cases is to
work harder to discern the principles and policies which undergird
First Amendment adjudication in analogous cases, not to abdicate
this function by purporting to balance numerous incommensurable
IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 12-13 (1996) (observing that hate speech poses a confrontation
between two constitutional norms - freedom of expression and equality - and there is
no way for the legal system to choose easily between these two transcendent commit-
ments).
14. See In re Sanders, 955 P.2d 369,370-71 (Wash. 1998) (reversing reprimand against
state Supreme Court Justice who spoke to an anti-abortion rally).
15. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Cf. Richard H. Pildes,
Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in Constitutional Law, 45
HASTINGS L.J. 711 (1994).
16. See, e.g., STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND
ROMANCE 4, 14-17 (1990); Post, supra note 6; Fallon, supra note 7.
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factors. How, for example, is a court to balance "the government's
interest in a fair and impartial judiciary, a judge's interest in the right
to express his or her views, and the need for the free expression of
those views in a system wherein the members of the judiciary are
elected to office" in an intellectually honest way? Better simply to
decide that the speech of judges is subject to regulation in a given
context, reasoning by analogy from similar cases involving attorneys,
government employees, or some other relevantly similar category of
speakers. Naturally, the determination that two categories are rele-
vantly similar is itself a contestable one, but it will usefully expose the
normative issues that undergird the legal doctrines. The constraint of
making principled distinctions, or plausible analogies, ensures that ju-
dicial decisions are justified on the basis of generally applicable politi-
cal and moral principles." It also gives decision makers access to the
intellectual resources of past decisions, so that each judge is not en-
gaged in a process of reinventing the wheel (or, worse, failing to in-
vent the wheel, which happens in a great many constitutional cases)."
The ambition of this Article, therefore, is to produce an account of
First Amendment theory that is both coherent and sensitive to the va-
riety of contexts in which lawyers' expressive interests are implicated.
Part II provides a critical overview of some of the contexts in
which lawyers' First Amendment interests are implicated. It draws
analogies between contemporary disputes like the Matthew Hale ap-
plication and historically significant events such as the McCarthy cru-
sade to weed subversive lawyers out of the bar. Parts III and IV then
provide two independent, but complementary approaches for ana-
lyzing lawyers' free speech rights: Part III adopts a doctrinal perspec-
tive, connecting the multifarious strands of constitutional law with the
factual settings in which they arise in lawyer-speech cases. The aim of
this discussion is to provide a sound doctrinal framework for decisions
in these cases, as a corrective to the frequently conclusory reasoning
employed by courts. Part IV takes the standpoint of free speech the-
ory, and asks whether the underlying reasons for affording a high de-
gree of protection to expression apply to cases in which the speakers
17. See generally ALBERT R. JONSEN & STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF
CASUISTRY: A HISTORY OF MORAL REASONING (1988); EDWARD H. LEVI, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949); Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Rea-
soning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1993); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv.
571 (1987); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1959).
18. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 195
(1996).
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are lawyers. Familiar constitutional tropes like the marketplace of
ideas and the dissenting pamphleteer make their appearance in this
section. Part V considers the intersection with the ethical norms
which regulate the practice of law. (By "ethical" here I mean both
the disciplinary rules enacted by state bar associations and the gener-
ally applicable moral principles that bind lawyers by virtue of being
persons.) The conception of professional ethics proposed is plural-
istic, meaning that no single value can adequately account for the so-
cial function of lawyers in our political culture. Thus, any complete
theory of free speech for lawyers must adapt to this pluralism. Fi-
nally, Part VI proposes a number of principles that may be inferred
from the preceding discussion of First Amendment doctrine and the-
ory and an appropriate vision of legal ethics.
To anticipate the arguments of the following sections, I will claim
that decisions by courts considering free speech arguments by lawyers
are surprisingly out of touch with the mainstream of constitutional
law. While generally applicable First Amendment law is astonish-
ingly protective of expression, even when it imposes high social
costs, 9 the decisions of courts in lawyer-speech cases cluster around
the opposite extreme. They generally acquiesce in the government's
asserted reasons for protecting speech, even where these reasons have
been unavailing in other contexts. Protecting the public image of the
bar, for example, has been deemed a legitimate state interest, justify-
ing regulations on expression, even in light of the Supreme Court's
commercial speech doctrine, which does not permit restrictions on
speech to be justified by similar concerns." Furthermore, the vision
of robust, open, vigorous public debate announced by the Supreme
Court in New York Times v. Sullivan21 has not been carried through
by lower courts into a protective rule for criticism of participants in
the judicial system. Judges, perhaps realizing that what's sauce for
the goose is sauce for the gander, also uphold decency and dignitary
restrictions on speech critical of the judiciary, despite a consistent line
of cases protecting undignified and indecent speech, subject only to
narrow exceptions for obscenity, and making clear that the offense of
19. One of the few decisions in recent memory recognizing the high social cost of
some speech as a reason for restricting it is Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000), uphold-
ing the validity of a floating no-speech zone around women seeking treatment at abortion
clinics.
20. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
21. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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a listener is alone no basis for restricting expressions Courts also
relax their customary scrutiny of vague and overbroad statutes, per-
mitting enforcement of prohibitions on "offensive personality" and
"conduct unbecoming a member of the bar," again notwithstanding
the Court's concern that vague regulations may be selectively en-
forced against the powerless or unpopular.' Finally, courts tend to
permit viewpoint-based discrimination, permitting selective enforce-
ment of general standards (such as the moral character requirement
for admission to the bar) against unpopular or obnoxious lawyers.
Throughout this article I will consider some sources of this doc-
trinal confusion. One possibility is that courts have over-generalized
from cases involving in-court expression. Naturally a court has the
power to discipline speech by lawyers that disrupts a court proceeding
or in some other manner interferes with a fair trial; in criminal cases
this power is of a constitutional dimension, owing to the Sixth
Amendment's fair trial guarantee. Outside of the context of formal
proceedings, however, these government interests are absent, yet
courts often assume, without analysis, that the speech of lawyers is
similarly circumscribed. In addition, courts seem to forget some basic
policies supporting expressive rights, such as the distrust of govern-
ment power or state-prescribed orthodoxies of belief that underlies
the "marketplace of ideas" rationale for protecting speech. Courts in
this area are surprisingly deferential to state decisions about the social
acceptability of the ideas and values of lawyers, in a way that would
not withstand scrutiny outside of this context. For example, they are
frequently willing to accept the prevention of offense or the preserva-
tion of the dignity of courts as a sufficient reason for restricting
speech.
A more charitable reason for the most significant source of the
observed disarray in state and lower federal court decisions is the
overlay of a pluralistic foundation for legal ethics onto the famously
indeterminate body of First Amendment law. It is almost a cliche to
observe the baroque complexity of free speech doctrine, but what is
less well appreciated is the extent to which no single model of law-
yering theory can account for the function of lawyers in our society.
Courts sometimes assume that the traditional status of lawyers as "of-
ficers of the court" entails a limited set of First Amendment free-
doms. The officer of the court obligation, however, must be consid-
22. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15 (1971).
23. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
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ered in light of the lawyer's other traditional role, which is to chal-
lenge exercises of state power. Taking the officer of the court duty
too seriously means undermining the lawyer's role as a bulwark be-
tween individual liberty and abuse of government power. Each of
these competing visions of legal practice - the quasi-governmental
obligation to help ensure the efficient functioning of the judicial sys-
tem and the private role as representative and advocate of clients -
can be connected with aspects of First Amendment doctrine to create
a theory of free speech for lawyers. The result of this multi-tiered
pluralism is a geometric increase in the number of plausible resolu-
tions to expressive-rights disputes, and hence the welter of conflicting
lower-court decisions.
H. Formal Taxonomy of Lawyer-Speech Cases
A. "Are You Now, or Have You Ever Been, a White Supremacist?":
The Hale Case and Pre-Admission Moral Character Review
The case of Matthew Hale has crystallized the debate over the
free speech rights of attorneys in a way that has not occurred since
the McCarthy era's loyalty oath cases. Hale is the leader (the self-
styled "Pontifex Maximus") of a white supremacist organization
called the World Church of the Creator, undistinguished among
fringe hate groups for its beliefs,24 but notable for its enthusiastic em-
brace of technology. His organization has been particularly aggres-
sive in using the World Wide Web to spread its message. Hale main-
tains a web site for his organization, which contains numerous
exhortations to "racial loyalty" and "racial holy war;" rantings about
blacks, Jews, and other ethnic minorities (called the "mud races" by
Hale); a bizarre theology based on the "Sixteen Commandments" and
vehement denunciations of Christianity; long-discredited bogus bio-
logical theories about racial differences; and a boilerplate disclaimer
that the group does not condone violence.5 The disclaimer rings
hollow in the face of the group's refusal to disavow violence in the
pursuit of its ambitions: "It is the program of the Church of the Crea-
tor to keep expanding the White Race and keep crowding the mud
races without necessarily engaging in any open warfare or without
24. See generally MICHAEL BARKUN, RELIGION AND THE RACIST RIGHT: THE
ORIGINS OF THE CHRISTIAN IDENTITY MOVEMENT (1997).
25. See World Church of the Creator, (visited 11/23/99) <http://www.rahowa.com>.
"Rahowa" is Hale's acronym for "racial holy war."
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necessarily killing anybody." And few believed that Hale was not
pleased when one of his followers, Benjamin Nathaniel Smith, went
on a multi-state killing spree targeted at Jews and people of colorY
Due to the visibility of the World Church of the Creator, Hale's ap-
plication to become a licensed attorney in Illinois was a high-profile
event, and the decision of the local bar committee, declining to certify
his fitness for admission, generated immediate controversy.?
Despite the horror of the Smith killings, the Hale proceeding is a
tempest in a teapot compared with the great upheaval surrounding
Senator Joseph McCarthy's investigations into alleged Communist in-
filtration of American political institutions in the 1950s.' The McCar-
thy era produced an extraordinary outpouring of sharply divided Su-
preme Court opinions, all considering the extent of constitutional
26. See FAQ About Creativity, Question #21, (visited 11/23/99)
<http./www.rahowa.com/faql> (emphasis added). See also Question # 24, id. ("Q: But
wouldn't [the agenda of the group] mean the decline and perhaps the extermination of the
colored races? A. Perhaps it would .... "); Question #29, id. ("Hitler's program was simi-
lar to what we are proposing .... ."). Unlike the Nuremberg Files website, which publishes
photographs and addresses of physicians who perform abortions, Hale's site does not con-
tain any information that would facilitate the commission of a crime of racial violence.
Thus, it does not fall within the category of "harm advocacy" speech, which two commen-
tators have recently proposed should be subject to plenary government regulatory author-
ity. See S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy & Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Recalibrating the Cost
of Harm Advocacy: Getting Beyond Brandenburg, 41 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1159 (2000).
27. See Bill Dedman, Midwest Gunman Had Engaged in Racist Acts at 2 Universities,
N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1999, available in 1999 WL 30542190. See also Southern Poverty Law
Center, The Great Creator, INTELLIGENCE REPORT (Summer 1999), at 23, 25-26 (detail-
ing connections between Hale and Smith).
28. The full name of the body which initially denied Hale's application is the Commit-
tee on Character and Fitness for the Third Appellate District of the Supreme Court of Il-
linois (Inquiry Panel). (Illinois does not have a unified bar.) The Inquiry Panel's decision
is reprinted in GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF
LAWYERING 875 (3d ed. 1999). For convenience I will refer to the version of the Inquiry
Panel's opinion included in the Hazard casebook, using that book's pagination [hereinaf-
ter "Hale Inq. Panel Opinion"]. The Inquiry Panel's decision was affirmed on a narrower
ground by a Hearing Panel of the Character and Fitness Committee. That decision is re-
printed in the Teacher's Manual to the Hazard casebook, but is not otherwise readily
available to the public. I will use the pagination from the Teacher's Manual for that deci-
sion [hereinafter "Hale Hrg. Panel Opinion."] The Hearing Panel ruling is final, in light of
the decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois to deny Hale's petition for review and the
denial of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court. See Illinois Supreme Court minute order,
M.R. 16075 (Nov. 12, 1999) (on file with author); Hale v. Illinois Bar, 120 S. Ct. 2716
(2000).
29. See generally STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE AMERICAN INQUISITION: JUSTICE AND
INJUSTICE IN THE COLD WAR (1982); MICHAL R. BELKNAP, COLD WAR POLITICAL
JUSTICE: THE SMITH ACT, THE COMMUNIST PARTY, AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
(1977); Marc Rohr, Communists and the First Amendment: The Shaping of Freedom of
Advocacy in the Cold War Era, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1 (1991).
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protection afforded to those who were suspected of harboring Com-
munist sympathies.' A significant number of these cases involved
lawyers who were denied admission to state bar associations, some-
times merely for refusing to answer questions about membership in
subversive organizations.31 The holdings of those cases, none of which
has ever been expressly overruled by the Court, may be surprising to
a lawyer who is acquainted only with contemporary free speech juris-
prudence, which is highly protective of potentially harmful speech.
Although applicants to the bar may not be required to disclose mere
membership in "subversive" organizations, 32 they nevertheless may be
forced to reveal whether they belong to an organization advocating
overthrow of the government by force and whether they share that
group's specific intent.' The Court cited a long line of decisions es-
tablishing the permissibility of conditioning government employment
on a satisfactory record of the applicant's freedom from subversive
activity.' Indeed, the bar-admission cases and other anti-Communist
loyalty-oath cases35 were decided after the Supreme Court's landmark
Brandenburg decision, which generally imposes a requirement that
the harm threatened by speech be imminent in time. Thus, the Hale
case poses an unresolved constitutional question of the highest impor-
tance - namely, whether a state benefit may be withheld on a show-
ing that the applicant poses a particularly acute threat to the demo-
cratic form of government.
The character and fitness committee's Inquiry Panel that consid-
ered Hale's application was aware of the loyalty-oath cases proscrib-
ing inquiry into beliefs as such, but it nevertheless concluded that the
state's interest in ensuring that lawyers are dedicated to certain "fun-
damental truths" outweighs Hale's First Amendment rights.3 6 These
30. See, e.g., Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Beilan v. Board of Educ.,
357 U.S. 399 (1958); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479 (1960); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); United States v. Robel,
389 U.S. 258 (1967).
31. See, e.g., Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S.
154 (1971); In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971); Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1
(1971); In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New
Mexico, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
32. See Baird, 401 U.S. at 8.
33. See Wadmond, 401 U.S. at 166-67. See generally Thomas Church, Jr.. Conspiracy
Doctrine and Speech Offenses: A Reexamination of Yates v. United States from the Per-
spective of United States v. Spock, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 569 (1975).
34. See, e.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
35. See, e.g., Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441 (1974).
36. See Hale Inq. Panel Opinion, supra note 28, at 881.
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fundamental truths include racial equality and the responsibility of
the courts to enforce this value. The Inquiry Panel cited the Supreme
Court's holding in Baird that "a State may not inquire about a man's
views or associations solely for the purpose of withholding a right or
benefit because of what he believes."'37 Its attempts to distinguish be-
tween inquiry into belief as such, and belief as it reveals an intent to
commit unlawful acts, reveals both constitutional questions left open
by the McCarthy-era jurisprudence of the Court and the issues posed
by the collision between antidiscrimination norms and free expression
principles.
First, the Inquiry Panel in the Hale case emphasized the differ-
ence between inquiring into beliefs and merely taking notice of be-
liefs that an applicant has publicized: "Matthew Hale has no interest
in keeping his beliefs a secret."'' It is true that the precise issue in
Baird was whether the state of Arizona could deny admission to an
applicant who had refused to answer questions about membership in
the Communist Party or any organization that "advocates overthrow
of the United States Government by force or violence."" It seems
peculiar to read Baird so narrowly as standing for a proposition that
the state may not inquire into membership in organizations advocat-
ing the violent overthrow of the United State government, but may
permissibly deny membership in the bar to an applicant who has ad-
mitted membership in such a group, perhaps through inadvertence,
naivete, or misplaced trust in the tolerance of the government. But
the Court is responsible for encouraging this strained interpretation
because it never squarely confronted the issue suggested by Baird -
whether Arizona could have denied admission to Sara Baird if she
had filled out her application truthfully. In a contemporaneous deci-
sion, the Court insisted that a state retains the power to inquire into
whether a bar applicant had the specific intent to further the aims of
an organization dedicated to the violent overthrow of the United
States government.4° The only prohibited inquiry is into beliefs as
37. Id. at 880, citing Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
38. Id. at 880, taking judicial notice of Hale's website.
39. 401 U.S. at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
40. See Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. at
164-66. (The Court had previously held, in Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. at 203, that
prosecution for membership in the Communist Party was not unconstitutional, provided
that the state prove "active" membership and specific intent to take illegal action.) The
state may require the applicant to answer these questions, on pain of denial of admission
for refusing to answer. Konigsberg, 366 U.S. at 56; In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. at 96-97.
One member of the Court has expressed the view that these holdings are of dubious
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such, which do not manifest themselves as a specific intent to commit
illegal acts.41 Still, this distinction does not complete the Illinois In-
quiry Panel's analysis. Hale never admitted forming a specific intent
to commit acts of racial violence; in fact, he specifically disavowed this
intent.42 One might disbelieve Hale on this point, but the Inquiry
Panel's decision does not contain a factual finding, supported by evi-
dence on the record, that Hale had a specific intent to accomplish a
criminal act. All that is apparent from the record is Hale's belief in
white supremacy - odious to be sure, but constitutionally protected.
The Inquiry Panel, perhaps anticipating this argument, then
waded into the quagmire of constitutional issues surrounding the ap-
plication of free expression principles to regulation of hate speech. It
concluded that the fundamental value of racial equality is so basic to
our legal system that it ought to be preferred to the values of the First
Amendment.43 To call this a novel argument would be a gross under-
statement. The Supreme Court, and federal appellate courts, have
consistently held that speech may not be restricted solely because of
its content, even where the regulations are motivated by the desire to
vindicate substantive norms of racial equality. For example, in
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the Court invalidated a city ordinance
criminalizing actions that "arouse[] anger, alarm or resentment in
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender .... 4
The Court reasoned that the ordinance discriminated on the basis of
the content of the expression; a sign arguing for racial tolerance
precedential value in light of intervening developments in the law and the end of the Cold
War. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Supreme Court Discourse on the Good Behavior of Law-
yers: Leeway Within Limits, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 183, 189 (1995). Justice Ginsburg cites
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), which held that advocacy of illegal action is
not, by itself, a justified basis for restricting speech unless there is a clear and present dan-
ger of imminent lawless activity. It is certainly difficult to reconcile Wadmond with Bran-
denburg, but the latter case was decided before Wadmond, so it does not seem to cast
doubt on the precedential value of the 1971 bar-admission cases. Rather, the argument
would have to be that Wadmond was wrongly decided in light of Brandenburg. See gener-
ally Special Project, Admission to the Bar: A Constitutional Analysis, 34 VAND. L. REV.
655 (1981); Rohr, supra note 29, at 115. Interestingly, as of 1994 the character and fitness
section of the application to the New York bar still contained a question about member-
ship in subversive organizations, in the form approved by the court in Wadmond. See
Colin A. Fieman, A Relic of McCarthyism: Question 21 of the Application for Admission to
the New York Bar, 42 BUFF. L. REV. 47 (1994).
41. See Baird, 401 U.S. at 9-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
42. See Hale Inq. Panel Opinion, supra note 28, at 876.
43. Id. at 882.
44. 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1992) (quoting St. Paul Bias Motivating Crime Ordinance, St.
Paul, Minn, Legis Code §292.02 (1990)).
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would not be subject to the ordinance, but a message conveying ha-
tred or racial superiority is illegal.45 Significantly, the state interest as-
serted by the city - "help[ing] ensure the basic human rights of
members of groups that have historically been subject to discrimina-
tion" ' - is the same interest that the Illinois Inquiry Panel claimed
justified Hale's exclusion from the bar. The ordinance was not neces-
sary to advance this interest, however. In an allusion to the "market-
place of ideas" vision of the First Amendment, the Court said that if
the St. Paul City Council wished to respond to hate speech, its only
option was to speak out against hate, not to ban expressions of it.47
The Inquiry Panel's only response to this argument was a citation
to Wisconsin v. Mitchell,48 the Supreme Court decision unanimously
upholding the constitutionality of a state penalty enhancement provi-
sion for crimes committed as a result of racial bias. Mitchell essen-
tially recapitulates the distinction drawn in Wadmond and Baird be-
tween beliefs as such and criminal acts motivated by beliefs. A
sentencing judge may not take into account a defendant's beliefs, as
might be evidenced by membership in a white supremacist prison
gang, having nothing to do with the actus reus of the crime for which
the defendant was convicted.49 If racist beliefs motivated the defen-
dant's actions, however, the sentencing judge may take them into ac-
count.' Similarly, under Baird a state may not inquire into a bar ap-
plicant's membership in subversive organizations, but it is permitted
by Wadmond to take into account evidence that the applicant had
formed the specific intent to overthrow the United States government
by force.5 The Court distinguished between conduct, which could be
made the subject of criminal penalties, and expression, which under
R.A.V. could not. 2 As I will argue, the speech/conduct distinction is
45. See id.
46. Id at 395.
47. See id. at 396. For a well known appellate decision reaching a similar conclusion,
see Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978). In that case, the court held that the city
of Skokie, Illinois, could not deny a parade permit to a group of Nazis who wished to
demonstrate in a city whose population included many Holocaust survivors. See id. at
1199, 1210. See also ARYEH NEIER, DEFENDING MY ENEMY: AMERICAN NAZIS, THE
SKOKIE CASE, AND THE RISKS OF FREEDOM (1979). See also American Booksellers
Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985).
48. 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
49. See Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159,167 (1992).
50. See Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 486; Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939,949 (1983).
51. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
52. See Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487.
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difficult to draw with any precision; the immediate problem for the
Illinois Inquiry Panel, however, was the lack of any factual record
that Hale had engaged in criminal conduct, as opposed to the advo-
cacy of criminality. For the same reason that the Inquiry Panel's ap-
plication of Baird was incorrect - namely, Hale had only advocated
race war, not formed the specific intent to commit racially motivated
crimes - the Inquiry Panel seriously misread Mitchell when it argued
that antidiscrimination values may be preferred to the First Amend-
ment in bar admission cases like Hale's.
Of course, the Minnesota teenager charged with the cross-
burning in R.A.V. was not a lawyer; perhaps Hale ought to be re-
quired to accept diminished free speech rights in exchange for the
valuable privilege of practicing law in Illinois. Indeed, the Inquiry
Panel makes exactly this argument: "The balance of values that we
strike leaves Matthew Hale free.., to incite as much racial hatred as
he desires .... But in our view he cannot do this as an officer of the
court."' 3 Many students of constitutional law will immediately be re-
minded of Holmes' well known aphorism, from an opinion written as
a Justice on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, that a person
"may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no consti-
tutional right to be a policeman."' The so-called right/privilege dis-
tinction has been repudiated on several occasions by the Supreme
Court, only to reappear in a different guise a few years later. It is par-
ticularly prevalent in lawyer-discipline cases in which lawyers claim
First Amendment protection. The misuse of right/privilege reasoning
forms the subject of Part III, Section C. of this article.55
On Hale's appeal from the Inquiry Panel's decision, a separate
five-member panel of the character and fitness committee (which I
will refer to as the Hearing Panel) affirmed the denial of Hale's appli-
cation to the bar, on the narrow ground that Hale had not proven that
he is willing to abide by the state's disciplinary rules for lawyers.56
Specifically, the record, including Hale's extravagantly racist web site
and a letter he had written using a racial epithet, indicated that he
would be unable to put aside his white supremacist beliefs and abide
by Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(a)5, which provides that
"[a] lawyer shall not.., engage in adverse discriminatory treatment
of litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others, based on race, sex,
53. Hale Inq. Panel Opinion, supra note 28, at 882.
54. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517,517 (Mass. 1892).
55. See infra notes 311-349 and accompanying text.
56. See Hale Hrg. Panel Opinion, supra note 28.
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religion, or national origin. ' s  Significantly, however, the Hearing
Panel did not allege that any of Hale's actions were illegal, or that
they revealed a specific intent to commit an illegal act. Were it not
for the Illinois disciplinary rule prohibiting racial discrimination, the
Hearing Panel's argument would be foreclosed by the Supreme
Court's decision in Baird.
Is the evidence that Hale would be unable to comply with Rule
8.4(a)5 a constitutionally permissible basis to deny Hale admission to
the bar? The answer turns on whether the rule itself is constitution-
ally sound and the related question of whether this evidence is ration-
ally related to Hale's fitness to practice law. There is nothing uncon-
stitutional (as opposed to wrongheaded58) with a court body or state
bar committee making predictive judgments about an applicant's fit-
ness to practice law, provided that the committee does not rely on
evidence of beliefs as such, as opposed to conduct which reveals char-
acter incompatible with the role of lawyer. Applicants are frequently
denied permission to sit for the bar exam on the basis of evidence
showing alcohol dependency, serious financial difficulties, a criminal
record, academic dishonesty, or even impulse-control problems, on
the grounds that they are more likely to be involved in some kind of
breach of professional standards if admitted." Moreover, even if Illi-
57. Id. at 292. Several other states, including California, Florida, Michigan, Minne-
sota, and New Jersey, have made or proposed similar modifications to the ABA Model
Rules. See PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES 250-54
(John S. Dzienkowski, ed., 1999-2000 unabridged edition); Brenda Jones Quick, Ethical
Rules Prohibiting Discrimination by Lawyers: The Legal Profession's Response to Dis-
crimination on the Rise, 7 NOTRE DAME f. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 5, 6-7 (1993). The
Illinois rule at issue in the Hale case is not limited on its face to discrimination in one's ca-
pacity as a lawyer, unlike other rules which are more narrowly tailored. Compare MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 8.4, Comment [2] ("A lawyer who in the
course of representing a client, knowingly manifests by words or conduct, bias or prejudice
based upon race, sex ..... ") (emphasis added). Thus, several of Hale's actions, including
writing letters expressing racial hatred, may be violations of the Illinois rule, despite being
entirely unconnected with lawyering activities. The scope of this rule may make it vulner-
able to a constitutional challenge on the basis of overbreadth.
58. See generally Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94
YALE L.J. 491 (1985).
59. See, e.g., In re Gossage, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 130 (2000) (convicted murderer with a
subsequent pattern of traffic and parking convictions); Radtke v. Board of Bar Examiners,
601 N.W. 2d 500 (Wis. 1999); see also, In re Converse, 602 N.W.2d 500 (Neb. 1999) (pat-
tern of harassing school officials); In re Kapel, 651 N.E.2d 955 (Ohio 1995) (repeated traf-
fic violations and psychiatric treatment for impulse control problems); In re Mustafa, 631
A.2d 45 (D.C. App. 1993) (mishandling moot court funds); In re Simmons, 584 N.E.2d
1159 (Ohio 1992) (misappropriation of funds from student organization); In re Charles M.,
545 A.2d 7 (Md. 1988) (fraud, bad faith bankruptcy claim, and lying in a deposition as a
lay witness); In re Lubonovic, 282 S.E.2d 298 (Ga. 1981) (commingling funds, failing to
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nois lawyers are never disbarred for violating Rule 8.4(a)5, the char-
acter and fitness comnttee could still use Hale's prospective viola-
tion of the rule as a basis for excluding him from the bar. Numerous
decisions have affirmed orders denying applications for admission
where the applicant's conduct would not have warranted disbarment
if committed by a licensed lawyer.6°
These decisions strike me as seriously flawed as a matter of
regulatory policy for reasons admirably canvassed by Deborah Rhode
in her 1984 article, Moral Character as a Professional Credential.6'
They are not, however, incorrectly decided as a matter of constitu-
tional law. Although the state could not criminalize the status of be-
ing an alcoholic,' it may rely on evidence of this status to make a for-
ward-looking judgment about the likelihood that an applicant to the
bar will be unable to function as a lawyer, provided that there is a ra-
tional connection between the evidence presented and the applicant's
fitness to practice law.63 Similarly, the state could not attach criminal
sanctions to speech that represents "mere abstract teaching" of the
necessity of resorting to violence,' but the unconstitutionality of such
a statute does not, by itself, establish that evidence of advocating rac-
ist violence is off limits as a basis for exclusion from the bar. This rea-
soning depends, however, on the constitutionality of the anti-
discrimination rule, which is doubtful.
Making a number of crucial assumptions, the character and fit-
audit, and using company funds for extravagant purchases). Compare the Court's rea-
soning in one of the loyalty-oath cases that questions aimed at membership in subversive
organizations are intended to "deny positions [of public trust] to persons supposed to be
dangerous." Konigsberg, 366 U.S. at 54 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 527.
60. See, e.g., Unglaub v. Board of Law Examiners, 979 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. App. 1998)
(applicant with history of alcohol abuse, but four years sober in AA; also had fallen be-
hind on student loan payments); In re C.R.W., 481 S.E.2d 511 (Ga. 1997) (applicant de-
faulted on student loans and had filed two previous petitions for bankruptcy) Frasher v.
Board of Law Examiners, 408 S.E.2d 675 (W. Va. 1991) (applicant had three DUI convic-
tions and 24 speeding tickets); Martin-Trigona v. Underwood, 529 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1975)
(denial for psychiatric evaluation of 'moderately-severe character defect"); see also
Rhode, supra note 58, at 546-50 (reviewing empirical evidence of bar admission and attor-
ney-discipline cases).
61. See Rhode, supra note 58.
62 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (criminal punishment for narcot-
ics addiction violates Eighth Amendment guarantee against cruel and unusual punish-
ment).
63. This principle was established by the majority opinion by Justice Black in Schware
v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232 (1957), and emphasized by Justice
Frankfurter's concurrence, id. at 251.
64. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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ness committee is free to refuse to certify Hale for admission to the
Illinois bar.6 This conclusion is dependent upon establishing the fol-
lowing propositions: (a) the conduct engaged in by Hale which is pur-
portedly prohibited by Rule 8.4(a)5 occurred in a context that would
be germane to Hale's performance of his duties as a lawyer;66 (b) the
committee did not make illegitimate use of evidence of Hale's beliefs,
as opposed to actions which evidence his inability to refrain from ra-
cial discrimination; and (c) the factual record supports the inferences
drawn by the committee. Many of these assumptions may turn out to
be unsupportable. For instance, the evidence of Hale's advocacy of
white-supremacist causes may not support the inference that he will
be unable to put aside his racist views and comply with Rule 8.4(a)5.'
And several of the incidents of racism relied upon by the committee
occurred in private settings, which prove nothing about Hale's ability
to keep his beliefs in check and conform to professional rules that
65. The decision not to admit Hale may be justified on another ground - namely,
Hale's failure to disclose on his bar application several arrests, disciplinary actions, and
protective orders entered against him. See Bob Van Voris, Muddying the Waters: Illinois
Racist's Free Speech Case is Complicated by His Arrest Record, NAT'L LJ., Feb. 21, 2000,
at Al. Even though several of these incidents arose out of Hale's advocacy for white su-
premacy, which may be constitutionally protected as political speech, he was required to
disclose them to the Illinois bar-admissions authorities. Failure to disclose anything in a
bar application - even a minor traffic offense - is an extremely serious matter, and is
frequently asserted as a factor in refusing admission to an applicant on character and fit-
ness grounds. See, e.g., In re Gossage, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 130 (2000) (failure to disclose traf-
fic and parking tickets as alternate ground for denying admission); Florida Bd. of Bar Ex-
aminers v. N.R.W., 674 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1996); In re Golia-Paladin, 472 S.E.2d 878 (N.C.
1996); In re Majorek, 508 N.W.2d 275 (Neb. 1993); In re DeBartolo, 488 N.E.2d 947 (Ill.
1986). This ground for denial of admission isn't very interesting as a political statement
about the moral character of lawyers, but it would have accomplished what the Illinois
character and fitness committee intended, which was to keep Hale out of the bar. I am
grateful to Bill Hodes for forcefully pointing out this facet of the Hale case in several
postings on the LEGALETHICS listserve.
66. If the rule reached conduct not related to the representation of clients, it may be
unconstitutionally overbroad. See infra notes 373 - 431, and accompanying text.
67. Fictionalized or factual descriptions of criminal activity are protected by the First
Amendment, because there is generally some social value - political, educational, artistic,
or entertainment - advanced by the work. It is therefore difficult to infer criminal intent
from speech about criminal conduct, such as "gangsta" rap lyrics exalting the killing of po-
lice officers. See Malloy & Krotoszynski, supra note 26, at 1237-38. (Certainly no one be-
lieves that humorist Bill Bryson really intends to shoot government bureaucrats, although
he plainly stated as much in an essay about his wife's treatment at the hands of immigra-
tion officials. See Bill Bryson, Drowning in Red Tape, in I'M A STRANGER HERE MYSELF.
NOTES ON RETURNING TO AMERICA AFTER TWENTY YEARS AWAY 196 (1999).)
Analogously, the factual record, including Hale's website and well-publicized racist be-
liefs, may be insufficient to support the conclusion that Hale has the intent to violate gen-
erally applicable law or state bar disciplinary rules as a lawyer.
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prohibit discrimination by lawyers in their professional capacities.6
It bears emphasizing, too, that refusing admission to Hale would
be a bad decision for reasons relating not to the constitution, but to
the ethical duties of lawyers. "Abolitionists, civil rights activists, suf-
fragists, and labor organizers - indeed, the architects of our constitu-
tional framework - all were guilty of 'disrespect for law' in precisely
the same sense that bar examiners employ it., 69 Anti-death penalty
activists may be accused of exhibiting disrespect for the law in the
same way. (In fact, Justice Scalia has leveled just such a charge, de-
crying the "guerilla war" tactics of defense lawyers who seek to delay
their clients' executions by all legally available means.") Challenging
conventional wisdom about the state of the law is a noble aspect of
the lawyer's role.71 It does not matter that Hale takes issue with a le-
gal principle that most people consider fundamental. Racial segrega-
tion and the juridical inequality of women were deemed orthodox
moral principles at one time. Of course, the natural response is,
"we're right and they were wrong," but it is precisely the function of
lawyers occasionally to shake up our most cherished beliefs about
right and wrong.
There is no doubt that Hale's views will not prevail in the mar-
ketplace of ideas, and for that we should all be grateful, but it does
68. Courts are frequently willing to discipline lawyers for activities unrelated to the
practice of law, generally under state versions of Model Rule 8.4, which prohibits, inter
alia, committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's fitness to practice law
and engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. See, e.g.. In re Ketter,
992 P.2d 205 (Kan. 1999) (lawyer with pattern of exposing himself to women and mastur-
bating in public); In re McEnaney, 718 A.2d 920 (R.I. 1998) (possession of crack cocaine
and marijuana); In re Ring, 692 N.E.2d 35 (Mass. 1998) (lawyer transferred assets to avoid
wife's claim in divorce case); In re Shinnick, 552 N.W.2d 212 (Minn. 1996) (lawyer in-
volved in fraudulent corporate transactions in his personal capacity, not in the course of
representing clients); In re Haecker, 664 N.E.2d 1176 (Ind. 1996) (lawyer charged with vo-
yeurism for drilling holes in wall to view neighbor's bathroom and bedroom). Where the
conduct at issue would be protected expression if engaged in by a private citizen, however,
courts ought to be scrupulous in requiring the government to show a connection with the
lawyer's professional activities. See infra notes 384 - 431, and accompanying text, on the
overbreadth doctrine, and infra notes 279 - 288, and accompanying text, on narrow tailor-
ing.
69. Rhode, supra note 58, at 570.
70. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154,185 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
71. Numerous Supreme Court decisions emphasize the role of the First Amendment
in protecting dissenters and challengers to state-imposed orthodoxies. See, e.g., Edwards
v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (invalidating state law requiring creationism to be taught
in secondary schools); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (protesting motorists had a
right not to display "Live Free or Die" on New Hampshire license plates); W. Va. State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (Jehovah's Witness children could not be
compelled to recite Pledge of Allegiance in school).
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not follow that his advocacy of white supremacy ought to lead auto-
matically to his exclusion from the bar. Perhaps it is important, as
Lee Bollinger has argued, to discipline ourselves as a society to toler-
ate odious characters, in order to acquire virtues that are necessary in
a democratic polity.'  One might also argue, from a legal-process
standpoint, that lawyers are not supposed to represent truth and vir-
tue, but clients, who may be right or wrong about moral issues.73 Bar-
ring a white-supremacist lawyer on the basis of his odious beliefs risks
establishing a principle that a lawyer may be denied admission for es-
pousing a viewpoint at odds with the mores of the time. Certainly if
the basis for exclusion is Hale's advocacy of a principle that is at odds
with then-prevailing law, it is hard to see why this principle cannot be
extended to deny admission to lawyers who believe in the unconstitu-
tionality of the death penalty, the immorality of sodomy statutes, or
the wrongness of Roe v. Wade.74
Finally, adopting the classic civil-libertarian defense of freedom
of speech, one might argue that Hale's advocacy of white supremacy
may have the incidental benefit of strengthening the legal protection
of speech for all marginalized members of society.75 The ACLU, for
example, takes the consequentialist (and controversial) position that
the protection of odious speech is justified because it establishes legal
principles that can be relied upon by civil rights activists in future
cases.76 The application of these familiar arguments to the expressive
rights of lawyers is the subject of Part IV of this article.
72. See LEE BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY (1986); Lee Bollinger, The Tol-
erant Society: A Response to Critics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 979 (1990).
73. Cf. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 566-67 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(political process should respect moral choices made by citizens).
74. See HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN
AMERICA 563 (Jamie Kalven ed. 1988).
75. A black civil-rights lawyer in Texas gave this reason for his decision to represent
the Grand Dragon of the Texas Ku Klux Klan in a dispute over whether the Klan would
be allowed to participate in a state highway "adoption" program. See David B. Wilkins,
Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment: Should a Black Lawyer Represent the Ku Klux
Klan?, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1030 (1995). See also ARYEH NEIER, supra note 47.
76. See SAMUEL WALKER, HATE SPEECH: THE HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN
CONTROVERSY 166 (1994); cf Harry Kalven, Upon Rereading Mr. Justice Black on the
First Amendment, 14 UCLA L. REV. 428, 432 (1967) ("Freedom of speech is indivisible;
unless we protect it for all, we will have it for none.").
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B. "Drunk on the Bench, Ignorant, Dishonest, and a Bully": Criticism
of Participants in Litigation
1. Lawyers vs. Judges
A number of freedom-of-speech decisions arise from situations
in which lawyers attack judges, often for tactical reasons. Many law-
yers seem to have a proclivity for asserting that judges are involved in
a conspiracy with their adversary,7 or that judges who issue adverse
rulings are motivated by some pernicious bias against one side of the
dispute.' For instance, a lawyer defending his client, who was alleged
to be a "militant radical" black woman, stated in a newspaper inter-
view that he did not believe that the trial judge had "the judicial tem-
perament or the racial sensitivity to sit as an impartial judge" over the
criminal trial for the murder of a state trooper. 9 The lawyer also re-
ferred to the proceedings as a "travesty," a "kangaroo court," and a
"legalized lynching."' Sometimes these accusations of prejudice take
the form of a claim that the judge is on the take."' In other cases, the
alleged partiality has racial or religious roots.82 In one of the more
77. See, e.g., In re Ronwin, 680 P.2d 107 (Ariz. 1983); Cerf v. State, 458 So.2d 1071
(Fla. 1984); In re Terry, 394 N.E.2d 94 (Ind. 1979); Committee on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct
of Iowa State Bar Ass'n v. Horack, 292 N.W.2d 129 (Iowa 1980); In re Graham, 453
N.W.2d 313 (Minn. 1990); Bar Ass'n v. Carlin, 423 N.E.2d 477 (Ohio 1981): In re Waldo,
429 N.W.2d 77 (Wis. 1988).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Cooper, 872 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989); Maier v. Orr, 758
F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Alexander v. Sharpe, 245 A.2d 279 (Me. 1968); Idaho State Bar
v. Topp, 925 P.2d 1113 (Idaho 1996); In re Riley, 691 P.2d 695, 704 (Ariz. 1984) ("[t]he
state simply doesn't get a fair trial in his court"); Ramirez v. State Bar, 619 P.2d 399, 401
(Cal. 1980) (accusing judge of maintaining "invidious alliance" with opposing party).
79. In re Hinds, 449 A.2d 483,487 (N.J. 1982).
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 66 (1964) (district attorney referring
to "racketeer influences" on judges); In re Palmisano, 70 F.3d 483, 485-86 (7th Cir. 1995)
(lawyer characterizing virtually every judge before whom he appeared as a "crook"); In re
Grimes, 364 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1966); In re Shearin, 721 A.2d 157 (Del. 1998); In re
Becker, 620 N.E.2d 691 (Ind. 1993); In re Kavanagh, 597 N.Y.S.2d 24 (App. Div. 1993); In
re Westfall, 808 S.W.2d 829 (Mo. 1991); In re Belue, 766 P.2d 206 (Mont. 19S8); Carter v.
Muka, 502 A.2d 327 (R.I. 1985); In re Lacey, 283 N.W.2d 250,251 (S.D. 1979) ("[tlhe state
courts were.., sometimes downright crooked").
82 See, e.g., In re Green, 11 P.3d 1078, 1089 (Colo. 2000) (reversing discipline against
lawyer who had written several letters to trial judge, calling him a racist and demanding he
recuse himself from proceedings); Standing Comm. v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1434 (9th
Cir. 1995) (accusing district judge of anti-Semitism); In re Kelly, 808 F.2d 549, 550 (7th Cir.
1986) (attorney suggesting judge would be biased in favor of Marquette University be-
cause lawyer falsely believed that the judge had spoken against abortion); In re Evans, 801
F.2d 703, 704 (4th Cir. 1986) (accusing magistrate judge of either incompetence or "Jewish
bias in favor of the Kaplan firm"); In re Larvadian, 664 So.2d 395 (La. 1995) (calling judge
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unusual allegations of judicial bias, a lawyer accused the judge of be-
ing in love with one of the parties.' Frequently, eloquence escapes
lawyers, and the best they can do is call a judge an "asshole,"' "the
biggest fool I've ever seen,"' "a disgrace to the bench"; 6 "puppets
and professional stooges,"' and "either incapable of recalling signifi-
cant facts or an unmitigated liar."' The prize for insultive creativity
probably belongs to the lawyer in Louisiana Bar Association v.
Karst,' who had accused a judge of corruption. When asked at a
deposition whether he had any evidence for this charge, the lawyer
replied, "I can't say that I know for a fact that [opposing counsel] is
paying the drug bills of Judge Humphries wife .... 
Whether these protests are in good taste or not is not the issue.
The constitutional question is whether these lawyers' comments are
protected expression under the First Amendment. Consider two ap-
pellate decisions written by Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit
and Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit that were issued within six
months of each other.9' Lawyers had been disciplined for making in-
temperate comments about judges in both cases. Although each law-
yer invoked the First Amendment as a defense, the courts' results and
reasoning were diametrically opposed to one another. In Palmisano,
Judge Easterbrook concluded that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by disbarring an obnoxious lawyer who made repeated
verbal attacks against state court judges.' Judge Kozinski reached
precisely the opposite result in Yagman. He reasoned that the district
court erred in sanctioning the lawyer because the attorney's com-
ments did not pose a clear and present danger to the functioning of
a racist); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Porter, 766 P.2d 958 (Okla. 1988) (same).
83. See In re Golub, 597 N.Y.S.2d 370 (App. Div. 1983).
84. See Lebbos v. State Bar, 806 P.2d 317,321 (Cal. 1991).
85. In re Friedland, 376 N.E.2d 1126,1128 (Ind. 1978).
86. Kunstler v. Gilligan, 571 N.Y.S.2d 930 (App. Div.), affd mem., 587 N.E.2d 286,
579 N.Y.S.2d (N.Y. 1991).
87. State of Nebraska ex rel. Neb. State Bar Ass'n v. Michaelis, 316 N.W.2d 46, 50
(Neb. 1982).
88. Greene v. Va. State Bar Ass'n, 411 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Va. 1976); see also Bar
Ass'n v. Carlin, 423 N.E.2d 477, 478 n.3 (Ohio 1981) ("Let the record reflect that the
Judge is an unmitigated liar, unmitigated, unequivocal liar.") The lawyer in Carlin inex-
plicably failed to add "pants on fire."
89. 428 So.2d 406 (La. 1983).
90. Id. at 410.
91. See Palmisano, 70 F.3d at 483; Standing Comm. v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430 (9th Cir.
1995).
92. See Palmisano, 70 F.3d at 487-88.
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the courts.93
What caused two of the most capable judges on the federal
bench to reach such different conclusions? One's instinct is that the
cases must be factually distinguishable, but in fact, they are remarka-
bly similar. Yagman publicly accused a United States District Judge
of anti-Semitism, saying that Judge Keller "has a penchant for sanc-
tioning Jewish lawyers." 4 He also said that Judge Keller was "drunk
on the bench," "ignorant, dishonest, ill-tempered, and a bully."'95 This
barrage was not without design. Yagman admitted that he intended
the publicity to cause Judge Keller to recuse himself from future cases
involving Yagman, which Yagman believed would benefit his clients.
When he and another lawyer discussed the press coverage of his dis-
pute with Judge Keller, "[1]ook, there are certain judges I want to be
in front of for my Civil Rights cases who are favorable to my view.
And I'd like to recuse out the ones who are extremely unfavorable., 96
The lawyer who heard Yagman's comment reported him to the bar
association.
Palmisano's remarks were similar in context, although they omit-
ted the allegations of religious bias, "I believe [Justices Unverzagt,
Inglis, and Dunn] are dishonest"; 97 "Judge Frank Siracusa is a crooked
judge, who fills the pockets of his buddies";98 "I believe and state that
most of the cases in Illinois in my experience are fixed, not with the
passing of money, but on personal relations, social status, and judicial
preference."' Palmisano's broadside was apparently devoid of any
93. See Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1445. For additional discussion of the "clear and present
danger" standard, see the analysis of contempt of court sanctions, infra notes 219 - 263,
and accompanying text.
94. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1434.
95. Id. at 1434 & n.4. The full text of this diatribe is remarkable, and warrants quot-
ing at length:
It is an understatement to characterize the Judge as "the worst judge in the cen-
tral district." It would be fairer to say that he is ignorant, dishonest, ill-tempered,
and a bully, and probably is one of the worst judges in the United States. If tele-
vision cameras ever were permitted in his courtroom, the other federal judges in
the Country would be so embarrassed by this buffoon that they would run for
cover. One might believe that some of the reason for this sub-standard human is
the recent acrimonious divorce through which he recently went: but talking to at-
torneys who knew him years ago indicates that, if anything, he has mellowed.
Id.
96. Standing Comm. v. Yagman, 856 F. Supp. 1384, 1387 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (per curiam
opinion of three-judge panel).
97. Palmisano, 70 F.3d at 486.
98. Id. at 485.
99. Id. at 485-86.
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tactical significance, i.e., the lawyer was not seeking to recuse these
judges in a future lawsuit.
In fact, the results in these two cases diverge because of the theo-
retical frameworks adopted by the judges as the starting point for
their analysis of attorney speech. Judge Easterbrook, who had the
benefit of the publication of the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Yagman,
succinctly identified the point of his disagreement with the earlier
case:
Courts therefore may require attorneys to speak with greater
care and civility than is the norm in political campaigns....
[T]he Constitution does not give attorneys the same freedom as
participants in political debate. To the extent Standing Com-
mittee v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430 (9th Cir. 1995), may hold that at-
torneys are entitled to excoriate judges in the same way, and
with the same lack of investigation, as persons may attack po-
litical officeholders, it is inconsistent with Gentile [v. State Bar
of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991)] and our own precedents .... "
The reference to the norm of political campaigns is significant be-
cause political speech is presumptively entitled to the highest degree
of constitutional protection.'' Judge Easterbrook's comments show
that he considered Palmisano's comments to be outside of political
discourse. Judge Kozinski, by contrast, analyzed Yagman's diatribe
as if it had been part of a public political debate, bringing to bear the
full panoply of constitutional safeguards that apply to journalists re-
porting on public figures: "Attorneys who make statements impugn-
ing the integrity of a judge are, however, entitled to other First
Amendment protections applicable in the defamation context."'
' 2
The different outcomes in these cases can be traced to a disagreement
over the nature of the practices engaged in by the two lawyers, Yag-
100. Palmisano, 70 F.3d at 487 (added brackets and underlines as found in the original
text).
101. See, e.g., Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1034 (opinion of Kennedy, J.) ("There is no question
that speech critical of the exercise of the State's power lies at the very center of the First
Amendment"); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (speech on matters of public
concern occupies the "highest rung of the hierarchy [sic] of First Amendment values, and
is entitled to special protection"). Erwin Chemerinsky argues that speech by attorneys
regarding pending court cases must fall within this protected core of political speech, sub-
ject to the most stringent constitutional protection (he advocates the Sullivan malice stan-
dard). See Erwin Chemerinsky, Silence is Not Golden: Protecting Lawyer Speech Under
the First Amendment, 47 EMORY L.J. 859 (1998).
102. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1438. The sanctions decision was treated as a political-speech
case on appeal, with amicus briefs filed by the American Jewish Congress, the National
Lawyers Guild, and a number of civil libertarian law professors. See Caprice L. Roberts,
Note, Standing Committee on Discipline v. Yagman: Missing the Point of Ethical Restric-
tions on Attorney Criticism of the Judiciary, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 817, 825 n.42 (1997).
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man and Palmisano. Judge Kozinski treated Yagman like a soapbox
orator in Hyde Park, while Judge Easterbrook recognized that litiga-
tion is something different. Judge Easterbrook viewed litigation as an
institution that is not necessarily a free-fire zone for all speech.
Neither Judge Easterbrook in Palmisano nor Judge Kozinski in
Yagman paid sufficient attention to a landmark precedent on lawyer
speech, the Supreme Court's decision in In re Sawyer"~ (although
Judge Kozinski's opinion was of a similar tenor). The lawyer in Saw-
yer served as defense counsel in a Hawaiian trial of several union offi-
cers and members who were indicted for violating the Smith Act."
She made a speech at a meeting arranged by the union in a village far
from Honolulu while the trial was pending. The speech, which was
reported in Honolulu newspapers, strongly criticized the govern-
ment's manner of prosecuting Smith Act cases. The speech survived
in the form of reporter's notes who attended the meeting. The notes
were reprinted by Justice Brennan as an appendix to his opinion. I
excerpt the speech at length here, because the lawyer's exact words
are important to the constitutional analysis of the discipline against
her:
[S]ome rather shocking and horrible things... go on at the trial
.... [M]en in power are trying to put men in jail because of
their thoughts and books written before [they] were born. One
of the reasons Jack Hall is on trial is because it is said he once
got a book, the Communist Manifesto, written in 1898, before
Jack Hall was a gleam in his father's eye .... [The] government
has never [charged] conspiracy when it had a case. When it
hasn't got enough evidence it lumps a number together and says
they agreed to do something. The government does not say ad-
vocated overthrow but says they agreed to. Conspiracy means
to charge a lot of people for agreeing to do something you have
never done .... It's enough to say a person is a communist to
cook his goose .... So Jack Hall violated the Smith Act be-
cause he saw a duffle bag with some books on overthrowing the
government in it. It's silly. Why does the government use your
money and mine to put people in jail for thoughts?... There's
no such thing as a fair trial in a Smith Act case. All rules of evi-
dence have to be scrapped or the government can't make a
case .... There's no fair trial in the case. They just make up
103. 360 U.S. 622 (1959).
104. The Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 371, et seq., made unlawful the advocacy or teaching
of the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing the United States gov-
ernment by force. See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 318-19 (1957); Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 502 (1951). Smith Act prosecutions were generally aimed at
members and organizers of the Communist Party. See, e.g., Dennis, 341 U.S. at 497.
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the rules as they go along .... Unless we stop the Smith Act in
its tracks here there will be a new crime. People will be charged
with knowing what is included in books, ideas.'o5
The Hawaii Supreme Court suspended the lawyer for a year for giv-
ing this address, determining that the speech impugned the integrity
of the trial judge and tended to create disrespect for the courts and
judicial officers in general."°  Notably, the only language in the entire
oration that could be interpreted as an attack on the trial judge was
the lawyer's contention that there can be "no fair trial" in a Smith Act
case and that some unspecified "they" act arbitrarily by "mak[ing] up
the rules as they go along." The U.S. Supreme Court decided the
case on a narrow nonconstitutional issue - whether the record could
support the Hawaii court's finding that the lawyer's speech impugned
the trial judge's impartiality and fairness. Although a majority of the
justices agreed that it did not, the Court did not agree on how the
constitutionality of restrictions on attorney speech should be evalu-
ated. However, the plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions set
forth the constitutional arguments that continue even today to inform
free speech jurisprudence in this context.
Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality, declined to reach the
question whether the Court's contempt-of-court precedents, which
had been briefed extensively, were applicable.'# However, his opin-
ion did sketch out a constitutional approach to the regulation of
speech by attorneys. One of Justice Brennan's principles must form
the bedrock of any analysis of lawyer speech - "lawyers are free to
criticize the state of the law.""+ Consistent with this axiom, criticism
of the law cannot be equated with an attack on the integrity of the
judges who enforce legal rules and preside at trials."° Thus, a lawyer
who vehemently argues that the Smith Act is a perversion which sub-
verts freedom of thought may not be disciplined for impugning the in-
tegrity of judges who merely conduct trials under the Smith Act. "To
say that 'the law is an ass, an idiot' is not to impugn the character of
those who must administer it."" Furthermore, attribution of honest
105. Sawyer, 360 U.S. at 641-45 (some capitalization and punctuation altered for read-
ability).
106. See id at 626.
107. See id. at 626-27, citing Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Pennekamp v.
Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947). These cases are dis-
cussed in more detail in Section II. C, infra.
108. Sawyer, 360 U.S. at 631.
109. See id at 631-32.
110. Id at 634.
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error to judges does not impute disgrace - after all, appellate courts
and academic commentators accuse judges of error on a daily basis,
and "[d]issenting opinions.., are apt to make petitioner's speech
look like tame stuff indeed.... The lawyer only criticized the law and
the judge's application of it. Therefore, Justice Brennan argued that
the Hawaii Supreme Court erred by disciplining her for her state-
ments, although his opinion left open the possibility that discipline
would have been appropriate if the lawyer actually had made an "im-
proper" attack on the trial judge's administration of justice."
Significantly, Justice Brennan's approach was followed by one of
the few recent Supreme Court cases involving lawyers' speech that
was critical of the courts, In re Snyder.13  In that case the Court
unanimously reversed an order suspending a lawyer from practice af-
ter he had written a letter criticizing the scanty payments approved in
the Eighth Circuit for lawyers defending indigent clients. Although
the Chief Judge of the Eighth Circuit found the letter "totally disre-
spectful to the federal courts," the Supreme Court said that lawyers
may appropriately express criticism of the courts, and should not be
found in contempt for doing so in a forceful manner."' Thus, Justice
Brennan's comment that a lawyer can say, "the law is an ass, an id-
iot," without being taken to have committed contempt of court, is still
a valid principle of First Amendment law for lawyers.
Returning to Sawyer, Justice Stewart concurred rather reluc-
tantly in the Court's judgment, on the ground that the lawyer was not
charged with attempting to prejudice the administration of justice by
111. Id. at 635. The passage of time has shown how apt Justice Brennan's observation
was. Justice Scalia has become well known for the sometimes vitriolic rhetoric of his dis-
sents. For example, he said that certain parts of one of Justice O'Connor's opinions "can-
not be taken seriously" or are "irrational." See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 607 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Romer v. Evans, 517, U.S. 620, 638 (1996) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting), in which he expressed his disgust with Justice Kennedy's reasoning by harrum-
phing, "[O]ur constitutional jurisprudence has achieved terminal silliness." Justice Scalia
also broke with the traditional practice of "respectfully" dissenting, in favor of the terse "I
[disrespectfully] dissent." Judge Kozinski who, in the Yagman case, was very protective of
lawyers' colorful language, has unleashed some zingers of his own. See, e.g., United States
v. Ramirez, 91 F.3d 1297, 1306 (9th Cir. 1996) (criticizing majority's "high-fallutin' rheto-
ric" and calling decision "smug" and "bad law on its own terms"); Gamboa v. Rubin, 80
F.3d 1338, 1353 (9th Cir. 1996) ("[B]ecause the majority's rationale for striking down the
regulation is so plainly wrong and dangerous, I proceed to address the most obvious flaws
in its analysis"). Cf. Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., The Importance of Dissent and the
Imperative of Judicial Civility, 28 VAL. L. REv. 583 (1994).
112. See Sawyer, 360 U.S. at 636.
113. 472 U.S. 638 (1985).
114. Id. at 646-47.
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interfering with a fair trial."' However, he made very clear that he
did not join in any part of Justice Brennan's opinion which suggests,
"a lawyer can invoke the constitutional right of free speech to immu-
nize himself from even-handed discipline for proven unethical con-
duct.... ,,"
Justice Stewart argued that professional norms may require a
lawyer to abstain from what would otherwise be constitutionally pro-
tected speech, citing as an analogy the proposition that a physician
could not claim First Amendment protection for broadcasting confi-
dential patient information.' 7 The implicit constitutional argument is
that the professional is not being compelled by "even-handed disci-
pline" to surrender an expressive right, because the ethical rules of
the profession prohibit the expression. As this formulation of the ar-
gument shows, the analogy offered by Justice Stewart holds only if it
is clear that the lawyer's comments were, in fact, unethical. Estab-
lishing this premise is the hardest step in Justice Stewart's argument,
for it requires grappling with the nature of the lawyer's role. Is it
never proper for a lawyer to excoriate a judge's decision?
Silencing lawyers' criticism of the law and those who administer
it interferes with the long-established "rebellious" dimension of the
lawyer's social function. Lawyers are supposed to give voice to dis-
senters, outsiders, and unpopular clients and challenge the exercise of
state power. The more difficult analogy for Justice Stewart to con-
sider would not be a physician who discloses confidential information,
but one who publicly criticizes the capitation rules imposed by an
HMO. In the latter case, the doctor would claim to be vindicating an
underlying principle of professional ethics, namely, the duty to advo-
cate for the patient's health."8
Similarly, the lawyer in Sawyer is appealing to a traditional func-
tion of the legal profession in society to justify her conduct. As I
hope to show in this article, particularly in Parts IV and V, the First
Amendment and the lawyer's traditional role of defending dissidents,
outcasts, and political minorities combine to create a sphere of pro-
tected speech, except in narrowly circumscribed areas, such as speech
that is directly connected with a pending judicial proceeding. Thus,
115. See Sawyer, 360 U.S. at 646-47 (Stewart, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 646.
117. See id. at 647.
118. For an interesting exploration of this dimension of the doctor's role, see William
M. Sage, Physicians as Advocates, 35 Hous. L. REV. 1529 (1999).
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Justice Stewart's dictum should not be taken as a justification for re-
stricting the speech of lawyers to a greater extent than would be per-
missible for ordinary citizens.
Justice Frankfurter, joined by three others, dissented in Sawyer."9
First, he challenged Justice Brennan's conclusion that the speech was
mere abstract criticism of the law, characterizing it instead as "a
plainly conveyed attack on the conduct of a particular trial, presided
over by a particular judge, involving particular defendants in whose
defense Mrs. Sawyer herself was professionally engaged."' Second,
and more importantly, Justice Frankfurter proposed an entirely dif-
ferent constitutional analysis of lawyers' speech. Justice Frankfurter
would have found it unprotected for reasons that are difficult to pin
down, while Justice Brennan strongly intimated that the speech would
be protected even if it were critical of the trial judge.
Initially, it appears that he supports reasonable content-neutral
regulations on lawyers' language: "Time, place and circumstances de-
termine the constitutional protection of the utterance.' '12' Later on,
he seems to suggest a version of the right/privilege distinction:i" "An
attorney actively engaged in the conduct of a trial is not merely an-
other citizen. He is an intimate and trusted and essential part of the
machinery of justice, an 'officer of the court' in the most compelling
sense."' ' However, the qualification "actively engaged in the conduct
of a trial," shows that Justice Frankfurter's view is subtler than the
ordinary right/privilege doctrine.
The traditional right/privilege doctrine states that one may have
a constitutional right to speak, but no right to a government license or
benefit. Instead, Justice Frankfurter cautions that:
[T]he particular conduct in which this petitioner engaged...
cannot be disposed of by general observations about free-
dom of speech .... What we are concerned with is the spe-
cific conduct, as revealed by this record, of a particular law-
yer, and not whether like findings applied to an abstract
situation relating to an abstract lawyer would support a sus-
pension."'24
In other words, Justice Frankfurter suggests that the forum in
119. 360 U.S. at 647 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
120. Id at 652.
121. Id. at 666.
122. See supra notes 311 - 349 and accompanying text.
123. See Sawyer, 360 U.S. at 668.
124. Id. at 666-68 (emphasis added).
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which the lawyer spoke was closely enough related to the business
of resolving disputes that it should not be deemed an open forum
for expressive activities; the government ought to be permitted to
enforce reasonable restrictions on speech in venues that it estab-
lishes for a particular purpose, such as trials and court filings."
The problem with Justice Frankfurter's argument, though, is
the nature of the forum. The lawyer did not make her allegations
in a filed brief or a closing argument. Instead, she attended a
public meeting where the conduct of the government in Smith
Act trials was discussed. It is simply not true that the lawyer's
speech occurred in a non-public forum - it was in the quintesse-
ntial public forum, far removed from the actual work of courts,
and should have been entitled to heightened constitutional pro-
tection.
2. Judicial Independence
A firestorm of criticism erupted in 1996 when United States Dis-
trict Judge Harold Baer, Jr., granted a motion to suppress a large
quantity of drugs that were seized in an investigative stop.126 Judge
Baer initially reasoned that the suspects' flight from police was natu-
ral, considering the history of police abuse directed at people of
color. 7 This ruling provoked outrage. Speaker of the House Newt
Gingrich, in a burst of hyperbole remarkable even for him, charac-
terized Judge Baer's decision as "the perfect reason why we are losing
our civilization."' ' Senator Bob Dole, in the midst of a presidential
campaign, called for Judge Baer's impeachment.29 President Clinton,
who had appointed Judge Baer, sensed a political disaster in the off-
ing and pressured Baer to reconsider his decision," which he did
125. This interpretation is the only way to harmonize Justice Frankfurter's opinion in
Sawyer with his statement in Bridges that "Uj]udges as persons, or courts as institutions, are
entitled to no greater immunity from criticism than other persons or institutions....
[J]udges must be kept mindful of their limitations and of their ultimate public responsibil-
ity by a vigorous stream of criticism expressed with candor however blunt." Bridges v.
California, 314 U.S. 252, 289 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Presumably Frankfurter
would apply this principle to everyone but lawyers who, ironically, are in a better position
than other actors to uncover reasons for criticizing judges.
126. See United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232, vacated on recons., 921 F. Supp.
211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
127. See Bayless, 913 F. Supp. at 239-40.
12& Louis H. Pollack, Criticizing Judges, 70 JUDICATURE 299,300 (May-June 1996).
129. See id.
130. See Alison Mitchell, Clinton Pressing Judge to Relent, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1996,
at Al.
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eventually. Perhaps the public outcry was nothing more than predict-
able election-year bluster and a calculated appeal to the "law and or-
der" vote, but many perceived the attacks on Judge Baer as a threat
to judicial independence. The Baer imbroglio was strongly reminis-
cent of attacks on other judges, which was based on ideological op-
position to his decision, such as the movement to impeach Earl War-
ren,131 the removal of Rose Bird from the California Supreme Court,
and Roosevelt's court-packing plan during the battle over the New
Deal.3' As such, it became the occasion for another outpouring of
scholarly commentary on judicial independence.33
The value of judicial independence is not easy to define; as Ste-
phen Burbank reminds us, independence is the flip side of judicial ac-
countability, another value of obvious significance in a democracy."M
At a minimum, though, independence means that no judge should be
removed from office or otherwise punished, through formal or infor-
mal means, for the content of her decision.3 "Punishment" can mean
direct political sanctioning mechanisms such as impeachment, or indi-
131. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPERCHIEF: EARL WARREN AND His SUPREME
COURT- A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY, 280-81 (1983).
132. See William E. Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt's Court-
Packing Plan, 1966 SuP. Cr. REv. 347.
133. For some of the most significant contributions to this sizeable body of literature,
see Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeal, 107 YALE L.J. 2155 (1998); Jon
0. Newman, The Judge Baer Controversy, 80 JUDICATURE 156 (Jan.-Feb. 1997); Stephen
B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice Be Done Amidst Efforts to Intimi-
date and Remove Judges from Office for Unpopular Decisions?, 72 NYU L. REV. 308
(1997); Monroe H. Freedman, The Threat of Judicial Independence by Criticism of Judges
- A Proposed Solution to a Real Problem, 25 HOFsTRA L. REv. 729 (1997): Stephen G.
Breyer, Judicial Independence in the United States, 40 ST. LOUIS L.J. 989 (1996); Stephen
P. Croly, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law. 62 U. CHI.
L. REv. 689 (1995); Irving R. Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 YALE L.J. 681
(1979); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest
Group Perspective, 18 J. L. & ECoN. 875 (1975).
134. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L.
REV. 315 (1999). For this reason, courts should give heightened protection to critical
speech that reaches an audience beyond the parties to a case, the lawyers, and the judge.
Although the result in In re Green, 11 P.3d 1078 (Colo. 2000), is correct, it is worth noting
that the court's reasoning gets this important point backwards. The lawyer in that case, in
a series of letters written directly to the judge, called the judge a racist. The court said that
the private nature of the speech presented a less serious threat to the administration of
justice than public comments in analogous attorney-discipline cases. See id. at 1086-87.
Ironically, however, the private nature of the comments makes them less significant from a
First Amendment point of view. To the extent that the constitutional free-speech guaran-
tee is intended to enable robust criticism of public officials, private speech should be enti-
tled to somewhat less protection.
135. See Burbank, supra note 134.
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rect means of control such as court-packing, contracting the jurisdic-
tion of the court (particularly federal courts, and recently with respect
to habeas corpus jurisdiction'36), and executive defiance of court or-
ders, such as the "massive resistance" to court-ordered school deseg-
regation in the South in the 1950s and 60s. 37 But what about vehe-
ment criticism by politicians and commentators? Is it a threat to
judicial independence?
Judicial independence is necessary to safeguard the rule of law so
that certain rights possessed by individuals are not subject to
abridgement by democratic majorities. For this reason, courts and
individual judges must enjoy some freedom from the kind of ordinary
democratic-process constraints that affect legislators and executive-
branch officials. At the same time, however, the location of the judi-
ciary within a democratic political order counsels against processes of
mystification, by which the workings of the court system are obscured
from public view and criticism. Courts must be perceived to follow
the law - otherwise, lacking an army and the power of taxation, they
are ineffectual, the "least dangerous branch" in Alexander Hamil-
ton's famous phrase.13 Ironically, though, the perception that judges
are bound by the law is not necessarily furthered by suppressing
speech critical of judges. It is too easy for judges and commentators
to conclude from the importance of the rule of law that restrictions on
the speech of critics is necessary to secure respect for courts.3 '
Courts, too, tend to be maddeningly conclusory in their arguments
when it comes to lawyers' criticism of judges; frequently they simply
state that the speech at issue would tend to diminish public confi-
dence in the judiciary if left unchecked.40
In this regard, it is instructive to compare the reasoning of courts
in attorney-criticism cases with that in analogous First Amendment
cases, such as those involving university hate speech codes. In the lat-
136. See, e.g., Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1217, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1996); James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan,
"Some Effectual Power": The Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article
III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696 (1998).
137. See Burbank, supra note 134, at 324.
138. See Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 78, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 465
(Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961).
139. See, e.g., Judith S. Kaye, Safeguarding a Crown Jewel: Judicial Independence and
Lawyer Criticism of Courts, 25 HOFSTRA L. REv. 703 (1997).
140. See, e.g., Iowa State Bar Ass'n v. Horak, 292 N.W.2d 129, 130 (Iowa 1980); Ken-
tucky Bar Ass'n v. Heleringer, 602 S.W.2d 165, 168 (Ky. 1980); In re Lacey, 283 N.W.2d
250,251-52 (S.D. 1979); In re Raggio, 487 P.2d 499,500 (Nev. 1971).
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ter decisions, courts were extremely skeptical of the universities' prof-
fered justifications for regulating speech, such as the interest in main-
taining an environment of acceptance and inclusion, in which women,
students of color, and students belonging to sexual minority groups
could participate without intimidation. 4' The courts acknowledged
that inclusiveness and diversity were valid educational goals, but con-
cluded that the free speech interests asserted by the challengers were
constitutionally more significant. Analogies can be multiplied - the
goals of campaign-finance reform,42 protecting children from Internet
pornography,43 and even maintaining military security.. have been
forced to yield to the interests of speakers and audiences. In none of
these cases was the Court willing to accept that the government's as-
serted justification passed strict-scrutiny review. (Although not per-
taining to a First Amendment case, one might observe that the Court
also explicitly rejected the exhaustively compiled Congressional rec-
ord showing the effect on interstate commerce of violence against
women.'45) Yet when speech amounts to judicial lMse majestg, courts
abandon their customary skepticism toward the government's prof-
fered justification.
It is certainly true that the public is woefully uninformed about
the process of judging, and is frequently swayed by single-issue cam-
paigns against particular judges.'46 But at the risk of repeating a First
Amendment clich6, the remedy for this ignorance is more speech, not
suppression of wrongheaded criticism of judges.47 It would be won-
141. See UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis., 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D.
Wis. 1991); Dambrot v. Central Mich. Univ., 839 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. Mich. 1993); Doe v.
University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
142. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
143. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
144. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
145. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
146. See Burbank, supra note 134, at 317.
147. "Judges as persons, or courts as institutions, are entitled to no greater immunity
from criticism than other persons or institutions .... [J]udges must be kept mindful of
their limitations and of their ultimate public responsibility by a vigorous stream of criti-
cism expressed with candor however blunt." Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 289
(1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Judges complain, however, that they are forced to en-
dure this criticism in silence. Judicial speech is fairly tightly circumscribed by state codes
of judicial conduct, many based on the ABA's Model Code of Judicial Conduct. Provi-
sions of the ABA Code prohibit judges from making statements that undermine public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, see § 2(A), acting in an impa-
tient or discourteous manner toward lawyers and litigants, see § 3(B)(4), manifesting bias
or prejudice, through words or conduct, see § 3(B)(5), or commenting publicly on a pend-
ing proceeding, see § 3(B)(9). The public-comment proscription has therefore recently
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derful if all criticism of courts was "responsible," in the sense of being
backed up by a careful study of the relevant decision and the legal
background." A robust requirement of responsible criticism, how-
ever, would conflict with First Amendment doctrine in other contexts,
such as the highly speech-protective Sullivan malice standard, which
requires a public-figure defamation plaintiff to show either knowl-
edge of falsity or reckless disregard for possible falsity of the state-
ments at issue.'49 Granted, criticism of judges' decisions is not the
same as defamation, so Sullivan does not technically apply, but the
underlying principle is the same - judges, as political officials, must
be prepared to tolerate a great deal of sharply worded criticism.
Courts should not be permitted to hold up maintaining public confi-
dence in the judiciary as a sufficient reason for restricting critical
commentary, even caustic or unfair attacks, without first establishing
two premises: first, that this criticism does, in fact, decrease public
confidence in the judiciary, and second, that the government's inter-
est in maintaining public confidence is not outweighed by the First
Amendment values that inform similar cases, such as public-figure
defamation actions. Both of these premises, I think, are highly doubt-ful.1
come in for criticism for ignoring the value of counterspeech in the marketplace of ideas.
See Stephen J. Fortunato, Jr., On a Judge's Duty to Speak Extrajudicially: Rethinking the
Strategy of Silence, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 679 (1999). See also Joseph W. Bellacosa,
Judging Cases Versus Courting Public Opinion, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 2381 (1997); Erwin
Chemerinsky, Is it the Siren's Call? Judges and Free Speech While Cases are Pending, 28
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 831 (1995); Abbie G. Baynes, Judicial Speech: A First Amendment
Analysis, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 81 (1992). Consideration of the other speech-limiting
provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct must await analysis of constitutional doctrine
in Section III. As discussed further in that section, I have serious doubts as to the consti-
tutionality of many of these restrictions, if challenged for vagueness, overbreadth, or as
impermissible content-based regulations of speech.
148. See Kaye, supra note 139, at 724.
149. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). "Actual malice," as
used in the law of defamation, is a "term of art denoting deliberate or reckless falsifica-
tion." Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496,499 (1991).
150. Cf. Chemerinsky, supra note 101, at 881-87 (noting that on the analogous issue of
pretrial publicity, empirical studies have shown no effect on jury deliberation from the ex-
trajudicial statements of lawyers, and arguing that the Sullivan malice standard ought to be
employed to protect First Amendment interests of lawyers); William E. Hornsby, Jr. &
Kurt Schimmel, Regulating Lawyer Advertising: Public Images and the Irresistible Aristo-
telian Impulse, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 325 (1996) (reviewing empirical studies of the
public perception of lawyers, and finding little impact from advertising); Rita J. Simon,
Does the Court's Decision in Nebraska Press Association Fit the Research Evidence on the
Impact on Jurors of New Coverage?, 29 STAN. L. REV. 515 (1977).
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3. Judges vs. Lawyers
Numerous judges have been disciplined for using racial or sexual
slurs to describe lawyers or litigants."1 A state trial court judge com-
mented to a prosecutor that no one would care about the case, be-
cause the victim was "just some old n- bitch." '152 Another judge
was finally disciplined after establishing a long history of using a lim-
itless variety of racial epithets to describe attorneys in his court-
room.153 The judge in one divorce case demonstrated his bias against
women by commenting on the physical appearance of the woman in a
divorce case, calling her a "girl," and concluding that the woman must
have proposed marriage to the man because why "buy the cow when
you get the milk free?"154 After the conclusion of trial in a domestic-
abuse case, the judge told the victim that once he had "laid [his own
wife] on the floor and did not have any more problems from her."' 55
A state court judge in Illinois reportedly told a woman lawyer: "I
don't think ladies should be lawyers. I believe you belong at home
raising a family."'56 Yet another judge told a sophomoric sexual joke
to two women attorneys.57
Courts tend to deal harshly with judges who consistently subject
attorneys to harassment and abuse. Judges can be removed from of-
fice or suspended for lengthy periods of time for failing to keep their
tempers in check. '58 In these cases, First Amendment arguments do
not cut much ice. One judge's constitutional arguments were brushed
aside after he was disciplined for writing an opinion in the form of
151. In addition to cases specifically mentioned in the text, see, e.g., In re Barr, 13
S.W.3d 525 (Tex. Rev. Trib. 1998); In re Goodfarb, 880 P.2d 620, 621 (Ariz. 1994); In re
Esworthy, 568 N.E.2d 1195 (N.Y. 1991); Gonzalez v. Commission on Judicial Perform-
ance, 657 P.2d 372,381-82 (Cal. 1983); In re Pearson, 386 S.E.2d 249 (S.C. 1989). For rep-
resentative scholarly overviews, see Marina Angel, Sexual Harassment by Judges, 45 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 817 (1991); Leonard E. Gross, Judicial Speech: Discipline and the First
Amendment, 36 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1181 (1985).
152. See Gail Diane Cox, How Could They Do It?, NAT'L L.J., May 1, 2000. at Al.
153. See In re Stevens, 645 P.2d 99 (Cal. 1982).
154. In re Marriage of Iverson, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 70, 72 (1992).
155. In re Greene, 403 S.E.2d 257,258 (N.C. 1991).
156. Quoted in J. Cunyon Gordon, A Response from the Visitor from Another Planet,
91 MICH. L. REV. 1953, 1956 (1993).
157. See Ryan v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 754 P.2d 724 (Cal. 1988). See
also Barr, 13 S.W.3d at 537 (another crude sexual joke).
158. See, e.g., In re Del Rio, 256 N.W.2d 727 (Mich. 1977) (judge suspended for five
years for subjecting attorneys to harassment and abuse); In re Jordan, 622 P.2d 297 (Or.
1981) (judge removed from office for calling defendant "chicken shit" and other violations
of Code of Judicial Conduct); In re Ross, 428 A.2d 858 (Me. 1981) (judge suspended for 90
days for using abusive and vulgar language).
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humorous verse.'59 The court, apparently forgetting the lesson of
Marbury v. Madison, said that the judge's free speech rights were
limited by the Code of Judicial Conduct. Although it is true that dis-
ciplinary rules may impose justifiable restraints on the freedom of
speech, it is by no means an automatic inference that any communica-
tion prohibited by the Code of Judicial Conduct passes constitutional
muster. As Justice Kennedy emphasized, "disciplinary rules govern-
ing the legal profession cannot punish activity protected by the First
Amendment.... [W]e will [not] defer to professional bodies when
those restrictions impinge upon First Amendment freedoms."'' 1 Un-
fortunately, even where there may be a valid constitutional argument
supporting the imposition of sanctions, judicial reasoning in discipli-
nary cases involving expression frequently tends to be highly conclu-
sory, with courts asserting that the restraints on expression placed on
lawyers and judges by bar association rules is dispositive of the First
Amendment issues.
The difficulty of the constitutional analysis, which is so often
elided by courts, is apparent in cases where a judge's speech may be
probative of racial or gender bias, but does not disrupt a pending pro-
ceeding. Consider the case of the chief judge of an intermediate ap-
pellate court in Florida, who was interviewed by a local newspaper."'
The interview reveals deep-seated racial prejudices and stereotypes,
revealing the judge as almost a caricature of the ignorant, right-wing
bigot:
I would not date a black girl. I would not take one home, my
mother would kill me .... I would not want my children to
marry a black or an Asian or a Chinese or a Puerto Rican. I
would not want them to. And they know that.... I think that
there is a difference between a lot of them that they can't over-
come. And it's not all of it their fault. It's the fault of their
mothers and their daddies and their ancestors. And our fault.
We have been too good to them. We, the United States Con-
gress. Because they make more money by staying home on wel-
fare than they do working.... [W]hy is it that 20 percent of the
population is black and 45 percent of the prisoners are black.
That's because, goddamnit, they're the ones committing the
162crimes. l s
159. See In re Rome, 542 P.2d 676 (Kan. 1975). Contrast the result in Fisher v. Lowe,
333 N.W.2d 67 (Mich. App. 1983) (opinion in verse).
160. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1054.
161. See In re Removal of a Chief Judge, 592 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1992). The interview is
reproduced as an appendix to the Florida Supreme Court's opinion.
162. Id. at 673.
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The Florida Supreme Court stripped the judge of his administrative
post as chief, but permitted him to remain on the bench, with a public
reprimand being the only other sanction imposed on him.""
The judge's comments were not in violation of the relevant pro-
vision of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which reaches expression or
conduct only insofar as it is connected with the tasks of judging:
A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by
words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice, including but not
limited to bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, na-
tional origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, or socioeco-
nomic status .... '64
But in essence the judge's words differ little from Matthew Hale's.
Hale is more overtly hateful, and does not distance himself from
Klansmen and Nazis, as this judge surely would if pressed, but the
substance of the messages is the same. To complicate matters further,
the Supreme Court has said that hate crime statutes must be treated
as content-based restrictions on speech;65 thus, if the rule of judicial
conduct quoted were drafted in such a way to reach the judge's out-
of-court comments, it arguably must be analyzed under the same ru-
bric as the statute in R.A.V. Applying ordinary First Amendment
principles, judicial speech in non-public forums (such as courtrooms)
may be subject to reasonable regulations, provided that adequate al-
terative channels of communication remain open. 6 However, any
restriction or state penalty that reaches the judge's interview with the
newspaper would amount to a regulation of speech in a classic public
forum. In a public forum, government penalties may not be imposed
on the basis of the content of the message communicated, unless
there is a compelling state interest supporting the regulation.67 There
is obviously a significant government interest in guaranteeing an im-
partial judiciary, but is it sufficient to warrant enforcing an anti-bias
rule against judges in their private capacities?
With respect to judges, the answer to this question is almost cer-
tainly yes, because the state, as an employer, has substantial power to
restrict its employees' speech where it would be disruptive of a core
government function.'6 s A government agency may fire an employee
163. See In re Santora, 602 So. 2d 1269 (Fla. 1992).
164. ABA, MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr § 3(B)(5) (1990).
165. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. 377.
166. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 8:8
(1996).
167. See id. § 8:5.
168. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Pickering v. Board of Educ. of Town-
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for a variety of reasons - being rude to customers, criticizing super-
visors, or using vulgar language.69 Although these grounds for disci-
plining employees pertain to speech in the workplace, the Court has
suggested that government employees may claim the protection of the
First Amendment only where their speech pertains to a matter of
public concern and where the state's ability to perform its services is
not compromised.7 ° In the case of the racist judge, the speech did
touch on matters of public concern - welfare policy, crime, and so on
- but it also interfered with the state's interest in assuring the public
of a fair, unbiased judiciary.
I am somewhat hesitant to endorse this position as a rule of con-
stitutional law because of the real potential for ideological bias, or
viewpoint discrimination. While it is hard to mourn the removal of a
virulently racist judge from the bench, consider as a counterexample
In re Boninf in which a trial court judge in Massachusetts was disci-
plined for merely attending a speech by Gore Vidal. The event was
held to benefit a fund for criminal defendants who had been accused
of engaging in homosexual activity in the Boston area. Vidal's speech
denounced the "witch hunt" by prosecutors and police against gays,
and questioned whether the defendants would receive a fair trial.
(Justice Bonin, the subject of the disciplinary action, was not sched-
uled to preside over the trials, nor to exercise any administrative re-
sponsibility over them."7 ) Vidal and Justice Bonin met, shook hands,
and were photographed together, and the photo was printed the next
day in a local newspaper with the caption, "Bonin at benefit for sex
defendants." The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed
the public censure against the judge, reasoning that his impartiality
could be questioned as a result of his attendance at the Vidal lecture.
It brushed aside the First Amendment arguments raised in an amicus
brief by the ACLU, stating implausibly that there were no "serious"
constitutional questions raised by the requirement that judges exer-
cise "mild self-restraint" on their associational and expressive liber-
ties."
ship High School District 205,391 U.S. 563 (1968).
169. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994); Pereira v. Comm'r of Soc. Servs., 733
N.E.2d 112 (Mass. 2000) (upholding dismissal of social worker for making racist joke at
testimonial dinner).
170. See Waters, 511 U.S. at 668.
171. 378 N.E.2d 669 (Mass. 1978).
172. See id. at 679.
173. Id at 684 n.8.
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Because judges are public employees, their speech is afforded a
lower degree of constitutional protection as compared with the
speech of private citizens. Although cases like Bonin seem wrongly
decided, it may be impossible to preserve a full measure of First
Amendment freedoms for judges without compromising the ideal of
judicial impartiality. Disciplining Justice Bonin may simply be the
price we pay for keeping racists like the Florida judge discussed
above off the bench. It is important not to conflate this principle into
a diminution of the speech rights of private lawyers, however. The
state interest in maintaining respect for the judiciary means that it
may take action against judges who manifest racial bias, either in their
in-court or extrajudicial comments. But this interest does not justify
punishing non-government lawyers (or prohibiting individuals from
becoming lawyers) for revealing themselves to be racists. It is also
important to remember that the fact of comprehensive state regula-
tion of judicial speech is not, in itself, dispositive of the permissibility
of discipline for judges who show bias. Courts wrongly short-circuit
the First Amendment analysis where expression by lawyers and
judges is at issue, reasoning that the extensive regulatory authority as-
serted by state bar associations is ipso facto justified. It is essential for
courts to pay attention to the constitutional analysis, however, be-
cause there are significant differences between the speech rights of
state-employee judges and private lawyers, even though both judges
and lawyers are subject to court and bar association regulations.
4. Lawyers vs. Lawyers
Although the criminal trial of O.J. Simpson may have drawn in-
creased popular attention to the problem of ad hominem (and ad
feminam) verbal assaults,174 and possibly represented the recent nadir
of lawyers' public dignity, name-calling in litigation certainly predates
the Simpson case. Disciplinary cases reveal a remarkable number
and variety of attorneys with what might sympathetically be termed
anger-management problems.17 Some lawyers' harangues are suffi-
174. For a rather depressing overview of the sniping by the Simpson lawyers, see Kevin
Cole & Fred C. Zacharias, The Agony of Victory and the Ethics of Lawyer Speech, 69 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1627, 1676 n.179 (1996).
175. See, e.g., United States v. Cutler, 58 F.3d 825, 831 (2d Cir. 1995) (accusing prose-
cutors of "dealing in vendettas" and going on a "witch hunt," and calling government law-
yers a "sick and demented lot"); Polk v. State Bar of Texas, 374 F. Supp. 784, 786 (N.D.
Tex. 1974) (publicly stating that his DWI trial was "one more awkward attempt by a dis-
honest and unethical district attorney.., to assure me an unfair trial"); Attorney Griev-
ance Comm'n v. Alison, 565 A.2d 660, 662 (Md. 1989) (calling opposing counsel an "ass-
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ciently over the top to merit block quotations in judicial opinions,
such as a lawyer's tirade in a deposition where he repeatedly called
opposing counsel a "son-of-a-bitch" and threatened to punch him in
the nose. 76 This sort of petty obnoxiousness has become one of the
principal concerns of one branch of the "professionalism" movement.
Most legal ethics casebooks now contain colorful stories about verbal
abuse in depositions, and both scholarly and practitioner-oriented
journals are filled with articles decrying incivility among lawyers."
Courts have also become increasingly impatient with gratuitous nasti-
ness by lawyers, and can be fairly creative in fashioning remedies for
incivility, such as one federal court which reduced a statutory fee
award by more than $350,000 to penalize persistent obnoxiousness by
the plaintiffs' lawyers.7 8
More serious incidents of incivility involve racist or sexist com-
ments by lawyers, which are intended to intimidate opposing counsel.
Reported cases reveal an almost limitless variety of insults, including
a lawyer's characterization of his opponent's conduct at a deposition
as "'little sheeny Hebrew tricks'; 179 a bankruptcy lawyer's reference
to a woman counsel for the United States trustee as "office help";"
repeated references to an attorney as "little lady, .... little mouse,"
"young girl," and "little girl"; 8' and a prosecutor's comment that he
did not believe "'either one of those chili-eating bastards"' who were
defendants in a death penalty case." One male lawyer was required
hole," saying "fuck you" to attorney during court proceeding); In re Vincenti, 554 A.2d
470,472 (NJ. 1989) (calling his opponent incompetent and a "piece of shit"); In re Eisen-
berg, 423 N.W.2d 867, 870 (Wis. 1988) ("'There is no excuse for that sleazy scum bag tac-
tic .... Does that stink. Talk about a smelly odor .... Mr. [Prosecutor], you don't even
know what you are talking about or what you are doing in this courtroom."').
176. Carroll v. Jaques Admiralty Law Firm, 110 F.3d 290,292 (5th Cir. 1997).
177. See, e.g., Jean M. Cary, Rambo Depositions: Controlling an Ethical Cancer in Civil
Litigation, 25 HOFSTRA L. REv. 561 (1996); Marvin E. Aspen, The Search for Renewed
Civility in Litigation, 28 VAL. U. L. REv. 513 (1994). Rob Atkinson has been a strong
critic of the conformist impulse behind some of these civility codes. See Rob Atkinson,
Br'er Rabbit Professionalism; A Homily on Moral Heroes and Lawyerly Mores, 27 FLA.
ST. U. L. REv. 137 (2000); Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter's Commentary on the Professional-
ism Crusade, 74 TEx. L. REv. 259 (1995).
178. See Lee v. American Eagle Airlines, Inc., 93 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1336 (S.D. Fla.
2000).
179. In re Williams, 414 N.W.2d 394,397 (Minn. 1987).
180. In re Plaza Hotel Corp., 111 B.R. 882, 891-92 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1990).
181. Principe v. Assay Partners, 586 N.Y.S.2d 182, 184 (Sup. Ct. 1992). For another
New York lawyer's sexist comments in a deposition, see In re Schiff, 599 N.Y.S.2d 242
(App. Div. 1993).
182. People v. Sharpe, 781 P.2d 659, 660 (Colo. 1989). The trial in this case was highly
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to pay his opponent's attorney's fees for a deposition at which he
called his female adversary "babe"; the court found that "babe," in
context, was "a crass attempt to gain an unfair advantage through the
use of demeaning language."'" Another lawyer was so annoyed at his
disqualification on the basis of a conflict of interest that he mailed a
flyer to the prosecutor, who was a woman. The flyer read: "MALE
LAWYERS PLAY BY THE RULES, DISCOVER TRUTH AND
RESTORE ORDER. FEMALE LAWYERS ARE OUTSIDE THE
LAW, CLOUD TRUTH AND DESTROY ORDER."'" Finally, a
lawyer was suspended for two years after repeatedly making sexual
advances toward his women employees." Dozens of other incidents
fill the pages of bar association study commission reports, which de-
tail pervasive gender and racial bias among lawyers and court person-
nel."
Analysis of the constitutional issues presented by these cases
largely depends on the context of the utterance. More theoretically,
the outcome turns on the legal paradigm to which courts assimilate
the utterance. Obnoxious comments in a deposition may be thought
of as discovery abuse, no different in principle from refusing to turn
over documents in response to a request for production. Alterna-
tively, they may be viewed as an instance of expression - a statement
of political dissent that may not be suppressed any more than a com-
ment made on a call-in radio show may be. In essence, this is the
question raised by the regulation of "hostile environment" sexual
harassment under Title VII.Y The aim of sexual harassment law is to
eradicate discrimination in the workplace, which may take the form
publicized and the comments resulted in widespread perception that the prosecutor was
biased against Latinos and was motivated by that prejudice to seek the death penalty.
183. Mullaney v. Aude, 730 A.2d 759,769 (Md. App. 1998).
184. United States v. Wunsch, 84 F.3d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir. 1996). The fiber was a copy
of a headline from an article in California Lawyer magazine, which reported on negative
gender-based stereotyping of female lawyers. See id. at 1113 n.1.
185. See Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Young, 731 N.E.2d 631 (2000).
186. See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz & Sharon Styles-Anderson, Still Officers of the Court:
Why the First Amendment is no Bar to Challenging Racism, Sexism and Ethnic Bias in the
Legal Profession, 9 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 781,788-90 (1996) (summarizing Florida's Su-
preme Court Gender Bias Study Commission Report); Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task
Force, The Effects of Gender in the Federal Courts, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 745 (1993). Minne-
sota Supreme Court Task Force for Gender Fairness in the Courts, Final Report, 15 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 825 (1989); Report of Maryland Special Joint Committee on Gender
Bias in the Courts, 20 U. BALT. L. REv. 1 (1990); Suellyn Scanecchia, Gender and Race
Bias Against Lawyers: A Classroom Response, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 319 (1990); Report
of the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts, 15 FoRD. URBAN L.J. 11 (1986).
187. See Meritor Sav. Bank FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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of tangible actions, such as refusing to hire women or demanding sex-
ual favors in exchange for promotions, but which also may occur
through a pattern of communications that changes the atmosphere of
the workplace to the point where it becomes intolerable to a reason-
able woman."= The critical analytical step here is to equate speech
with discriminatory action. Amazingly, this bit of category-
manipulation seems to have worked. Despite a consistent string of
decisions invalidating hate-speech statuteslw reiterating the constitu-
tional principle of content-neutrality," and underscoring the principle
that speech may not be regulated on the basis of its offensiveness,"'
and despite strenuous academic criticism,1" sexual harassment law has
secured its location outside the domain of the First Amendment.
Courts generally accept the plaintiffs' argument that expression is not
the subject of regulation, even though the prohibited discrimination
occurs through the medium of speech. Rather, it is only the effect of
placing women in a subordinate role in the workplace that is reached
by Title VII. Given the setting of the speech, especially where the lis-
tener is in some sense a captive audience," the antidiscrimination
norm embodied in the federal statute takes precedence over the free
speech principles that would ordinarily apply in cases like Hustler and
188. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,20 (1993).
189. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. 377.
190. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988); American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hud-
nut III, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985).
191. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
192. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, What Speech Does "Hostile Work Environment" Har-
assment Law Restrict?, 85 GEO. LJ. 627 (1997); Nadine Strossen, The Tensions Between
Regulating Workplace Harassment and the First Amendment: No Trump, 71 C1.-KENT L.
REV. 701 (1995); Volokh, supra note 7; Browne, supra note 7.
193. The Supreme Court has occasionally permitted content-based restrictions on
speech where the audience would otherwise find it difficult to avoid offensive communica-
tions. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (ban on residential picketing); FCC
v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (FCC's "seven dirty words" regulation of speech on
radio broadcasts); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (ban on adult
movies at a drive-in theater whose screen was visible outside the premises); Lehman v.
City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (restriction on political advertising on city
buses); Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (upholding power
of postal service to restrict offensive mailings at the request of customers); Kovacs v. Coo-
per, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (ban on sound trucks). The Court's most recent attorney-speech
case, dealing with solicitation of accident victims, was also motivated in part by captive-
audience concerns. See Went For It, 515 U.S. 618 (1995). Justice O'Connor's opinion al-
ludes to the interest in protecting the peace and tranquility of the recipient of attorneys'
solicitations, an interest that would be presumptively insufficient to justify restrictions on
speech in anything other than a captive-audience case.
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R.A.V. Those cases differ from hostile work environment harassment
cases only in their context - the victims of harassment are not re-
quired to face their antagonists every day, and are not faced with the
Hobson's choice of leaving their jobs or enduring abuse.19 In fact, it
is probably fair to read the sexual-harassment cases for the principle
that it is the workplace setting that transmutes the hostile utterances
from protected speech to unprotected conduct. University hate
speech codes, by contrast, do not make this context-based distinction.
Most of these regulations apply to speech uttered at any time, in any
place, by members of the university community. Thus, they fail to ac-
count for the fact that in many settings, the audience is not "captive,"
and may not be subjected to a pattern of discriminatory treatment.
Harassing speech by lawyers, too, may be broadly regulated in
limited contexts. The captive audience concern certainly permits ex-
tensive regulation of speech in trials and depositions where the audi-
ence is present under compulsion. A witness does not have the op-
tion of leaving a formal judicial proceeding, and an attorney who
terminates a deposition runs the risk of being sanctioned for dilatory
tactics.195 The distinction between concise, non-argumentative objec-
tions and prohibited interference with a deposition is undoubtedly
content-based, but the First Amendment permits this kind of regula-
tion in a non-public forum, provided that the regulation is reason-
able.196 In addition, by analogy with the Title VII cases, courts reason
that prohibitions on introducing irrelevant or unfairly prejudicial evi-
dence, engaging in dilatory tactics, or making frivolous arguments are
regulations of conduct, not expression. Cases in which attorneys be-
rate their adversary in an attempt to intimidate also do not raise First
Amendment issues, to the extent that the utterances can be charac-
terized as assaults or threats.'" Traditionally, speech by attorneys in
judicial forums is subject to rules of evidence and procedure, which
unproblematically draw content-based distinctions. Lengthy "speak-
ing objections" in depositions are rightly characterized as discovery
abuse, not protected speech, and may subject the speaker to penal-
ties.9'
The hard cases are those in which the communications at issue
occur outside formal proceedings, but which nevertheless create the
194. See Epstein, supra note 7, at 421-29.
195. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(2).
196. See infra notes 464 - 482 and accompanying text.
197. See infra notes 219 -252 and accompanying text.
198. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(1).
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evils of racial and gender bias in the legal system. (Examples include
the letter to opposing counsel in Wunsch, muttered courthouse com-
ments as in Sharpe, and statements to the media.) Here, the clash of
constitutional and regulatory norms is most apparent. State bar asso-
ciations and courts possess extensive power to control lawyers subject
to their jurisdiction - lawyers must keep personal and client funds
separate, respond promptly to client communications, refrain from
talking to represented opponents, and so on. Does this power extend
to regulating the speech of lawyers, insofar as it is germane to their
professional activities? The answer turns on how the extrajudicial
speech of lawyers ought to be understood.
In an important article on workplace harassment, Cynthia Est-
lund argues that the workplace is a natural forum for the exchange of
ideas among citizens, yet is outside the public domain in significant
ways.' It is what political theorists might call an intermediate asso-
ciation" - one which serves the valuable end of permitting individu-
als to participate in public discourse outside the orbit of the state -
but because of the pervasiveness of work in our society, the norm of
sexual and racial equality applies with particular force in that setting.
This dual nature of the workplace makes it difficult to strike a balance
between equality norms and free speech considerations. Inequality in
the workplace is likely to have a significant deleterious effect on so-
cial justice generally. However, the flip side of the captive audience
doctrine is the "captive speaker" concern; the only place that many
people can express themselves is in the workplace, and if they are
prohibited from expressing particular viewpoints, those messages will
be suppressed entirely."°
Analogously, the legal system provides a venue for individuals to
address their grievances to a wider audience, and attorneys are re-
quired to facilitate this access; at the same time, the system can func-
tion effectively only if barriers to participation, such as sex- and race-
based discrimination, are eradicated. This is another example of
Robert Post's "paradox of public discourse" - free and open debate
requires the absence of coercion and other barriers to participation,
yet the very nature of unrestricted debate may have the effect of si-
199. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the Workplace and the Problem
of Discriminatory Harassment, 75 TEX. L. REV. 687 (1997).
200. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713, 1714-15
(1988).
201. See KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS: INDIVIDUALS, COMMUNITIES,
AND LIBERTIES OF SPEECH 83-87 (1995) [Hereinafter GREENAWALT, FIGHTING
WORDS].
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lencing would-be participants.2" Post's solution is to define clearly
the boundaries around "public" discourse, leaving that sphere rela-
tively unregulated, while permitting more restrictions on speech in
non-public settings. Outside the domains of public discourse, equality
norms have priority; within the public setting, free speech norms take
precedence, even if the effect may be to silence marginalized speak-
ers.
Estlund challenges the narrowness of Post's definition, and pro-
poses recognizing "satellite" domains of expressive freedom, which
are those settings in which speech may "contribute to public discourse
and to self-governance... largely through the prism of its mediating
role between individual and society."2 3 In order to accommodate the
equality interests that seem to be sacrificed through the enhanced
speech rights of participants, she argues that the manner of expres-
sion, though not its content, should be regulated. "Personal insults,
divisive gossip, racial slurs, sexual taunts, propositions, [and] innu-
endo" are the kind of words that undermine the respect, tolerance,
and trust among co-workers that are necessary preconditions for ra-
tional discourse.' Thus, speech forfeits protection if, in its manner of
expression, it would be grossly offensive to the listener and the lis-
tener has no chance to avoid the speech. 5
Applied to the professional setting, Estlund's proposal would
permit enforcement of various civility and professionalism regulations
promulgated by state and local bar associations and courts. For in-
stance, federal district courts have, by local rules, proscribed conduct
that is "incivil,"' or "provoking or insulting."'  Restrictions such as
these are not as troubling as content-based regulations, Estlund ar-
gues, because government actors are not to be given discretion to
make value-laden decisions, such as whether an utterance is a matter
of public concern." But the "grossly offensive" criterion is surely
evaluative in its essence. Certainly sexual advances at co-workers
make no contribution to public discourse, but the case is not so clear
202. ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY,
MANAGEMENT 134-48 (1995). See also FiSS, supra note 13, at 16-18.
203. Estlund, supra note 199, at 720-21.
204. l at 733.
205. See id. at 750.
206. U.S. DIST. Cr. M.D. FLA. R. 2.05(g).
207. U.S. DIST. CT. D. ALASKA R. 39.5(d); cf. U.S. DIST. CT. N.D. OKLA. R. 83.2(14)
(lawyers admonished to "[a]void disparaging personal remarks or acrimony toward op-
posing counsel"); U.S. DIST. CT. W.D. TEx. R. AT-5(b)(17) (same).
208. See Estlund, supra note 199, at 753.
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with other kinds of offensive speech. (This is probably why Estlund
relies on the captive-audience principle in conjunction with the offen-
siveness standard.) I can readily imagine a judge concluding that Ste-
phen Yagman's tirade was grossly offensive,' and I suspect that judi-
cial evaluation would diverge on the civility of the comments of
another lawyer who called a judge a racist and referred to the trial as
a "kangaroo court" and a "legalized lynching."21  Offensiveness
seems to be an innocuous criterion when applied to racial epithets,
but the potential for manipulation of this category is evident from in-
numerable cases where thin-skinned judges have reacted against
speech they regarded as incivil. The following discussion of contempt
of court reveals some of the plasticity of the concept of civility in liti-
gation.
C. "When There Is No More Respect We Might As Well Give Up the
United States": Contempt of Court and the Legacy of the Chicago
Seven
The power to punish contempt of court is inherent within the in-
stitution of the judicial system, and is remarkably unconstrained by
statutory guidelines. The federal contempt statute, for example, does
not define key terms such as "misbehavior" and "obstruct[ion of] the
administration of justice. '211 Virtually every observer to address con-
tempt of court has remarked upon the murkiness of the substantive
and procedural law governing the imposition of contempt sanctions*21
2
It is nevertheless possible to provide a brief overview of the law of
contempt and show how constitutional norms set limits on the ability
of courts to sanction attorneys for engaging in expressive activities.
Contempt was closely related to defamation throughout its his-
torical development in England, and this relationship was preserved
across the Atlantic. 3 Just as the law of defamation was brought by
209. For a discussion of the Yagman case, see supra notes 94-96 and accompanying
text.
210. In re Hinds, 449 A.2d 483,487 (NJ. 1982).
211. 18 U.S.C. § 401. Judicial glosses on this language are frequently vague and subjec-
tive. See, e.g., United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 366 (7th Cir. 1972) (defining misbe-
havior as "conduct inappropriate to the particular role of the actor, be he judge, juror,
party, witness, counsel or spectator").
212- See Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Getting Beyond the Civil/Criminal Distinction: A New Ap-
proach to the Regulation of Indirect Contempts, 79 VA. L. REv. 1025, 1026-29 (1995)
(summarizing critical scholarship).
213. See Melvin B. Lewis, Judicial Forging of a Political Weapon: The Impact of the
Cold War on the Law of Contempt, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 3 (1993).
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the Supreme Court within the ambit of the First Amendment to re-
fleet the public interest in open, spirited public debate,214 contempt
law has been constitutionalized to some extent, to accommodate a
similar public interest. (Unlike the law of defamation, however, Con-
gress has acted to curb the power of courts to issue contempt cita-
tions, in one case impeaching a federal judge who had imposed a con-
tempt sentence on a lawyer who had criticized him.211) This process
began before World War II, with the appeal from contempt citations
against labor leader Harry Bridges and the Los Angeles Times, in-
volving public statements made about labor-relations disputes in the
state courts.216 In one contempt proceeding, local newspapers pub-
lished a telegram by Bridges, asserting that enforcement of a state
court decree would cause work stoppages along the entire waterfront.
While the dissenting justices read the comments as a threat by
Bridges to call a massive strike, and therefore as an attempt to intimi-
date the courts into reversing the decision,217 Justice Black for the
majority invoked the classic First Amendment vision of the free ex-
change of ideas, comment, and criticism. He observed that the very
facts that made Bridges' comments dangerous - the importance of
the issue in public debate and the impact a strike might have on the
local economy - are precisely the reasons for affording his speech a
high degree of protection. "No suggestion can be found in the Con-
stitution that the freedom there guaranteed for speech and the press
bears an inverse ratio to the timeliness and importance of the ideas
seeking expression......
Paradoxically, then, the inherent power of the courts to safe-
guard the integrity of their processes is limited in the cases which
most threaten them. 9 Courts are permitted to punish speakers pur-
suant to their contempt power only where the speech poses a clear
and present danger of substantially interfering with the pending pro-
214. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); ANTHoNY LEWIS,
MAKE No LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1991).
215. See Lewis, supra note 213, at 5. The judge was acquitted in the Senate, but the
case led Congress to pass a statute specifying acts for which federal courts could find law-
yers, or others, in contempt. The statute is still in effect at 18 U.S.C. § 401. RONALD L.
GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 21 (1963).
216. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
217. See id. at 301-04 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 269.
219. See also Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 388 (1962) ("The type of 'danger' evi-
denced by the record is precisely one of the types of activity envisioned by the Founders in
presenting the First Amendment for ratification.").
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ceeding.' Under this standard, the Court reversed the separate con-
tempt convictions against the Los Angeles Times, on the grounds that
the newspaper editorials and cartoons critical of judicial decisions did
not pose a sufficient threat to the administration of justice. 1 Subse-
quent Supreme Court decisions expanded Bridges, making clear that
all trials, not just high-profile cases, have an element of public inter-
est, and judges must accept criticism of their disposition of cases, even
in sharp or intemperate language.' The Court has even refused to
permit a finding of contempt to be predicated on a distortion of the
factual record.'m These cases therefore establish a broad sphere of
protected expression around criticism of the judiciary and underscore
the principle that the harm permitting interference with expression
must go beyond insults to dignity or the potential diminution of pub-
lie respect for courts.
After the constitutionalization of contempt in Bridges, Pen-
nekamp, and Craig, a lawyer may still be punished for contempt for
engaging in conduct that violates standards of courtroom decorum,
and which rises to the level of actual interference with the administra-
tion of justice. ' The Court has cautioned that lawyers may be found
in contempt only where the effect of their conduct goes beyond mere
offense to the judge's sensibilities, and extends to actual obstruction
of the proceedings.'m The difficult boundary to draw is between con-
temptuous obstruction of justice and the kind of zealous advocacy
that is expected of certain kinds of participants in the trial process,
such as criminal defense lawyers, who are constitutionally entitled to
220. See Bridges, 314 U.S. at 261-63.
221. See id. at 273-75.
222 See Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
223. See Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
224. See Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952); In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230
(1962).
225. See Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954); Brown v. United States, 356 U.S.
148, 153 (1958); In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227-28 (1945). A similar limitation is con-
tained in the disciplinary rules of many state bar associations, which prohibit lawyers from
engaging in "conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCr, Rule 3.5(c). For a state court case drawing this distinction correctly, see Wil-
liams v. Williams, 721 A.2d 1072,1073 (Pa. 1998). In that case, after an unfavorable ruling,
the lawyer said under his breath, "[h]e's such a fucking asshole," referring to the trial
judge. IL The opposing lawyer repeated the remark louder to get it on the record. See
id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court said the remark was ill-mannered but caused no sig-
nificant disruption in proceeding; thus, criminal contempt was not warranted. See id. at
1074-75.
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gum up the works. 6 "Attorneys have a right to be persistent, vocif-
erous, contentious, and imposing, even to the point of appearing ob-
noxious, when acting in their client's behalf." 7 To turn the point
around, even a seemingly respectful act can interfere with another
party's goals at trial. A well-timed objection to the admission of evi-
dence can obstruct justice, if "justice" is understood only as the con-
viction of guilty defendants. No one would suggest that objecting to
evidence is contempt, but that is only because we have become com-
fortable with the role of exclusionary rules in the law of evidence.
These rules are justified by other policies, such as ensuring even-
handed treatment by the government.
Other kinds of lawyering activities at trial are more controversial.
In the Chicago Seven trial, for example, the defense lawyers' strategy
was to portray the entire government effort to prosecute the Vietnam
war and quell domestic opposition as an abuse of authority.' Their
actions were directed at making the judge look ridiculous, as he
gradually lost control over the proceedings. Were these actions justi-
fied as part of an effort to vindicate principles of substantive justice?
Some legal ethicists would respond in the affirmative, appealing to
the tradition in our legal culture of appealing to the social values that
underwrite and legitimate positive legal norms. 9  Contempt deci-
sions, however, tend to emphasize procedural norms such as effi-
ciency and manageability. The rule that disagreement with a judge's
order is no justification for disruptive courtroom conduct' is in-
tended to channel lawyers' adversarial zeal. Lawyers should refrain
from informal avenues of protest such as speaking out at trial, and opt
for formal processes such as filing appeals and collateral challenges.
"It is essential to the proper administration of criminal justice that
226. See, e.g., In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389,397-98 (7th Cir. 1972).
227. aId at 400. See also Louis S. Raveson, Advocacy and Contempt - Part Two:
Charting the Boundaries of Contempt: Ensuring Adequate Breathing Room for Advocacy,
65 WASH. L. REV. 743 (1990). I agree with Rob Atkinson's characterization of the obses-
sion with civility as "Mickey Mouse professionalism," which obscures the moral tradition
of rebellious lawyering. Atkinson, supra note 177, at 146-49.
228. See Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Le-
gal Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 369 (1982-83).
229. For the most prominent, and best argued example of this position, see WILLIAM
H. SIMON, THE PRACrICE OFJUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHICS (1998).
230. See, e.g., Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337,346-47 (1970); United States v. Sacher, 182
F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1950) (Augustus Hand, J.), aff'd, 343 U.S. 1 (1952) (involving con-
tempt proceedings against the lawyers who had participated in the Smith Act trial which
underlay United States v. Dennis, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v.
Breiner, 969 P.2d 1285 (Haw. 1999).
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dignity, order, and decorum be the hallmarks of all court proceedings
in our country."3' Or, as the foreman of the Chicago Seven jury said,
"[w]hen there is no more respect we might as well give up the United
States."
Although this proposition sounds innocuous enough, it is difficult
to square with First Amendment law in other contexts and with the
ethical traditions of lawyering. Courts generally rule out ensuring
"dignity" and "decorum" as reasons for regulating speech in other
contexts. Even attorneys may speak indecorously in advertisements,
for example, 3 and journalists may use "strong language, intemperate
language, [and] .. .unfair criticism" in response to judicial deci-
sions.' But other constitutional norms complicate the regulation of
lawyer speech at trial. For instance, the Sixth Amendment fair trial
guarantee limits expression by lawyers, judges, parties, and even spec-
tators that might unfairly prejudice a criminal defendant.3 5 The ap-
plication of this principle to restrict even core political speech is evi-
dent from a Ninth Circuit case in which the court reversed a rape
conviction because of the presence of a large number of spectators
wearing "Women Against Rape" buttons at the trial' 6 The impor-
tance of the Sixth Amendment is apparent in light of Supreme Court
decisions protecting significantly more inflammatory slogans worn in
courthouses, such as the "Fuck the Draft" jacket in Cohen v. Califor-
nia. ' The difference between Cohen and the rape case lies in the im-
pact the buttons had on the jury's deliberations; by suggesting that the
spectators had already satisfied themselves of the defendant's guilt,
the buttons undermined the presumption of innocence' 8 Although
231. Allen, 397 U.S. at 343.
232. J. ANTHONY LUKAS, THE BARNYARD EPITHET AND OTHER OBSCENITIES:
NOTES ON THE CHICAGO CONSPIRACY TRIAL 26 (1970).
233. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985); In re
Felmeister & Isaacs, 518 A.2d 188 (N.J. 1986).
234. Craig, 331 U.S. at 376.
235. See, e.g., Haeberle v. Texas Int'l Airlines, 739 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1984).
236. See Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828 (9th Cir. 1990). Two state court cases reached
divergent results in drunk-driving cases where the spectators wore Mothers Against
Drunk Drivers ("MADD") buttons. See State v. McNaught, 713 P.2d 457 (Kan. 1986)
(buttons not prejudicial); State v. Franklin, 327 S.E.2d 449 (W. Va. 1985) (ordering new
trial because of prejudice caused by buttons).
237. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
238. See Norris, 918 F.2d at 830. Whether the "Women Against Rape" or MADD but-
tons may be worn in courtrooms may depend on the permissibility of lawyers advocating
jury nullification. Lawyers have been prosecuted for obstruction of justice, notwithstand-
ing the First Amendment, for directly appealing to jurors to reach decisions unsupported
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the state's dignitary interests were not sufficient to justify punishing
Cohen for wearing his jacket, the combination of dignitary and Sixth
Amendment interests warranted a rule prohibiting political commen-
tary by trial spectators. It is noteworthy that the addition of fair trial
interests justifies even content-based restrictions, which are ordinarily
disfavored and subject to heightened scrutiny. (There is no sugges-
tion in the opinion that the Court would have reversed the conviction
if spectators had been wearing "Save the Whales" buttons.)
The Supreme Court tried to reconcile the fair-trial interests pro-
tected by the Sixth Amendment and the free speech interests of law-
yers, secured by the First, in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada." The
lawyer, whose client had been indicted the previous day, held a press
conference at which he attempted to establish his client's innocence.
Significantly, this was a "highly publicized" case,24° meaning that the
press had already been given information by the prosecution. The de-
fense lawyer (but not the prosecutor) was disciplined under a state
bar association rule, based upon ABA Model Rule 3.6, prohibiting
extrajudicial statements by attorneys that are substantially likely to
create material prejudice to a party in a judicial proceeding. The re-
sulting opinion, responding to the First Amendment challenge to this
rule, is a badly fragmented mess - one of those decisions that re-
quires a scorecard to keep straight the alignment of the Justices. The
opinion for the Court encompassed two separate holdings: first, that
the Nevada rule was void for vagueness, for failing to give adequate
notice of when a press conference would subject a lawyer to disci-
pline; second, that the rule was not an unconstitutional prior re-
straint.242 The most interesting aspect of the opinion was the debate
by the judge's instructions and evidence received in a case. See, e.g., Turney v. State, 936
P.2d 533 (Alaska 1997). In the Turney case, the lawyer had urged jurors to call 1-800-
TEL-JURY to listen to a recording instructing them on the "right" of jury nullification.
See id at 536. One scholar of nullification essentially argues that nullification advocacy in
the courtroom may be regulated, just as the state may punish attempts to bribe or threaten
jurors. See Nancy J. King, Silencing Nullification Advocacy Inside the Jury Room and Out-
side the Courtroom, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 433,495-99 (1998).
239. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
240. Id. at 1063.
241. See id. at 1048-51 (majority made up of Kennedy, J., and four other Justices).
242. See id. at 1063-76 (majority made up of Rehnquist, J., and four other Justices).
Prior restraint doctrine requires the state to show a "clear and present danger" of actual
prejudice or an imminent harm in order to justify an injunction against the publication of
newsworthy information. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976);
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). "Prior restraints are presump-
tively unconstitutional" and, in fact, are almost always held to violate the First Amend-
ment. SMOLLA, supra note 166 § 15:7.
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among the Justices over why the bar association rule was not subject
to the near-absolute constitutional ban on prior restraints. The law-
yer had argued that the case ought to be controlled not only by the
prior-restraints doctrine, but also by the Court's contempt precedents,
which held that a court may not punish, by contempt penalties, news-
papers that published editorials, cartoons, and other materials critical
of the judge's conduct of a particular case, unless the publications
posed a clear and present danger of harm.243 Justice Rehnquist, in re-
sponse, noted that none of the speakers in the contempt cases had
been lawyers.2  This is true, and it is also a commonplace that law-
yers' speech in the courtroom itself may be regulated under the less
demanding "reasonable basis" standard,24 but neither of these prem-
ises are dispositive of whether a criminal defense lawyer's extra-
judicial speech ought to be subject to restriction on a broader basis
than a newspaper reporter's speech.
It is important to focus carefully on what Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion says about the constitutional protection for law-
yers' speech, because Gentile is frequently misinterpreted by lower
courts. The opinion is a pastiche of dicta from other cases, which
themselves are susceptible to misinterpretation. For example, Chief
Justice Rehnquist reads Sawyer as establishing the proposition that
"lawyers in pending cases [a]re subject to ethical restrictions on
speech to which an ordinary citizen would not be., 246 But as we have
seen, the Court decided Sawyer on non-constitutional grounds. Jus-
tice Stewart's concurring opinion in Sawyer does suggest that he
would permit the state to impose discipline for "unethical" behavior,
even if it involved speech that would otherwise be protected. But this
statement begs the question of what speech would be unethical, a
question which must be answered by delving into both First Amend-
ment principles and the function of the legal profession in society.
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Gentile emphasizes this distinction; he
characterizes the lawyer's press conference as "classic political
speech" on a matter of public importance. 7 Political speech is enti-
tled to the highest degree of First Amendment protection; moreover,
speaking out in defense of individuals who are resisting government
power is a traditional function of lawyers. Ethical principles and con-
243. See Bridges, 314 U.S. 252; Pennekamp, 328 U.S. 331; Craig, 331 U.S. 367.
244. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1070.
245. Id. at 1071.
246. Id. (citing In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959)).
247. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1034.
Winter 20011
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
stitutional norms coincide. To avoid this conclusion, Chief Justice
Rehnquist relied heavily on the dissent in Sawyer, which said that
lawyers are "an intimate and trusted and essential part of the machin-
ery of justice, an 'officer of the court' in the most compelling sense. '
This vision of the lawyer's role emphasizes the alignment of the law-
yer with the government's interests, even if the "machinery of justice"
grinds on to the detriment of the client. In some cases lawyers must
accept additional responsibility for social justice, 49 but the one situa-
tion in which that is never true is criminal defense. The responsibili-
ties of the criminal defense lawyer have always been understood as
being in opposition to the state. For instance, although lawyers are
prohibited from advancing frivolous defenses, a criminal defense at-
torney is nevertheless entitled to "put the state to its proof," requiring
that the government establish every element of its case, even if the
defense lawyer knows that there is no good faith basis in law and fact
for doing so." Thus, it is wrong to characterize the "officer of the
court" dimension of the criminal defense lawyer's duty as placing the
lawyer's speech on some sort of a lower plane of constitutional sig-
nificance from pure political speech. Because criminal defense law-
yers are expected to be independent of the government, and to serve
as a bulwark against state overreaching in the domain of individual
liberty, the press conference by the lawyer in Gentile was indeed a
classic example of political speech.
So Justice Kennedy is right and Chief Justice Rehnquist is wrong
- but the latter Justice's opinion in Gentile is still the authoritative
pronouncement from the Supreme Court on this issue. What, then, is
the rule in that case? It is emphatically not that lawyers have dimin-
ished expressive rights, as compared with ordinary citizens, in most
speech situations. The scope of Gentile extends only to statements
made about a pending case in which the lawyer is participating."1
Lawyers are still free to denounce the government's prosecution of
certain categories of cases, to rail against bias in the court system,
even to advocate white supremacist causes on the Internet. Thus,
Judge Easterbrook read too much into Gentile when he said that "the
248. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1072 (quoting Sawyer, 360 U.S. at 668 (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting)).
249. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr, Rule 3.8 and cmt. 1 (de-
tailing special obligations of prosecutors who are "minister[s] of justice" and not simply
advocates).
250. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT, Rule 3.1.
251. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1072 n.5,1074.
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Constitution does not give attorneys the same freedom as participants
in political debate." 2 The attorney in that case did make numerous
baseless allegations of corruption against judges, but the constitu-
tional status of his speech is identical with that of private citizens.
Under Gentile, being a lawyer does not change Palmisano's speech
rights, except with respect to pending cases. It does not work a gen-
eral diminution of the constitutional protection afforded to political
speech, of which accusations of judicial corruption is surely an exem-
plar. Although courts sometimes miss this point, Gentile does not re-
vive the long-discredited right/privilege distinction, in which a lawyer
may be said to have accepted reduced protection for speech in ex-
change for the privilege of a license to practice law. It merely makes
the less controversial constitutional point that in some kinds of state-
established forums, speakers' rights may be limited by reasonable
government interests. The only novel aspect of Gentile is the exten-
sion of the "forum" beyond the courtroom and court filings, to ex-
trajudicial comments on pending cases. This modest extension is jus-
tified by the Sixth Amendment fair trial guarantee. In cases where
the lawyer's speech is not germane to a pending proceeding, however,
the Sixth Amendment is not implicated and the extension of the non-
public forum is not warranted.
M. Lawyers and First Amendment Doctrine
The byzantine complexity of contemporary First Amendment
law is no accident. It is the natural by-product of a recurring need to
reconcile the basic political values of freedom and order. The pull
exerted by these two values has never been adequately restrained by
some "meta" theory of constitutional interpretation, no matter how
sophisticated. 3 For this reason, some have proposed abandoning the
search for constitutional theory at a high level of abstraction, and re-
solving cases "one case at a time," through a process of reasoning by
analogy in which moral principles serve as only one position in a dia-
lectic with the particularities of decided cases.2' I do not wish to be
distracted by this debate, but I do think it is important to approach
questions of First Amendment law from both sides, as it were: first,
252. Palmisano, 70 F.3d at 487 (discussed supra notes 91-105 and accompanying text).
253. See WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 13-19 (1984).
254. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON
THE SUPREME COURT (1999); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF
FREE SPEECH (1996).
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from the direction of the particular; second, from the direction of the
general. This section is concerned with the general, with the agglom-
eration of precedents generated by generations of litigation. The ob-
jective of this discussion is to bring together the body of lawyer-
speech cases with First Amendment decisions from other contexts, to
illuminate some of the continuities that do exist in constitutional law.
Following, Part IV will change course and examine lawyer-speech
cases from the theoretical direction, inquiring whether and to what
extent the policies which underlie the First Amendment apply to the
expression of lawyers.
A. Speech or Conduct?
Threats of physical violence, although obviously involving speech
in the literal sense, do not raise First Amendment issues. The Court
has never wavered from its position that criminal conduct such as
conspiracy, solicitation, and intimidation may be proscribed without
offending the First Amendment. 5 Even Justice Black, who is associ-
ated with the absolutist view that no restrictions on speech are per-
missible, 6 was perfectly willing to grant states considerable latitude
to regulate expressive conduct. 7 The speech/conduct distinction un-
dergirds the heightened constitutional protection for expressive ac-
tivities, because the government is naturally in the business of regu-
lating conduct - violence, threats, discrimination - without regard
to the beliefs that motivated the actions' 8 A politically motivated
255. See, e.g., R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 380 n.1 (conceding that burning cross in back yard of
African-American family can be prosecuted as a terroristic threat or damage to property);
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406-07 (suggesting that flag burning could be prosecuted under a
statute prohibiting outdoor fires); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456
(1978) (First Amendment does not preclude regulation of commercial conduct); Branden-
burg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 456-57 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("The line between
what is permissible and not subject to control and what may be made subject to regulation
is the line between ideas and overt acts."). For examples of cases in which attorneys
threatened physical harm to another (generally an opposing lawyer) and raised First
Amendment arguments, see Florida Bar v. Sayler, 721 So.2d 1152 (Fla. 1998) (sending ad-
versary a newspaper article about workers' compensation lawyers who had been mur-
dered); In re Beaver, 510 N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 1994) (threatening to kill adversary); In re
Belue, 766 P.2d 206 (Mont. 1988) (threatening to beat up public defender and shoot sher-
iffs deputy). In all of these cases, the courts summarily rejected the free speech claims.
256. See, e.g., Konigsberg, 366 U.S. at 60-61 (Black, J., dissenting); Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109, 141-43 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
257. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting) (Cohen's
"absurd and immature antic" was mainly conduct, not speech); Adderley v. Florida, 385
U.S. 39 (1966) (affirming trespass convictions of civil rights demonstrators).
258. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW §
3.6, at 319 (1986); Laurence H. Tribe, The Mystery of Motive, Private and Public: Some
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killing, such as the shooting of physicians who perform abortions, may
still be prosecuted as murder, despite the intention of the killer to ex-
press a message. Making a threat against the life of the President is a
federal offense,29 even though the speaker may be motivated by dis-
agreement with the President's economic policies. Absent the very
narrow boundaries of the necessity doctrine, would-be Robin Hoods
cannot escape punishment by appealing to considerations of distribu-
tive justice. The distinction between speech and conduct is an artifi-
cial one in many cases, and courts can manipulate outcomes by mov-
ing the line between speech and conduct to protect activity that has
previously been determined to be worthy of protection."" As John
Ely has famously observed, all communicative behavior is 100%
speech and 100% conduct.2 6' Line-drawing problems are not difficult
in cases where the activity at issue is a specific threat of physical vio-
lence. Impassioned advocacy that might be construed as a call to
arms presents a problem for free speech theory that has long troubled
the Court,62 but the modern "clear and present danger" test never-
theless allows prosecution of a speaker whose words are "directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and [are] likely to incite
or produce such action."
' 61
Notes Inspired by the Problems of Hate Crime and Animal Sacrifice, 1993 SUP. Cr. REV. 1.
259. See 18 U.S.C. § 871.
260. See, e.g., Texas v. Ku Klux Klan, 853 F. Supp. 958 (E.D. Tex. 1994), affd, 58 F.3d
1075 (5th Cir. 1995) (approving of state highway department's denial of Klan's application
to "adopt" a section of highway abutting a public housing project, where the adoption
would allow the Klan to continue threatening the project's residents in violation of a court
order); see also Stanley Fish, Fraught With Death: Skepticism, Progressivism, and the First
Amendment, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1061, 1066-67 (1993).
261. See John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization
and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L REv. 1482, 1495-96 (1975). For
examples of cases in which the Court protected expressive conduct as speech, see Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (burning the American flag); Clark v. Community for Crea-
tive Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (camping in public park to dramatize problem of
homelessness); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (attaching peace sign to flag);
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing black
armbands to protest Vietnam war).
262. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (affirming conviction for
"criminal syndacalism" based on defendant's attendance at Communist Party convention);
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (upholding criminal anarchy convictions based
on circulation of a pamphlet urging strikes).
263. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (per curiam). This robust version of the
"clear and present danger" test should be contrasted with the original statement of the test
in Schenck, which upheld a conviction for what today would probably be considered pro-
tected advocacy. Cf. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam) (reversing
conviction for threatening to take the life of the President, and construing defendant's
statement as mere "political hyperbole").
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Kent Greenawalt has written about a category of communica-
tions he refers to (following J.L. Austin and John Searle) as "situa-
tion-altering utterances."26' Situation-altering utterances alter the le-
gal status of existing relationships, for example, by creating a binding
contract between an offeror ("I'll sell you my car for $10,000") and an
offeree ("You've got yourself a deal").265 Similarly, in the case of quid
pro quo sexual harassment, a supervisor's explicit or implicit threat
that, "I'll fire you if you don't sleep with me" puts the employee to
the Hobson's choice of having unwanted sex or losing her job."' Un-
der ordinary First Amendment doctrine, situation-altering utterances
may be regulated as conduct because they are properly thought of as
behavior itself.267 Attorneys have unusually broad power to change
the rights and obligations of others by their utterances. They are
vested by the state with the power to commence lawsuits, compel the
attendance of witnesses at trials and depositions, obtain documents
from parties who may not wish to have them inspected, encumber
property with liens, bind their clients to various legal relationships,
and so on. Under the distinction proposed by Greenawalt, these
speech-acts do not raise First Amendment issues. Consider, for ex-
ample, court rules proscribing frivolous or vexatious legal documents,
which have never been invalidated on free speech grounds. These
communications are more like conduct than speech, and for this rea-
son are subject to broad regulation by courts. Accordingly, many
courts have brushed aside freedom of expression arguments by char-
acterizing contested incidents as conduct, not speech.'
Similarly, a great deal of recent scholarship has proposed that ra-
cial and sexual epithets may be, in some cases, essentially identical to
unprotected conduct, such as the tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress.269 Slurs uttered against another on the basis of race or
264. See KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 57-60
(1989) [hereinafter "GREENAWALT, SPEECH"].
265. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 801(c) advisory committee's note ("verbal acts" bear on the
legal rights of the parties and, accordingly, are not offered in evidence to prove the truth
of the matter asserted).
266. See GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS, supra note 201, at 78-79 (1995). Of
course, not all sexual harassment cases are of the quid pro quo variety. Some cases are
examples of pure hatred based on sex, with no attempt by the speaker to extort sexual fa-
vors from the plaintiff.
267. See GREENAWALT, SPEECH, supra note 264, at 58.
268. See, e.g., Eisenberg v. Boardman, 302 F. Supp. 1360 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
269. See, e.g., CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 29-41 (1993); Richard Del-
gado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133,180 (1982).
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sex cause tremendous pain and humiliation, when compared with
other, more generic insults."0 Thus, some have argued that bar asso-
ciations ought to promulgate enforceable rules forbidding lawyers to
engage in "verbal or physical discriminatory conduct, on account of
race, ethnicity, or gender.' 27v The words "verbal... conduct" are
carefully chosen to avoid the First Amendment protection that would
accompany pure non-conduct, or speech. (Indeed, many courts have
upheld state hate crimes statutes against constitutional challenge, on
the ground that they penalize conduct motivated by biased belief, not
beliefs or speech as such.2')
The debate over remedies for hate speech is perhaps sharpest in
the area of workplace sexual harassment, where creating a "hostile
work environment" is actionable under federal law.273 One group of
scholars argues, in one form or another, that it is the act of discrimi-
nation which is prohibited, not speech.274 Thus, the First Amendment
is a non-issue. Opponents contend that if the statute punishes speech
taking a particular viewpoint (e.g. "women don't belong in the work-
place"), then it is unconstitutional.l 5 Here, the characterization issue
- speech or conduct - drives the constitutional analysis. As noted
previously, courts have largely accepted the characterization of sexual
270. See generally Charles R. Lawrence HI, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating
Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DuKE L.J. 431, 452; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to
Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320,2337-38 (1989).
271. Andrew E. Taslitz & Sharon Styles-Anderson, Still Officers of the Court: Why the
First Amendment is no Bar to Challenging Racism, Sexism, and Ethnic Bias in the Legal
Profession, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 781,785 (1996).
272. See, e.g., In re Joshua H., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 291 (Ct. App. 1993); People v. Richards,
509 N.W.2d 528 (Mich. App. 1993).
273. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57 (1986). The Supreme Court upheld Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
against First Amendment challenges in Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
274. See, e.g., Deborah Epstein, Free Speech at Work. Verbal Harassment as Gender-
based Discriminatory (Mis) Treatment, 85 GEO. L.J. 649 (1997); Deborah Epstein, Can a
"Dumb Ass Woman" Achieve Equality in the Workplace? Running the Gauntlet of Hostile
Environment Harassing Speech, 84 GEO. L. REV. 399 (1995); Suzanne Sangree, Title VII
Prohibitions Against Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment and the First Amendment:
No Collision in Sight, 47 RUTGERS L. REv. 41 (1995); Linda S. Greene, Sexual Harass-
ment Law and the First Amendment, 71 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 729 (1995).
275. See, e.g., Nadine Stroessen, The Tensions Between Regulating Workplace Harass-
ment and the First Amendment: No Trump, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 701,710 (1995); Eugene
Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1791 (1992);
Nadine Stroessen, Regulating Workplace Sexual Harassment and Upholding the First
Amendment - Avoiding a Collision, 37 VILL. L. REv. 757 (1992); Kingsley R. Browne,
Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harassment and the First Amendment, 52
OHIo ST. L.J. 481 (1991).
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harassment as conduct, not speech.
The line between speech and conduct collapses entirely in cases
where the government seeks to regulate expressive conduct, such as
flag- or draft card-burning, 6 camping in public parks as a protest
against homelessness,2" and labor picketing."S Where government
regulations touch on expressive conduct, the constitutional analysis
depends on whether the regulation is directed at the communicative
nature of the act.279 If so, the restriction must be justified by a com-
pelling government interest and must be narrowly tailored to achieve
that interest. In the Texas flag-burning case, for example, the chal-
lenged state statute prohibited the "desecration" of a flag.' The
Court had little difficulty concluding that this statute was aimed at the
expressive elements of hybrid speech/conduct." (The Court was
more sharply divided over the sufficiency of the asserted government
interest in preserving the sanctity of the flag.) A closer case might
have been presented by the federal Flag Protection Act of 1989,
which was drafted to avoid the holding in Johnson by purporting to
regulate the conduct of anyone who "knowingly mutilates, defaces,
physically defiles, bums, maintains on the floor or ground, or tram-
ples upon any flag" without regard to the expressive intent of the ac-
tor.m The Court, however, essentially concluded that the statute's as-
serted justification was a pretext for regulating the expressive aspect
of communicative action, and invalidated the statute.2 3 If, on the
other hand, the government regulation is justified by an interest un-
276. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (draft cards); Eichman v.
United States, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (American flag); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)
(American flag).
277. See Clark, 468 U.S. 288.
278. See, e.g., Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,
Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
279. See generally LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2 (2d
ed. 1988). Tribe's metaphor of "track one" and "track two" regulation has become widely
accepted in First Amendment scholarship. See, e.g., Larry A. Alexander. Trouble on
Track Two: Incidental Regulations of Speech and Free Speech Theory, 44 HASTINGS L.J.
921 (1993).
280. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 400 n.1.
281. See id. at 407-08,412.
282 Eichman, 496 U.S. at 314.
283. See id. at 317. Rodney Smolla points out that the statute prohibiting mutilation of
draft cards at issue in the O'Brien case was also passed for reasons related to the suppres-
sion of free expression, and the asserted government interests, such as reminding holders
of their ongoing obligation to notify the draft board of changes of address, were pretex-
tual. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH §9:5
(1996).
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related to the suppression of expression, the regulation is subjected to
relaxed scrutiny - it must be no broader in scope than necessary to
accomplish an important state interest.2 Begging on the subway, for
example, may be regulated to achieve the city government's interest
in protecting passengers from intimidation and harassment by aggres-
sive panhandlers. Similarly, a city may prohibit the posting of leaf-
lets on city property in order to prevent the proliferation of litter and
visual blight.' Of course, both sides of any debate can play the cate-
gorization game, as revealed by Justice Rehnquist's characterization
of aggressive anti-abortion protests as "speech," even though the rec-
ord showed that the protesters had shoved, jostled, grabbed, pushed,
elbowed, and spit on women entering the clinic. "Leafletting and
commenting on matters of public concern are classic forms of speech
that lie at the heart of the First Amendment,"2' wrote the Chief Jus-
tice, as though the protesters merely had been passing out handbills,
not attempting to obstruct women's access to the clinic physically.
Indeed, these cases reveal that the Court has considerable latitude to
label disfavored expressive activities as "conduct," thereby avoiding
the protection of the First Amendment altogether.
The two-track analytical framework which varies the level of
scrutiny applied to government regulations according to whether the
subject of the regulation is characterized as speech or conduct, shows
that a wide variety of court-imposed restrictions on attorneys' con-
duct may be justified, notwithstanding the First Amendment interests
asserted by lawyers. The critical inquiry is whether the regulation is
directed at the expressive dimension of the conduct. If not, then the
expressive conduct may be regulated, provided that an important
government interest is advanced, and the restriction does not infringe
on expression more than necessary. Requiring allegations of judicial
corruption or unethical conduct by opposing counsel to be raised in
separate proceedings or motion papers is a permissible restriction on
speech, because it leaves open alternative channels for communicat-
ing the message. Attorneys who berate their opposing counsel in
depositions, causing delay and increased expense, may be sanctioned
for discovery abuse (a category which belongs more to the paradigm
284. See, e.g., O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
285. See Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146,157-58 (2d Cir. 1990).
286. See City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
287. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357, 363
(1997).
288. Id. at 377.
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of conduct than speech), because the regulation is not aimed at sup-
pressing expression.' 9 Arguably, though, a courtroom setting justifies
even more explicitly content-based restrictions on the expressive di-
mensions of hybrid speech/conduct. Suppose an attorney wishes to
wear a tie with a Kente cloth pattern, symbolizing pride in his African
heritage.' ° The lawyer is representing a criminal defendant in a city
with a sizeable African-American population; thus, there is a good
chance that the jury pool will be racially diverse. Could the lawyer be
ordered by the court not to wear the tie? Disciplinary rules prevent
lawyers from personally vouching for the credibility of a witness or
stating a personal opinion about the justness of the proceeding.29' As
far as I can tell, no lawyer has even asserted, much less prevailed on, a
First Amendment-based argument that the anti-vouching rule is un-
constitutional; it is unproblematically regarded as a justifiable inci-
dent of the trial court's inherent power to regulate the proceedings
before it, despite infringing on lawyers' speech.2' Thus, if the charac-
terization of the tie as "vouching" is correct, the lawyer can be or-
dered not to wear it, although I am skeptical that a Kente cloth tie is
any more prejudicial than, say, a yarmulke or some other symbol of
religious observance or racial pride.
Finally, the speech/conduct distinction provides the key to un-
derstanding some of the First Amendment issues surrounding bar-
admissions cases, which are otherwise rather puzzling. Contempora-
neously with the Matthew Hale controversy, the Nebraska Supreme
Court approved the decision of that state's bar association to deny
admission to an applicant who had caused endless headaches to fac-
289. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37. The formulation "not aimed at the expressive dimension
of the utterance" is better than the familiar term "content-neutral," because rules against
discovery abuse are certainly content-based. That is, questions which seek to elicit infor-
mation that may lead to the discovery of admissible evidence are permissible in deposi-
tions, see FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1). However, "speaking objections," or those which do
more than concisely state the basis for the objection, are not allowed. See FED. R. Civ. P.
30(d)(1). The distinction here turns on the content of the communication, although the
regulation is not aimed at the expressive dimension, or the meaning, of the utterance, but
at its effect on the orderly disposition of the litigation.
290. This example is taken from the case of John Harvey, an African-American lawyer
in the District of Columbia. See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification, 105 YALE
L.J. 677, 685 (1995); Patricia Gaines-Carter, D.C. Lawyer Told to Remove African Kente
Cloth for Jury Trial, WASH. POST, May 23, 1992, at Fl. For a similar case imolving a law-
yer, who was an ordained Catholic priest, and was prohibited from wearing a clerical collar
while trying a jury case, see LaRocca v. Lane, 338 N.E.2d 606 (N.Y. 1975).
291. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr, Rule 3.4(e).
292. Cf Saltany v. Reagan, 886 F.2d 438, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (no First Amendment
defense to Rule 11, even for lawsuits filed as political protests).
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ulty and administrators at his law school, by writing letters to local
newspapers, threatening to sue over the school's request that he re-
move a nude photograph from his library carrel, publicly accusing the
dean of incompetence and corruption, and printing and selling
"Deanie on a Weenie" T-shirts, depicting the dean "astride what ap-
pears to be a large hot dog."'2 There is no doubt that this student was
a pain in the neck, but the harm created by his speech pales in com-
parison with the hatred and terror created by Hale's white-
supremacist Web site and organization. Nevertheless, although the
Hale case has attracted the attention of high-profile constitutional
lawyers, who claim that it is a classic First Amendment case,94 the de-
nial of Paul Converse's application to the Nebraska bar was unani-
mously affirmed by the court. What explains the difference in these
cases? The answer turns on the ability of the Nebraska Supreme
Court to characterize all of Converse's activities as conduct, which
could be used as evidence of his unfitness to practice law.295 At this
point, however, the court's constitutional analysis became muddled.
Instead of arguing that the bar's character-and-fitness inquiry was
aimed at the non-expressive elements of hybrid speech/conduct, it as-
sumed arguendo that Converse's expressive conduct was protected by
the First Amendment. It then interpreted the McCarthy-era loyalty
oath cases as permitting a bar association to inquire into protected
expression which bears on an applicant's moral character. But the
distinction articulated in Baird and Wadmond was not between ex-
pression and character, but between beliefs as such, and membership
in an organization combined with the specific intent to further an un-
lawful end.'l There is no suggestion in the court's opinion that Paul
Converse acted unlawfully; if anything, his conduct was hyper-
legalistic - threatening lawsuits over trifles, accusing others of seri-
ous illegality, and translating interpersonal disputes into juridical
terms.
293. See In re Converse, 602 N.W.2d 500,505 (Neb. 1999).
294. See Van Voris, supra note 65 (quoting Alan Dershowitz, who had offered to rep-
resent Hale); George Anastaplo, Lawyers, First Principles, and Contemporary Challenges:
Explorations, 19 N. ILL L. REV. 353, 356-57 (1999) (reporting that a Jewish civil rights
lawyer - a "true believer" in the First Amendment - had also offered to represent
Hale). Anastaplo himself had been refused admission to the Illinois bar for refusing to
disclose whether he was a member of the Communist party. He also asserted a right of
revolution, citing the Declaration of Independence. See id. at 359-62.
295. See Converse, 602 N.W.2d at 505.
296. See Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154
(1971); Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
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The kernel of a constitutionally sound basis for denying Con-
verse's application is located in Converse's record of lawsuits and
outbursts, for they show that he has a tendency to overreact to per-
ceived offenses and employ legal and extralegal processes to harass
and intimidate others. By writing letters to the newspaper (carbon-
copied to federal judges Alex Kozinski and Richard Posner), rallying
other students to trash a professor who had treated Converse harshly
in class, and printing the infamous "Deanie on a Weenie" hot dog
shirt, Converse showed that he was not inclined to resolve disputes in
an orderly manner.2' Of course, the same could be said about Mat-
thew Hale - he is apt to seek social change through extralegal meth-
ods such as exhorting followers to "racial holy war." The only distinc-
tion, therefore, between the two cases is that Hale's expression has so
far taken the form of pure speech, while Converse's crossed the line
into conduct. In both cases the bar was making a predictive judgment
about the compatibility of the character of the applicants with the
character required of lawyers. What apparently makes the Hale deci-
sion a significant constitutional case, worthy of the intervention of
Alan Dershowitz, is that his hatefulness is manifested in speech alone,
while Converse's case languishes in obscurity because he had actually
acted on his character. This seems to be a flimsy reed on which to
hang the constitutional protection afforded to beliefs, but bar-
admissions cases have consistently permitted state bar associations to
inquire into a broad range of conduct that is held to be probative of
one's future fitness for practicing law. This inquiry is extremely nar-
rowly circumscribed by the First Amendment under Baird and Wad-
mond, probably less so than many lawyers appreciate. It is interesting
to speculate about what would happen if the Hale case, or one like it,
makes it to the U.S. Supreme Court. Would the Court take that op-
portunity to bring bar-admissions cases more in line with contempo-
rary First Amendment law, which is broadly protective of hateful
speech, and even the advocacy of illegal action, provided that the
danger is not imminent, clear, and present? Or would the Court con-
tinue effectively to carve out an exception for expressive activities by
lawyers, who are subject to heightened state regulation? I believe
that the more satisfying resolution of these tensions would be to treat
the Hale case more like R.A.V. and Brandenburg, prohibiting state
bar associations from denying membership to odious characters who
have not crossed the line into unlawful conduct. But this resolution
297. See Converse, 602 N.W.2d at 509-10.
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would fly in the face of the extremely deferential approach of state
courts, who tend to approve of state bar decisions in cases like Con-
verse, for reasons related to the public esteem and image of the legal
profession.
B. Fighting Words
Perhaps the speech of Paul Converse and Matthew Hale is of
such marginal constitutional status that it merits less protection than
higher-valued speech. The preceding discussion of threats of vio-
lence, with the related suggestion that certain situation-altering
speech is beyond the purview of the First Amendment, brings to mind
the Supreme Court's multiple holdings that some kinds of expression
are of such slight social value that the First Amendment does not
prohibit their regulation.298 These two concepts are somewhat differ-
ent, because some speech may not be situation-altering, but may nev-
ertheless be virtually valueless. The classic example of an unpro-
tected category of speech is "fighting words," which are those words
which, "by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an im-
mediate breach of the peace."299 The Chaplinsky fighting words stan-
dard has been criticized as anachronistic and gender-based, because it
assumes that listeners are equivalent to drunk, rowdy men, who are
prone to starting a barroom brawl if insulted.' It is a bizarre consti-
tutional doctrine that depends more on the size, health, and tem-
perament of the listener than on the content of the communication or
298. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22 (1973) (obscenity); FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (offensive language in radio broadcasts); Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity).
299. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,572 (1942).,
300. See, e.g., Steven H. Shiffrin, Racist Speech, Outsider Jurisprudence, and the
Meaning of America, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 43, 80 (1994); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword:
The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REV. 22, 42 (1992); Stephen W. Gard,
Fighting Words as Free Speech, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 531 (1980). The "fighting words" meta-
phor may be overinclusive as well, because just about any statement could start a barroom
brawl under the right circumstances. Even an innocuous - and, presumably, constitu-
tionally protected - statement about a baseball team might lead to a fracas if the audi-
ence were drunk enough and the speaker cast aspersions on the hometown team. This is
unlikely most of the time, of course, but it shows the oddity of making constitutional free
speech guarantees depend on the likelihood of fisticuffs. The fighting words doctrine
strikes me as a strange vestige of the culture of honor, which flourished in the American
South prior to the Civil War, and which to some extent lives on in the form of a height-
ened sensitivity to insult and tendency to resort to extrajudicial retaliation for the redress
of grievances. See generally RICHARD E. NISBETr & Dov COHEN, CULTURE OF HONOR:
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH (1996); KENNETH S. GREENBERG,
HONOR & SLAVERY (1996); BERTRAM WYATr-BROWN, SOUTHERN HONOR: ETHICS &
BEHAVIOR IN THE OLD SOUTH (1982).
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the speaker's intent. Professor Greenawalt observes that a torrent of
insults directed by a white speaker toward a black listener would be
subject to regulation under Chaplinsky where the listener is a twenty-
year-old male, but not a child of nine or a person with a disability."'
In addition, Chaplinsky's interment, or at least drastic limitation, has
been suggested by a host of subsequent Supreme Court decisions.'
Just when one thinks Chaplinsky is a dead letter, however, the
Court cites it with approval, as all but one of the justices did in their
separate opinions in R.A.V. The lower federal courts that consid-
ered university hate speech restrictions in the early 1990s were forced
to wrestle anew with the fighting words doctrine, because the univer-
sities generally defended their speech codes on the basis of congru-
ence with the category of fighting wordsY Courts considering the
free speech arguments advanced by obnoxious lawyers are also fond
of Chaplinsky. For example, in one disciplinary proceeding, the law-
yer was suspended from the practice of law for ninety days for, among
other offenses, shouting at workers from the Connecticut Department
of Children and Youth Services, calling them "nazis" and screaming,
301. See GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS, supra note 264, at 52.
302. See Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 132 n.1 (1974) ("you goddamn mother-
fucking police"); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107 (1973) ("We'll take the fucking street
later"); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 n.1 (1972) ("You son of a bitch I'll choke
you to death"); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (protester wearing "fuck the draft"
jacket in courthouse); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). In all but Cohen
and Brandenburg, the words were uttered to a police officer, but the speakers' convictions
were nevertheless struck down. In Gooding and Lewis, the statutes under which the con-
viction was obtained were deemed overbroad, because they proscribed speech beyond that
which would tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. Similarly, in Texas v. John-
son, the Court observed that burning the flag, a "generalized expression of dissatisfaction
with the policies of the Federal Government," is unlikely to be perceived as a direct per-
sonal insult that would naturally provoke an observer to violence. 491 U.S. 397, 409
(1989). One student commentator has accordingly urged that the fighting words doctrine
be interpreted in parallel with Brandenburg, to permit suppression of speech only where
there is a clear and present danger of imminent lawless action. See Michael J. Mann-
heimer, Note, The Fighting Words Doctrine, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1527 (1993).
303. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 377; see also Johnson, 491 U.S. at 409, 430-31 (Justice
Brennan and Justice Rehnquist disagreeing over applicability of Chaplinsky to flag burn-
ing).
304. See, e.g., UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis., 774 F. Supp. 1163,
1169-73 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (holding that the University of Wisconsin hate speech rules went
beyond the scope of Chaplinsky); Dambrot v. Central Mich. Univ., 839 F. Supp. 477, 482-
83 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (observing that rules did not proscribe fighting words that were not
directed at the listener on account of race, sex, or other protected class); see also
DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 6, at 96 (reporting that University of Texas and Uni-
versity of California at Berkeley prohibited speech that was essentially equivalent to
fighting words).
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"there go the child molesters." 5 The court invoked Chaplinsky, and
held that the attorney's speech was not constitutionally protected be-
cause it constituted words that "tend to incite a breach of the
peace." 3' In other words, the court seemed to make the remarkable
assumption that the state workers would have beaten up the lawyer if
they had not been capable of exercising extraordinary self-restraint.
But the decision does fall within the narrowed construction of
Chaplinsky given by the Court - the words were uttered directly at
the person of the addressee, and possibly were words which by their
very nature would tend to provoke violent retaliation.'
Another attorney-speech case, In re Spivey, also fits within the
narrow bounds of Chaplinsky. In that case, a district attorney repeat-
edly and loudly addressed another patron at a bar as a "n-," and
was removed from office by the Superior Court, pursuant to a state
statute. The court took judicial notice of the effect the attorney's
words would have on an African-American listener, and observed
that the attorney was probably trying to provoke a confrontation at
the bar - a paradigmatic instance of fighting words under Chaplin-
sky. Interestingly, the trial court went beyond this application of
Chaplinsky, and concluded that the attorney's removal was justified
because he had engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration
of justice.3 Not only the bar confrontation, but also the testimony of
numerous witnesses at the removal hearing, established that the at-
torney had a long history of mistreating black citizens of his district.
The finding that his conduct was prejudicial to justice was one that
the trial court was obligated to make under the removal statute, but it
is worth speculating on the result if the bar assault had not occurred.
Could the testimony of the African-American witnesses, showing that
the district attorney was a racist, establish a constitutionally sound ba-
sis for removal? And, if so, why could the Illinois committee not
deny admission to Matthew Hale on the same ground? The answer,
in light of the university hate speech cases, is probably that racially
disparaging language that was not essentially an invitation to fight
could not form the basis for state sanctions against a lawyer, provided
305. See Statewide Grievance Comm'n v. Presnick, 559 A.2d 220,225 (Conn. App. Ct.
1989).
306. 1&
307. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20.
308. See Gooding, 405 U.S. at 525-27.
309. 345 N.E.2d 693 (N.C. 1997).
310. Id. at 699.
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that the language was not part and parcel of the act of racial discrimi-
nation in the lawyer's professional capacity. The decision of the Illi-
nois character and fitness committee is supportable only on the
ground that the record supports a predictive judgment that Hale will
be unable to comply with a valid disciplinary rule preventing dis-
crimination against clients and other lawyers and litigants. Chaplin-
sky does not equate to an exception to the general requirement that
speech restrictions be content-neutral; it merely provides some regu-
latory authority where violent response may be expected.
C. The Right/Privilege Distinction
A recurring theme in constitutional law, going back at least as far
as Justice Holmes's tenure on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts, is that in some cases the government may hand out benefits
with strings attached. Justice Holmes wrote a decision upholding the
dismissal of a policeman for violating a regulation against participat-
ing in political activity, famously stating in the process that "[t]he pe-
titioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman."3"' This vision of constitutional
rights is essentially contractarian - in the absence of coercion, the
individual is free, in the course of her relationship with the state, to
surrender a privilege that the state otherwise would have safe-
guarded, in exchange for some valuable government benefit. The
employee's government job, along with the full panoply of expressive
rights enjoyed by other citizens, therefore, is merely a privilege, an in-
terest "created by the grace of the state and dependent for [its] exis-
tence on the state's sufferance." ' If the state wishes to demand the
surrender of a constitutional right in exchange for the government
job, it is free to do so.
On several occasions, the Court has announced the end of the
right/privilege distinction."' The modern doctrine, which the Court
311. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892). Interestingly, the
same principle was applied by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Scopes's appeal from his
conviction at the famous "monkey trial." The court said that Scopes "had no right or
privilege to serve the State except upon such terms as the State prescribed," including re-
quiring teachers to refrain from teaching evolution. See Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363, 364-
65 (Tenn. 1927).
312. Rodney A. Smolla, The Reemergence of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Consti-
tutional Law: The Price of Protesting Too Much, 35 STAN. L. REv. 69,71 (1982).
313. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,541 (1985); Abood v.
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209,229-30 (1977). See also William Van Alstyne, The De-
mise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1429
(1968)(providing a well known academic commentary on this development).
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generally claims to follow, is that of "unconstitutional conditions.
314
According to this principle, the government may not grant a benefit
to a person on the condition that the recipient refrain from engaging
in some constitutionally protected activity, even if the recipient is not
entitled to the benefit in the first place.315 For instance, a government
agency may not deny a job to someone or dismiss an employee for
belonging to "subversive" organizations, 316 for refusing to take a loy-
alty oath311 for refusing to declare belief in God,31 or for criticizing
the employer."9 A federal appellate court has held that a state may
not deny a hateful organization permission to "adopt" a stretch of
highway, reasoning that the state could not condition the privilege of
picking up litter alongside the road on the renunciation of white su-
premacist beliefs."l The Court has extended the protection of the un-
constitutional conditions doctrine to government contractors, whose
contracts may not be terminated for speaking out against the gov-
ernment or for refusing to support an elected official's campaign.32'
The unconstitutional conditions analysis does not apply to many
lawyer free expression cases, because the constitutional right that the
lawyer claims is infringed is not a right which would exist outside the
context in which it was asserted.3 ' Suppose a lawyer is disciplined for
making racist remarks in a closing argument at trial. It is to no avail
to claim that the disciplinary agency is requiring the lawyer to surren-
der a constitutional right in exchange for the privilege of trying cases
before the courts of the state, because the lawyer had no preexisting
right to address a jury in a courtroom. 3 If, on the other hand, the
314. See Kathleen Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1413
(1989). For an early statement of this doctrine, see Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad
Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926).
315. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593,597 (1972).
316. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,605-06 (1967).
317. See Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183,191 (1952).
318. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488,405 (1961).
319. See Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1979); Mt.
Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,284 (1977).
320. See Cuffley v. Mickes, 208 F.3d 702,709 (8th Cir. 2000). This reasoning is faulty,
because the court misconstrued the nature of the Klan's rights. It is true that Klansmen
had a preexisting right to pick up litter near the highway, wearing their robes if they'd like,
but they had no prior right to have the state put up signs acknowledging this effort.
321. See O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996); Board of
County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, (1996).
322. See WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, FIRST AMENDMENT 330-31 (1991).
323. Cf. Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438 (1979) (appearing pro hac vice is a privilege, not a
right). This case is not an impermissible example of right/privilege reasoning, because the
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lawyer had been disciplined for making racist remarks in a letter to
the editor, unconnected with any pending litigation, the unconstitu-
tional conditions analysis would be applicable. In that case, the law-
yer would be engaging in an activity in which she was fully entitled to
participate as an ordinary, non-lawyer citizen.
Despite the Supreme Court's avowal of the end of the
right/privilege doctrine, this reasoning lives on in two contexts which
have immediate application to the regulation of lawyers. The first is
the Court's procedural due process line of cases: a government entity
must provide due process only when the claimant is deprived of an in-
terest that may be characterized as "life, liberty, or property."' ' 4 In
other situations, the recipient of a government benefit may be
deemed to have waived due process rights as part of the bargaining
process by which the benefit was obtained. So long as "courts retain
their normal power to police bargains and carefully scrutinize the
contractual process, the lack of meaningful procedural recourse for an
individual can surely be the legitimate object of an enforceable bar-
gain. ', 31 In the words of Justice Rehnquist, the recipient of a govern-
ment license, job, or benefit must "take the bitter with the sweet." 326
The second, closely related, recurrence of the right/privilege dis-
tinction, one which bears by analogy on the First Amendment rights
of lawyers, is the Court's public employment cases. The typical fact
pattern involves a government employee who says something critical
of her employer or makes comments inconsistent with the employer's
mission, and is subsequently fired. For example, an employee of the
county sheriff's office heard that someone had attempted to assassi-
nate President Reagan, and remarked, "[i]f they go for him again, I
hope they get him., 327 The Court reasoned that the sheriff s interest
in the effective functioning of his office did not outweigh the em-
ployee's right to speak out on matters of public concern.3' In Waters
lawyer has no preexisting constitutional right to represent clients in states in which she is
not licensed. Thus, the government is not requiring her to surrender a right in order to
obtain a state license. If appearing pro hac vice were conditioned upon the lawyer's
agreement not to criticize the courts of the new state, however, the exchange would be a
violation of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
324. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA AND JOHN E. NOVAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 17.2, at 584 (2d ed. 1992).
325. Smolla, supra note 312, at 111.
326. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134,153-54 (1974).
327. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378,380 (1987).
328. The Court announced this two-prong test for the free speech rights of public em-
ployees in Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). See also Pickering v. Board of Educ.,
391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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v. Churchill,329 by contrast, the Court held that a public hospital em-
ployee could be fired for criticizing her department, because the
state's interest in the efficient operation of the hospital outweighed
the employee's free expression rights. These two cases exhibit some
of the vexing analytical problems raised by First Amendment issues
- the prevalence of balancing rhetoric in the Court's decisions, the
need to pass on the importance of asserted government or individual
interests, and the manipulation of categories such as "matters of pub-
lic concern." Nevertheless, there are some appealing analogies be-
tween the public employee cases and lawyer-speech issues.3 For one
thing, the public employee analysis recognizes the "officer of the
court" dimension of the lawyer's role. Lawyers do have a significant
private or fiduciary function - they represent the interests of clients
against the state and other private parties. At the same time, how-
ever, lawyers must conform their client's conduct to the boundaries of
the law, and may not counsel or assist their clients in violating the
law. This aspect of the lawyer's role is a quasi-public obligation; law-
yers are not literally public employees, but their acts do take on a
public quality by virtue of the power of lawyers to invoke the official
apparatus of the state. (Significantly, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized that lawyers are officers of the court, not of the government, a
distinction which recalls both the importance of judicial independence
and of the independence of lawyers from the state.33' The Court has
also cautioned that the public-employer analogy is not to be taken lit-
erally, and that lawyers are not government officeholders - a class
whose membership may permissibly be limited to United States citi-
zens. 32) In addition, the public employee cases capture an important
feature of First Amendment policy in the requirement that speech be
on matters of public concern in order to be protected. There is little
reason to require the efficient functioning of government to be im-
peded by lawyers' speech that does not in some way contribute to
public welfare or to the protection of a legal or moral entitlement of
329. 511 U.S. 661 (1994).
330. In the Matthew Hale bar-admission case, the committee cited some of the Court's
public-employee decisions as though they were directly on point, not simply helpful by
analogy. See Hale Inq. Panel Opinion, supra note 28, at 880-81, citing Pickering v. Board
of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). The committee seemed blissfully unaware of the limitations
of this analogy, principally that lawyers also have a significant (and perhaps overriding, in
many cases) private duty to represent clients, even those whose interests are not aligned
with those of the government.
331. See Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333,378 (1866).
332. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
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the speaker - by advancing the search for truth, facilitating demo-
cratic self-government, or enabling disempowered minorities or dissi-
dents to assert claims for relief. Speech that merely harasses the lis-
tener, drives up the cost of resolving disputes, or enables the lawyer
to vent his spleen ought to be entitled to less protection than speech
that is critical of government actions.
The Court claims to have repudiated the right/privilege distinc-
tion in the context of admission to the bar, in Baird v. State Bar of
Arizona.333 In that case, a lawyer was denied admission to the state
bar because she refused to answer questions about whether she had
ever belonged to the Communist Party or any other organization
which advocates violent overthrow of the United States government.
Justice Black, writing for the majority, said that "[t]he practice of law
is not a matter of grace, but of right for one who is qualified by his
learning and moral character."3" Thus, the applicant could not be
forced to give up her right not to speak about her previous associa-
tions as a condition of becoming an attorney. In a later case, Keller v.
State Bar of California, the Court reiterated that lawyers cannot be
forced to surrender their right to associate or to refrain from speaking
in exchange for a license to practice law.33 Keller involved a scheme
under which a portion of state bar association licensing fees were al-
located to the bar association's lobbying activities. (This issue re-
curred many years later in the guise of the funding of student political
advocacy organizations through student activity fees at public univer-
sities.336) The Court reasoned, citing several cases involving labor
unions, that employees (or lawyers) cannot be required to surrender,
as a condition of employment or licensing, their First Amendment
right not to be compelled to support ideological causes with which
they disagree.337
Despite the Court's claim to have eschewed the right/privilege
333. 401 U.S. 1 (1971). For a representative statement to the same effect from a state
court, see Cunningham v. Superior Court, 170 Cal. App. 3d 349 (citing to Baird v. State
Bar, 401 U.S. 1 (1971))("The right to practice law.., must not be predicated upon the re-
linquishment of constitutional rights.").
334. Baird, 401 U.S. at 8. Compare Justice Blackmun's dissent, where he argued that
membership in the bar is a privilege, not a right, and that the state could constitutionally
inquire into the applicant's fitness as a condition on granting that privilege. See 401 U.S.
at 19-20.
335. 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
336. See Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth. 529 U.S. 217
(2000); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
337. See Baird, 496 U.S. at 10.
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distinction in bar admissions and licensing fee cases, this analysis can
still be found in numerous cases involving discipline for lawyers en-
gaging in expressive activities, the most prominent example being Jus-
tice Rehnquist's opinion in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada.3' "Mem-
bership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions," he wrote,
quoting Judge Cardozo.339 According to Justice Rehnquist, lawyers in
pending cases are subject to restrictions on speech to which an ordi-
nary citizen would not be. 0 He emphasized that even rights as fun-
damental as those guaranteed by the First Amendment may be sub-
ordinated to other interests that arise in litigation."41 The reason for
this subordination is the special status of a lawyer - she is an officer
of the court, "an intimate and trusted and essential part of the ma-
chinery of justice."' 2 Justice Kennedy, by contrast, was concerned
that application of the right/privilege distinction to speech by lawyers
would have the consequence of reducing a lawyer to the status of a
cog in the machinery of justice. "There is no question that speech
critical of the exercise of the State's power lies at the very center of
the First Amendment."' "3 A cog, after all, is in no position to criticize
the operation of the machine. Thus, Justice Kennedy sought to vest
the lawyer's speech with the constitutional safeguards available to
core political speech, arguing that the public's right to be informed on
how criminal trials are conducted justified heightened protection for
the lawyer's comments to the press.' The attorney's capacity to
make this information public suggested to Justice Kennedy that the
338. See Gentile, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
339. Id. at 1066 (citing In re Rouss, 116 N.E. 782, 783 (N.Y. 1917) (Cardozo, J.)); see
also People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 162 N.E. 487,489 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, J.). Despite
the prestige of the author of these opinions, they are of doubtful precedential value, since
they long predate the Supreme Court's general rejection of the right/privilege distinction.
340. See id at 1071.
341. See id. at 1073 (citing Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) (claiming
that courts may issue protective orders limiting the dissemination of information obtained
in discovery)). This citation is also inapposite, because the confidential information di-
vulged by the parties in Rhinehart was obtained by the lawyer only pursuant to the court's
power to order discovery; it is not information to which the lawyer (and therefore the
newspaper) would otherwise have been entitled.
342. Id at 1072 (quoting In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 668 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting)).
343. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1034 (Kennedy, J.).
344. See id. at 1035 (citing Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829,
838-39 (1978) and Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980)). The
lawyer in Gentile, after all, was only countering the state's publicity efforts, which included
a leak to the press suggesting that two other potential suspects had passed lie-detector
tests. See id at 1040-42.
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"officer of the court" appellation actually entailed less regulation of
lawyers' speech, not more, as Justice Rehnquist argued. It may be
more accurate, however, to say that Justice Kennedy elevated the pri-
vate, or fiduciary dimension of the lawyer's role to a position of pri-
macy over the public or officer of the court duty.
As I have argued, Justice Kennedy's reasoning is sounder, in
light of both constitutional doctrine and the ethical traditions of the
legal profession. 46 Because Justice Rehnquist's opinion commanded
the majority on the constitutional issues, however, it is important to
be very clear on what, exactly, it holds. Court?' and commentatorse
345. Id. at 1056.
346. See supra notes 160 - 173 and accompanying text.
347. See, e.g., Howell v. State Bar of Texas, 843 F.2d 205, 207 (5th Cir. 1988); In re
Frerichs, 238 N.W.2d 764, 768-69 (Iowa 1976) ("A lawyer, acting in a professional capac-
ity, may have some fewer rights of free speech than would a private citizen"); Attorney
Grievance Comm'n v. Alison, 565 A.2d 660, 665-66 (Md. Ct. App. 1989) (lawyers volun-
tarily accept restrictions on conduct more demanding than those applicable to other mem-
bers of society); In re Williams, 414 N.W.2d 394, 397 (Minn. 1987) ("Outside the court-
room the lawyer may, as any other citizen, freely engage in the marketplace of ideas ....
But here respondent was in the courtroom, and officer of the court engaged in court busi-
ness, and for his speech to be governed by appropriate rules of evidence, decorum, and
professional conduct does not offend the first amendment."); State ex rel. Nebraska Bar
Ass'n v. Michaelis, 316 N.W.2d 46, 53 (Neb. 1982) ("A layman may, perhaps, pursue his
theories of free speech or political activities until he runs afoul of the penalties of libel or
slander, or into some infraction of our statutory law. A member of the bar can, and will,
be stopped at the point where he infringes our Canons of Ethics; and if he wishes to re-
main a member of the bar he will conduct himself in accordance therewith."); In re Con-
verse, 602 N.W.2d 500 (Neb. 1999); In re Raggio, 487 P.2d 499, 500-01 (Nev. 1971) ("We
are never surprised when persons, not intimately involved with the administration of jus-
tice, speak out in anger or frustration about our work .... A member of the bar, however,
stands in a different position by reason of his oath of office and the standards of conduct
which he is sworn to uphold."); Justice of the Appellate Division v. Erdmann, 301 N.E.2d
426, 428 (N.Y. 1973) (Burke J., dissenting) ("The article, as well as the remarks, violate
restrictions placed on attorneys which they impliedly assume when they accopt admission
to the Bar.") but see Polk v. State Bar of Texas, 374 F. Supp. 784,787 (N.D. Tex. 1974) ("It
cannot be seriously asserted that a private citizen surrenders his right to freedom of ex-
pression when he becomes a licensed attorney in this state"); In re Johnson, 729 P.2d 1175,
1178 (Kan. 1986) ("One who has received a license and is accorded the prih ilege to prac-
tice law is still guaranteed the right of freedom of speech."); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n
v. Porter, 766 P.2d 958, 961 (Okla. 1988); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL
ETHICS §11.3.2, at 602 (1986).
348. This student note on an attorney free speech case is typical: "[E]very attorney
should be aware that the right to free speech is a qualified right. Attorneys representing
clients in a judicial context are subject to ethical restrictions on speech greater than those
that bind ordinary citizens." Brian E. Mitchell, Note, An Attorney's Constitutional Right
to Have an Offensive Personality? United States v. Wunsch and Section 6068(f of the
California Business and Professions Code, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 703, 720 (1997). See also
Leora Harpaz, Compelled Lawyer Representation and the Free Speech Rights of Attorneys,
20 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 49, 56 (1998) ("the speech of lawyers can be subject to some
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are prone to misread Gentile as endorsing a broad right/privilege dis-
tinction. Careless quotation from Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Gen-
tile can suggest that lawyers waive expressive rights upon admission to
the bar, but of course this is a position that has no support in prece-
dent and is wildly out of step with First Amendment doctrine in other
contexts. Gentile, properly understood, permits courts to regulate
lawyers' speech related to pending cases in which they are involved,
at a threshold lower than "clear and present danger." Significantly, it
still requires the state to show a substantial likelihood of material
prejudice to a judicial proceeding 9 Only a very small set of lawyers'
utterances may be regulated under this standard, and a great many
cases which cite Gentile do not involve speech that threatens concrete
harm to a specific court proceeding.
D. The Government Speech Analogy
There is some truth in the right/privilege distinction as applied to
lawyers, but only in a limited context. When lawyers speak on behalf
of clients, either in courtroom proceedings or otherwise as agents for
their clients, they are speaking pursuant to an entitlement granted by
the state, to which the state may attach certain conditions necessary
for the realization of important government interests. No one has se-
riously suggested that rules of evidence (such as standards of rele-
vance), civil procedure (for example, the rule prohibiting frivolous
legal arguments 51), or professional conduct (such as the anti-vouching
rule5 ) raise First Amendment problems. In these cases, however, the
lawyer is not giving up constitutional rights that she otherwise would
have possessed as a private citizen, in exchange for a government
benefit or license. Without a license to practice law, the lawyer could
not have spoken on behalf of a client in a courtroom at all. Thus, it
may be helpful to think of lawyers' speech that is directly related to
representing clients as a kind of government-funded expression, to
which content-based restrictions may be attached.
The government is free to attach certain kinds of conditions to
the speech it funds. It may allocate funding using criteria that would
forms of regulation that would not be constitutional if applied to the expression of other
speakers"); Roberts, supra note 102, at 820-25.
349. This standard is incorporated into Rule 3.6(a) of the ABA Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct.
350. FED. R. EVID. 401.
351. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
352. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT, Rule 3.4(e).
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be impermissible if used as a basis for direct regulation of speech.353
For example, when setting up public schools, the state may limit ex-
pression - in the form of books to be bought for the school library,
the scope of curricula, and the in-class speech of teachers - accord-
ing to criteria of educational suitability.3M "It may be true that a life
promoting astrology, cat-beating, sadomasochism, racism or witch-
craft is the good life, but a grammar school pursuing any of the above
in a substantial way would not be accredited." '355 Universities may
make funding available to student organizations whose activities are
related to the educational purposes of the university.356 Grants may
be parceled out to artists on the basis of artistic excellence (the NEA
does not have to fund kitsch),357 or to teachers on the basis of peda-
gogical effectiveness." The government may fund anti-smoking, pro-
seat belt, or join-the-military campaigns, which obviously discriminate
on the basis of viewpoint in the distribution of subsidies.59 Congress
may establish the National Endowment for Democracy, which is
permitted to deny funding for speakers who wish to tout the benefits
of a Latin American-style military junta as an acceptable alternative
form of government.3" Speech restrictions, too, can be permissible if
applied to government speakers. The Hatch Act, which limits the
ability of federal employees to engage in electoral politics, has been
held constitutional.36' By analogy then, the state ought to be free to
set up a court system in which frivolous arguments are prohibited,
only relevant evidence is introduced, and courtroom speech may be
limited by criteria of germaneness to the business of the court.
None of the permissible criteria for funding speech has any
bearing on what the speaker does outside the narrow context in which
353. National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569,587-88 (1998).
354. See, e.g., Hazlewood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Board of Educ.
v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
355. SHIFFRIN, supra note 300, at 89.
356. See Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
357. See Finley, 524 U.S. 569.
358. 1a at 589 (reviewing government awards, such as fellowships and grants, available
to teachers and students on the basis of excellence in some activity).
359. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (restricting government funding of family
planning clinics to those which did not mention abortion). One of the insights of Mark
Yudof's book on government speech is just how pervasive this state-sponsored expression
is. See MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITIcs, LAW, AND
GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (1983).
360. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 194.
361. See United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413
U.S. 548 (1973).
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government funding is available. Although the NEA may fund art
that is "excellent" and not "indecent," it may not restrict its funding
to artists who agree not to criticize the government in some other fo-
rum - such as through the medium of their privately-funded art.
Schoolteachers may participate in public debate, and may weigh in
with opinions that may not be expressed in the classroom362 -- say, a
judgment that "creation science" ought to be taught on a par with
evolution. They just may not talk about creationism to their students,
on class time. The government is entitled, under the First Amend-
ment, to disassociate itself from speech that reflects badly on its poli-
cies, such as providing sound education in science to high school stu-
dents or promoting artistic excellence, but it may not extend this
selective funding authority to regulate the speech of private actors
who do not speak on behalf of the government.3"
Although most lawyers are not literally state employees, fre-
quently they speak pursuant to government-established procedures,
or using state property, such as courthouses. Thus, the Court's fo-
rum-analysis cases also provide a principled distinction between
speech settings in which lawyers are subject to stringent regulation
and those in which lawyers' expressive rights are more akin to those
of non-lawyer citizens. The essential distinction is between govern-
ment property that may be used "for purposes of assembly, commu-
nicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions"3"
and that which is closed to expressive activities by the general pub-
lic.3" The first category of "public forums" is typified by sidewalks
and parks, and within these venues, content-based regulations on
speech are strictly disfavored.3 6 In non-public forums, by contrast,
the government may impose reasonable restrictions on speech, pro-
vided that it is not viewpoint-discriminatory.367 The permissibility of
reasonable regulation of speech in a non-public forum captures the
core of truth in the right/privilege distinction - if an individual would
362. Cf Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (striking down "equal time" statute
which required teaching creationism along with evolution); Eppserson v. Arkansas, 393
U.S. 97 (1968) (invalidating ban on teaching evolution in public schools).
363. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Intersection of Free Speech and the Legal Profession:
Constraints on Lawyers' First Amendment Rights, 67 FoRD. L. REV. 569,587 (1998).
364. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496,515 (1939).
365. See generally SMOLLA, supra note 166 §§ 8:1 - 8.9.
366. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
For further discussion of content-based and content-neutral regulations, see infra notes
432 -482 and accompanying text.
367. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 47.
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not have the right to enter onto government property and use it for
expressive purposes, then the government may condition entry into
this forum on the speaker's agreement to comply with reasonable
ground rules set by the government. Although cases are legion in
which courts have been called upon to determine whether particular
settings - such as airports,3'6 high school student newspapers,69 inter-
nal mail systems,370 and sidewalks in front of government buildings"
- are public or a non-public forums, it is clear that many of the con-
texts in which lawyers speak are not open to the public for expressive
purposes. The reason why lawyers may not make frivolous argu-
ments in court filings is emphatically not because they possess dimin-
ished expressive rights as "officers of the court"; rather, it is because
the pleading system set up by the rules of civil procedure is a non-
public forum, subject to reasonable, viewpoint-neutral regulations.
Kathieen Sullivan is therefore absolutely correct to point out that the
state should not be permitted to define its functional interests too
broadly.372 The domain of non-public forums, in which lawyers'
speech is subject to extensive regulation, should be understood as
limited to communications which are essential to the accomplishment
of core court business, such as resolving disputes. Speech outside
these venues, such as courthouse-steps press conferences, critical let-
ters to newspapers or even judges, and spats between adversaries,
may not be restricted except in the relatively rare instances in which it
poses a clear and present danger to the administration of justice.
E. Vagueness and Overbreadth
A regulation that "either forbids or requires the doing of an act
in terms so vague that men [and women] of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, vio-
lates the first essential of due process of law."'37 The Court has ruled
on several occasions that terms such as "loafing," "rogues and vaga-
bonds," "obscene or opprobrious language," and "credible and reli-
able identification" are too imprecise to give fair warning to those
who risk punishment under a criminal statute.37' The vagueness doc-
368. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
369. See Hazlewood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
370. See Perry, 460 U.S. 37.
371. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990).
372. See Sullivan, supra note 363, at 588.
373. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
374. See Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 156-57; Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983);
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trine requires the government to provide clear guidelines for law en-
forcement, so that the threat of sanctions does not have a chilling ef-
fect on lawful activity.375 Because the Constitution is designed to
maximize individual liberty within the rule of law, restrictions on
one's lawful activities ought to be clearly demarcated, so a law-
abiding citizen can conform her conduct to legal requirements with-
out excessively limiting her freedom.376 Impermissibly vague laws also
permit government agents to target enforcement efforts selectively,
usually against unpopular individuals or groups.'
The vagueness doctrine is a corollary of the requirement, em-
bodied in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, that the govern-
ment provide due process before depriving a citizen of a protected in-
terest.378  However, courts have long maintained that the First
Amendment is an independent basis upon which to find regulations
void for vagueness.7 9 This is so because of the heightened public in-
terest in the free flow of information,' particularly in academic set-
tings or other institutional contexts where the exchange of ideas is of
paramount importance, ' the concern that fuzzy boundaries around
Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham,
382 U.S. 87 (1965). The statute at issue in Papachristou is a marvel of unconstitutionally
vague, but wonderfully evocative, Damon Runyon-esque language:
Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging, common
gamblers, persons who use juggling or unlawful games or plays, common drunk-
ards, common night walkers, thieves, pilferers or pickpockets, traders in stolen
property, lewd, wanton and lascivious persons, keepers of gambling places, com-
mon railers and brawlers, persons wandering or strolling around from place to
place without any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafers, disorderly persons,
persons neglecting all lawful business and habitually spending their time by fre-
quenting houses of ill fame, gaming houses, or places where alcoholic beverages
are sold or served, persons able to work but habitually living upon the earnings
of their wives or minor children shall be deemed vagrants ....
Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 156-57
375. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
432-33 (1963).
376. See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357.
377. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999); Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972); Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358, 360; Papachristou, 405
U.S. at 168-70.
378. See 4 ROTUNDA AND NOWAK, supra note 324 § 20.9, at 36.
379. See, e.g., Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358; Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109; Reno v. ACLU, 521
U.S. 844, 871-72 (1997); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974); Smith v. Goguen, 415
U.S. 566,573 (1974); Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242,1266 (3d Cir. 1992).
380. See, e.g., Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455
U.S. 489,499 (1981) (more stringent vagueness test applies where law interferes with right
of free speech); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147,151 (1959).
381. See Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
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unprotected speech would chill protected communication,3' 2 and be-
cause of the possibility that vague restrictions on speech might be
employed arbitrarily to penalize speakers of unpopular messages.3
Under the closely related overbreadth doctrine, a court may in-
validate a regulation that is designed to punish activities that are not
safeguarded by the constitution, but which includes within its scope
activities which are constitutionally protected.3 " An overbroad stat-
ute amounts to "burn[ing] the house to roast the pig." ' Courts often
speak of the chilling effect of overly broad statutes on free expres-
sion. 6 Thus, statutes regulating speech potentially covered by the
First Amendment must be narrowly drawn to address specific
harms.W "Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space
to survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow
specificity. ',3'  For example, a statute which prohibits assaulting, op-
posing, abusing, or molesting a police officer in any manner is uncon-
stitutionally overbroad because it forbids criticizing the police in im-
passioned speeches, letters to the editor, rap songs (like "Cop
Killer"), or even private conversation .3 In a university hate-speech
case involving the termination of a basketball coach for using a racial
epithet, the court worried that a student's term paper "or even a cafe-
teria bull session" might have the effect of creating a "negative con-
382. See ACLU, 521 U.S. at 872.
383. See, e.g., Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 576
(1987); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 666 n.10 (1985) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Shuttlesworth, 382 U.S. at 90. Cf
Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 503-04 (deferring consideration of retailer's contention that
city ordinance against selling cigarette papers, roach clips, and other drug paraphernalia
would be selectively enforced against individuals with alternative lifestyles). Where this
concern is not present, such as where the government is selectively funding speech, the
vagueness doctrine is not strictly enforced. See National Endowment for the Arts v. Fin-
ley, 524 U.S. 569,588-89 (1998).
384. See 4 ROTUNDA AND NOWAK, supra note 324 § 20.8, at 26; Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853 (1991).
385. Sable Communications. of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127 (19S9)(quoting
Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380,383 (1957).
386. See, e.g., Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569 (1987)
(invalidating a ludicrously overbroad ban on all "First Amendment activities" in Los An-
geles International Airport); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (striking down
statute making it illegal to display a red flag as a "sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to
organized government").
387. See ACLU, 521 U.S. at 874-76; Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,611 (1973).
388. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296,311 (1940)).
389. See Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1985).
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notation about an individual's racial or ethnic affiliation"; because the
university's "discriminatory harassment policy" covered speech that
did not amount to legally proscribed racial discrimination, harass-
ment, defamation, or intentional infliction of emotional distress, the
court held it facially overbroad." The Communications Decency
Act, designed to protect children from obscene material on the Inter-
net, was held invalid in part because it effectively criminalized a sub-
stantial amount of expression that adults had a right to receive.39 But
courts tend to relax their vigilance against overbreadth when the
speech of lawyers is concerned. For example, in one judicial-speech
case in which a judge was charged with making sexist comments to at-
torneys, the court paid lip service to the limitless variety of judging
styles that exist in Texas, noting that "[t]here must always be room for
the colorful judge as well as the more conventional judge."'" The
court, however, dealt perfunctorily with the judge's argument that
terms like "promotes public confidence in the integrity and imparti-
ality of the judiciary" prohibited the kind of colorful judging styles
the court professed to protect. 3' Although the record reveals that the
judge was an insensitive, boorish individual - a good ol' boy, in the
local vernacular - it is hard to see how his conduct could have un-
dermined public confidence in the Texas judiciary (which isn't all that
high to begin with).'94 Moreover, the rule would presumably also
have restricted the speech of eccentric but competent judges - just
the kind of jurists the court claimed to want in Texas.
A facially vague or overbroad statute may be narrowed through
judicial construction, administrative guidelines, or social context. For
390. Dambrot v. Central Michigan Univ., 839 F. Supp. 477, 481-82 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
In a somewhat paradoxical decision, the court also granted the university's cross-motion
for summary judgment on the coach's wrongful-termination claim. It held that because
the coach's speech was not on a matter of public concern, the university did not violate his
First Amendment rights by terminating him. See id. at 490. The university's inability to
promulgate an enforceable code of conduct prohibiting the coach's use of a racial epithet,
alongside its power to fire the coach for precisely that reason, is an ironic consequence of
the byzantine complexity of First Amendment doctrine.
391. See ACLU, 521 U.S. at 874.
392. In re Barr, 13 S.W.3d 525,539 (Tex. Review Tribunal 1999).
393. See id. at 564-65 (opinion on rehearing). See also In re Hill, 8 S.W.3d 578, 583
(Mo. 2000) (making extremely conclusory argument that judge's letter to a local newspa-
per, as part of a political dispute, did not promote public confidence in the judiciary).
394. For a fairly typical view of the Texas judiciary, see Randall T. Shepard, Judicial
Professionalism and the Relations Between Judges and Lawyers, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 223, 239 n.114 (2000) (relating joke in which a judge decides that
the ethical course of action is to take campaign contributions from both sides and decide
the case on the merits).
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example, in Hoffman Estates, the Court was unimpressed with the de-
fendant's argument that statutory language requiring a retail outlet to
obtain a license to sell drug paraphernalia was vague.95 The village's
licensing guidelines employed terms like "roach clips" and "pipes,"
which the Court concluded were adequately clear in the context of
illegal drug use. 96 Of course, clarity through common usage by itself
may not save a statute from unconstitutional vagueness, because of
the problem of discriminatory enforcement. Everyone knows who
"cpersons neglecting all lawful business and habitually spending their
time by frequenting houses of ill fame, gaming houses, or places
where alcoholic beverages are sold" are - even Justice Douglas, the
author of the majority opinion in Papachristou knew these persons
were the "so-called undesirables" who are continually subjected to
police harassment.97 The basis for the constitutional infirmity of the
statute is the possibility that these disfavored citizens "are permitted
to stand on a public sidewalk... only at the whim of any police offi-
cer."3' In other words, the words in a statute might not be literally
vague, when read in light of common usage, but they may be uncon-
stitutionally vague insofar as they permit discriminatory enforcement
of penal laws.
The twin issues of vagueness and overbreadth are inextricably
bound up with the attempt by courts to promulgate rules regulating
speech and expressive conduct by lawyers. Some federal district
court local rules prohibit speech which is "prejudicial to the admini-
stration of justice; '' that "degrades or impugns the integrity of the
court;' 4 or that is "unbecoming [of] an officer of the Court.""0 Many
states have adopted a version of ABA Model Rule 4.4, which prohib-
its statements to third parties that have no purpose other than embar-
rassing, delaying, or burdening the listener; some courts have held
395. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S.
489,497-500 (1981).
396. See id. at 500-02.
397. Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 171,158.
398. Id. at 170 (citing Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 (1965) (internal
alterations omitted)).
399. U.S. DIST Cr. D. HAW. R. 110-3; cf. U.S. DIST. Cr. D.S.C. R. 2.09(l)(4) (prohib-
iting "[c]onduct tending to pollute or obstruct the administration of justice").
400. U.S. DIST. Cr. E.D. CAL. R. 180(e); U.S. DIST. Cr. C.D. CAL. R. 2.5.2 U.S. DIST.
Cr. D. IDAHO R. 83.6(a).
401. U.S. DIST. Cr. E.D. KY. AND W.D. KY. R. 3(b); see also U.S. DIST. Cr. D.R.I. R.
4(e)(3); U.S. DIST. Cr. E.D. Tax. R. 3(d)(1)(A); U.S. DIST. Cr. N.D. TEX. R. 13.2(b)(i).
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that these rules are unconstitutionally vague.' On a different sub-
ject, federal district courts have prohibited speech which "can rea-
sonably be interpreted as manifesting prejudice or bias" based on
race, sex, or other suspect classifications.4" One state statute prohib-
its the exhibition of "offensive personality" by lawyers.' A handful of
states have adopted anti-discrimination amendments to their rules of
professional discipline, such as the Michigan rule prohibiting "invidi-
ous discrimination."'  All of these rules are potentially vulnerable to
a challenge for vagueness or overbreadth, but interestingly, many
courts have found expressions like "offensive personality" to be pel-
lucid to lawyers, most of whom are presumably well acquainted with
many personalities of varying degrees of offensiveness.
Consider, as an example, the case of In re Beaver, in which an at-
torney was disciplined for violating his oath to "abstain from all of-
fensive personality.'"' Mr. Beaver argued that this provision of the
oath was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague, but the court con-
cluded that, in context, the term was restricted to "conduct that re-
flects adversely on a person's fitness as a lawyer."'  I cannot fathom
why this verbal formulation is not just as vague as "offensive person-
ality," but the court's discussion does suggest an important princi-
ple: attorneys are expected to conduct themselves according to pro-
fessional standards, and these standards are not always susceptible to
being reduced to precise statutory language.' Indeed, the Supreme
Court has said that the phrase "conduct unbecoming a member of the
bar" must be read in the context of the "lore of the profession." 1' Al-
though at one point in the opinion the Court seemed to equate pro-
fessional lore with the positive disciplinary codes promulgated by
402- See, e.g., Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. Benton, 980 S.W.2d 425, 440-43
(Tex. 1998) (holding that Texas Disciplinary Rule 3.06(d), a version of Model Rule 4.4, is
unconstitutionally vague).
403. See U.S. DIsT. Cr. D. ARIZ. R. 1.20; see also U.S. DIST. Cr. N.D. CAL. R. Cv. 11-
3(b) (lacking mention of suspect classifications); U.S. DIST. Cr. W.D. WASH. R. GR 9;
U.S. DIST. Cr. N.D. AND S.D. W. VA. Gen P 3.02.
404. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068 (f) (West 2000).
405. See Quick, supra note 57, at 37.
406. 510 N.W.2d 129,132 (Wis. 1994).
407. Id at 133.
408. Cf. Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 435, 941 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding city or-
dinance against loitering remains vague if the imprecise terms are equated with another
vague term, in this case, "hanging out").
409. See Beaver, 510 N.W.2d at 133-34.
410. In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634,644-45 (1985).
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state bar associations,41' the Court also appears to concede that the
competing demands of zealously advocating one's client's cause and
advancing the cause of justice must be resolved "in light of the tradi-
tional duties imposed on an attorney," '412 which are not neatly cap-
tured in the disciplinary codes. In other cases, the Court has not at-
tempted to anchor the narrowing construction of disciplinary
standards to the state bar codes and rules.
Given the traditions of the legal profession and an attorney's
specialized professional training, there is unquestionably some
room for enforcement of standards that might be impermissibly
vague in other contexts; an attorney in many instances may
properly be punished for conduct which all responsible attor-
neys would recognize as improper for a member of the profes-
413
sion.
In other words, by belonging to a community and sharing in the prac-
tices of similarly situated professionals, lawyers become acquainted
with professional norms that are not reducible to neat disciplinary
codes.
Lower federal and state courts have offered similar arguments
for why the standard of "good moral character" required for appli-
cants to the bar is not unconstitutionally vague.4 4 The only due proc-
ess-related limitation on the use of this criterion by states is that the
evidence upon which denial of admission is based must bear a "ra-
tional connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice
law., 415 At the very least, this principle has prevented states from re-
lying on such private matters as cohabitation and consensual homo-
sexual intimacy as grounds for denial of admission.4 6 But in relation
to other disciplinary rules, such as the prohibition in Model Rule
8.4(d) on engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of jus-
tice, judges have been quite willing to reject challenges to the vague-
ness of these aspirational standards. Like the Supreme Court in Sny-
de, these courts claim that "the traditions of the legal profession"
417
411. See id. at 645 (finding guidance provided by "lore of the profession, as embodied
in codes of professional conduct") (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted).
412. Id. at 644-45.
413. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 666 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
414. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHIcS § 15.3, at 859 (1986).
415. Schware v. Board of Bar Exam'rs, 353 U.S. 232,239 (1957).
416. See In re N.R.S., 403 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. 1981); Cord v. Gibb, 254 S.E.2d 71 (Va.
1979).
417. Committee on Legal Ethics v. Douglas, 370 S.E.2d 325,328 (W. Va. 1988).
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flesh out the rules and provide adequate notice of prohibited conduct
to reasonable lawyers.418
Not all courts to consider the issue have assumed that the exer-
cise of professional judgment and the lore and traditions of the pro-
fession are sufficient to warn lawyers of when their conduct may be
sanctioned as a violation of the duty of civility. For example, the
Ninth Circuit held that a provision of the California Business and
Professions Code proscribing offensive personalities was void for
vagueness. In Wunsch, a male defense lawyer, annoyed with his ad-
versary, a woman, sent her a letter with the photocopied statement
"MALE LAWYERS PLAY BY THE RULES, DISCOVER
TRUTH, AND RESTORE ORDER. FEMALE LAWYERS ARE
OUTSIDE THE LAW, CLOUD TRUTH, AND DESTROY
ORDER." 419 The trial court had sanctioned the lawyer under the
California statute, incorporated by reference into the local rules of
the federal district courts. It had reasoned that state judicial decisions
had sufficiently narrowed the range of proscribed conduct, affording
lawyers notice of what behavior would fall within the statutory defini-
tion of "offensive personality." The court of appeals, however, held
that the cases did not provide a sufficiently clear boundary between
obnoxious, but permissible, lawyering activities and those which could
be the subject of sanctions.42 A dissenting judge would have applied
the "professional lore" analysis, reasoning that the ethical traditions
of the legal profession are known to all lawyers, and provide a clear
418. For courts that have accepted the argument that professional norms or traditions
are sufficiently clear to provide guidance for lawyers, see, e.g., Howell v. State Bar of
Texas, 843 F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir. 1988); In re Phelps, 637 F.2d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 1981); In
re Bithoney, 486 F.2d 319, 324-25 (1st Cir. 1973); In re Keiler, 380 A.2d 119, 126 (D.C.
1977); Commission on Prof. Ethics v. Hurd, 360 N.W.2d 96, 105 (Iowa 1984); In re Frer-
ichs, 238 N.W.2d 764,768 (Iowa 1976); State v. Nelson, 504 P.2d 211 (Kan. 1972); Attorney
Grievance Comm'n v. Alison, 565 A.2d 660, 667 (Md. 1989); In re Stanbury, 561 N.W.2d
507 (Minn. 1997); In re Hinds, 449 A.2d 483,497-98 (NJ. 1982). The Eleventh Circuit ap-
pears to take the position that the "lore of the profession" must be set forth in disciplinary
codes in order to serve as grounds for sanctions. See In re Finkelstein, 901 F.2d 1560, 1565
(11th Cir. 1990) (citing In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634 (1985)). That court faulted the district
judge for suspending a lawyer from practice based on violations of a "transcendental code
of conduct... [which] existed only in the subjective opinion of the court." Id. However,
the court was focused on whether the lawyer had notice of the code of conduct which he
allegedly violated, leaving open the possibility that an uncodified but suitably clear profes-
sional norm could form the basis for discipline, even in the Eleventh Circuit, if the lawyer
knew or should have known of its existence. Uncodified norms are not necessarily subjec-
tive.
419. See United States v. Wunsch, 84 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 1996).
420. See &L at 1119.
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enough boundary between acceptable and impermissible behavior."'
The problem with the approach suggested by courts' reliance on
the lore of the legal profession is that norms of a professional com-
munity provide sufficient guidance only if a sufficient number of pro-
fessionals assent to the norms or at least agree on what they pro-
vide." In large-scale, pluralistic communities, however, there is
unlikely to be substantial agreement on the boundaries of acceptable
behavior. For example, economic theorist Robert Ellickson has de-
scribed informal norm-enforcement mechanisms among cattle ranch-
ers in a rural California county, which provide an interesting contrast
to state-sponsored law as a means of social control."' Although El-
lickson argues that the ranchers' society tends to propagate efficient
norms, he recognizes the limitation of that kind of model of social
control to small, closely-knit groups.4 Perhaps the small, homogene-
ous group of English barristers could be regulated by informal means,
and governed by the lore of the profession and the unwritten code of
English gentlemen.4' In a more diverse professional association, such
as the bar of any medium-sized or larger city, unwritten codes of be-
havior are much more difficult to enforce. Individuals are frequently
not repeat players with respect to each other, so they have less incen-
tive to take into account the perceptions of others.426
Another problem with professional lore and community stan-
dards is suggested by the Court's decision in Papachristou: it is not
enough to avoid unconstitutional vagueness for a statute to provide
an adequate description of the class of persons to whom it applies, if
the possibility exists of discriminatory enforcement in the hands of
enforcement personnel. Every practitioner knows what a "Rambo
litigator" or an "attack dog" lawyer is, and can cite examples at will,
but this does not guarantee the constitutional fitness of a court rule
prohibiting "attack dog" tactics. These rules may be enforced only
421. See id. at 1121 (Farris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
422. See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96
MICH. L. REV. 338,358-59 (1997).
423. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991).
424. See id. at 177-82.
425. See SAMUEL HABER, THE QUEST FOR AUTHORITY AND HONOR IN THE
AMERICAN PROFESSIONS 1750-1900 76 (1991).
426. See ELLICKSON, supra note 423, at 178-80; Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H.
Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Liti-
gation, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 509, 543-46 (1994) (noting that small, localized communities
are necessary for the development of "reputational markets").
[Vol. 28
against disfavored lawyers - those representing unpopular clients or
causes, for example.4 7 As the Court recognized in Papachristou,
vesting too much discretion in the hands of enforcement authorities
creates pressure to toe the official line: "Those generally implicated
by the imprecise terms of the ordinance - poor people, nonconfo-
rmists, dissenters, idlers - may be required to comport themselves
according to the life style deemed appropriate by the Jacksonville po-
lice and courts."' 8 Too much enforcement discretion in the hands of
courts and disciplinary agencies is intolerable, given the lawyer's tra-
ditional role as a champion for dissenters and nonconformists. And
lest one believe that the discriminatory enforcement is a constitu-
tional bogey that never actually appears, consider some cases in
which African-American lawyers have been disciplined for accusing
government actors of racism. In one case, a lawyer was sanctioned
for making "overly emphatic denunciations of Judge Tucker's court-
room procedures.""42 The federal district court abstained from the
Virginia disciplinary proceedings on Younger grounds, but the opin-
ion leaves a definite impression of racially discriminatory enforce-
ment" Similarly, although a court ultimately refused to impose dis-
cipline, the Oklahoma bar association attempted to punish a black
lawyer who had called a trial judge a racist.43'
F. Content and Viewpoint Neutrality
The analysis of restrictions on speech proceeds on different
courses or tracks, to use Laurence Tribe's metaphor,4 32 depending on
whether the regulation is motivated by the substance of the expres-
sion.433 Some government regulations are justified without reference
427. Cf. DONALD D. LANDON, COUNTRY LAWYERS: THE IMPACT OF CONTEXT ON
PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 123-31 (1990) (reporting interviews with small-town lawyers
who were discouraged by their community from taking on certain types of cases, like civil
rights suits).
428. Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 170.
429. Greene v. Virginia State Bar Ass'n, 411 F. Supp. 512,515 (E.D. Va. 1976).
430. See idL at 517 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)).
431. See State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Porter, 766 P.2d 958 (Okla. 1988).
432. See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-7 (2d ed. 1988).
433. For some of the academic commentary on the distinction between content-based
and content-neutral regulation of speech, see Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in
First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1981); Geoffrey Stone, Comment: Anti-
Pornography Legislation as Viewpoint Discrimination, 9 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 461
(1986); Geoffrey Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 46 (1987); Geof-
frey Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 189
(1983); Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589; Su-
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to the content of the communication; these do not trigger presump-
tive First Amendment scrutiny, provided that they are narrowly tai-
lored to achieve a significant government interest and leave open am-
ple alternative channels of communication. 4 These regulations do
not implicate value judgments about the substantive message con-
tained in the communication; therefore, they do not raise concerns
about government interfering in the marketplace of ideas. The same
relaxed scrutiny is applied to expressive conduct that is not particu-
larized, which may be subject to regulations unrelated to the suppres-
sion of free expression.435 Conditions on speech that meet these crite-
ria are frequently referred to as "time, place, and manner"
restrictions, but I will use the term "modal" restrictions, for brevity.
The classic example of a permissible modal restriction is a municipal
ordinance that prohibits sound trucks from operating in residential
neighborhoods after 10:00 p.m. This ordinance is justified by the gov-
san Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615
(1991).
434. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989). According to the
Court in Ward, this test is functionally equivalent to the O'Brien test, which is intended to
evaluate restrictions on symbolic expression. See infra, note 441; Clark v. Community for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,293 (1984).
435. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968). The definition between conduct what "possesses sufficient communicative ele-
ments to bring the First Amendment into play" and conduct whose message is more pe-
ripheral is another one of those exceedingly blurry lines of which courts are so fond in
First Amendment cases. See, e.g., Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146
(2d Cir. 1990). In Young, the court argued that begging in the subway is not like burning a
flag by a political protester (See Johnson, 491 U.S. 397), wearing black armbands to pro-
test the Vietnam war (See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969)), or sitting in at a segregated lunch counter (See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131
(1966)). The court admitted that begging does communicate messages such as "govern-
ment aid for the homeless is inadequate," but claimed that it was nevertheless not expres-
sive, because most subway panhandlers just want money. Young, 903 F.2d 146. Of course,
in one sense black students who sat in at lunch counters just wanted lunch, albeit on equal
terms with white patrons. The power of the sit-in protests was incidental to the inability of
the protesters to engage in the conduct of obtaining a meal. The court's analysis in Young
also depended on its armchair empiricism about the actual intention of subway panhan-
dlers. See 903 F.2d at 153-54. It does not seem improbable that panhandlers choose cer-
tain subway lines - say, the 4/5/6 East Side trains heading downtown during morning rush
hour - to dramatize their plight to wealthy commuters heading to their jobs at law firms
and investment banks. Perhaps, like John Dillinger, panhandlers ride those trains only
because "it's where the money is." In any event, a constitutional line of demarcation that
depends on the subjective intention of the speaker seems destined for inconsistent applica-
tion and manipulation by courts. Cf. Larry Alexander, Free Speech and Speaker's Intent,
12 CONST. COMMENTARY 21 (1995); Laurence H. Tribe, The Mystery of Motive, Private
and Public: Some Notes Inspired by the Problems of Hate Crime and Animal Sacrifice,
1993 SuP. CT. REv. 1.
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erment interest in preserving the tranquility of residential neighbor-
hoods, and therefore would apply whether the sound trucks were
broadcasting an oration by Castro or the B-Minor Mass.436 There is
little likelihood that government disagreement with a particular mes-
sage motivated the passage of the ordinance, because the ordinance is
aimed at the "non-meaning effect" of the sound trucks - the noise
pollution that is independent of the meaning of the broadcasts.437
Modal restrictions coordinate expressive interests with other
competing, valid claims, rather than subordinating speech interests to
the other values.4 (Compare the Court's obscenity cases, which state
that the government interest in order and morality outweigh the
speaker's and the audience's right to sexually explicit entertain-
ment.439) For this reason, scholars from all political perspectives tend
to praise the Court's endorsement of modal restrictions instead of
outright bans on certain kinds of speech.' 0 Modal regulations are, by
their very nature, directed toward the non-communicative aspect of
expression, such as the forum in which it is delivered. Provided that
alternative channels of communication are left open, the speaker's
message is not suppressed. At the same time, the modal regulations
ensure that other rights-holders are not forgotten in the rush to pro-
tect the speaker's expressive interests - residents living near Central
Park are not subjected to intolerably loud rock concerts, for exam-
ple,"1 patients seeking access to abortion clinics are not prohibited
from obtaining treatment by aggressive protesters,442 and visitors at
the Minnesota State Fair are free to move around without being fol-
lowed by Hare Krishnas.43
436. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 113 (1980).
437. See Melville Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First Amend-
ment, 21 UCLA L. REv. 29 (1973). Of course, the sound truck ordinance and its suppos-
edly content-neutral justification may be a pretext to regulate the content of speech if, for
example, the only speakers using sound trucks in a given town are members of the opposi-
tion political party, or some other disfavored group such as union organizers or civil rights
advocates. As I argue below, the distinction between content-neutral and content-based
restrictions on speech is extraordinarily slippery.
438. Post, supra note 202, at 1261.
439. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
440. See, e.g., Michael C. Doff, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARv.
L. REV. 1175, 1208-09 (1996) (on the left); Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Ju-
risprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHi. L. REv. 225,237 (1992) (on the right).
441. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (upholding requirement
that bands use city sound engineer at concert).
442. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
443. See Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981)
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The reduced burden on the state to justify modal restrictions on
speech has obvious application to cases involving in-court expression
by lawyers, or statements made by lawyers in filed court papers or
pretrial depositions. In just about any conceivable case, the govern-
ment can show a significant interest and alternative channels of com-
munication that are not foreclosed by the restriction. For example,
many courts, considering allegations of corruption by judges, have re-
sponded that lawyers are free to make these accusations in the ap-
propriate time, place, and manner - such as to a state commission on
judicial conduct.' The government's interest is in maintaining or-
derly recusal or disqualification procedures, and the alternative chan-
nels of communication are established by these mechanisms, which
permit complaints to be filed by aggrieved attorneys. In general,
these decisions are unobjectionable, but it is important not to over-
state the reach of permissible modal restrictions. A requirement that
criticism of judges be "respectful" or not "prejudicial to the admini-
stration of justice" may very well be enforced in a discriminatory
manner, even though it appears to be a modal regulation. The Chi-
cago Seven trial was replete with incidents in which the judge's at-
tempt to maintain "decorum" was transparently aimed at delegiti-
mizing the political messages communicated by the defendants and
their lawyers. (This stigmatizing of dissenting voices extended be-
yond the courtroom: amidst the passions of the trial, a skit performed
at the Chicago Bar Association's annual Christmas show, criticizing
Judge Hoffman's conduct of the trial, was attacked in the Chicago
(upholding requirement that groups distributing literature must do so from booth).
444. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 72 F.3d 25, 29 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting that
"[a]ttorneys should be free to challenge, in appropriate legal proceedings, a court's per-
ceived partiality"); In re Riley, 691 P.2d 695,704-05 (Ariz. 1984) ("Any grievance a lawyer
may have concerning ethical misconduct by a sitting judge should be submitted to the
Commission on Judicial Qualifications. 'Going public' by a member of the Bar is not the
appropriate method to redress misconduct by a judge"); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Heler-
inger, 602 S.W.2d 165, 169 (Ky. 1980) ("the proper forum in which to have made his claim
was the Judicial Retirement and Removal Commission"); Louisiana Bar Ass'n v. Karst,
428 So.2d 406 (La. 1983); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Alison, 565 A.2d 660 (Md. Ct.
App. 1989); In re Westfall, 808 S.W.2d 829, 839 (Mo. 1991) ("Avenues of complaint were
available.., through the filing of a complaint with the Commission on Retirement, Re-
moval, and Discipline"); State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Michaelis, 316 N.W.2d
46, 51 (Neb. 1982) (finding that "Michaelis never brought the alleged acts of impropriety
to the attention of the proper authorities"); In re Lacey, 283 N.W.2d 250, 252 (S.D. 1979)
(noting that "[the lawyer] must have been well aware at the time he made the statement
that he could have voiced his complaints to the South Dakota Judicial Qualifications
Commission").
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Tribune as "a clear violation of the canons of professional ethics.""5)
The question of how to reconcile dignitary and efficiency interests
and other procedural norms with the political function of trials was
nicely posed by an exchange at the trial between Judge Hoffman and
David Dellinger:
THE COURT: There comes a time when courtroom decorum
must be observed.
MR. DELLINGER: Decorum is more important than justice, I446
suppose.
Dellinger's comment shows that a criterion like "decorum" is not
necessarily content-neutral because Judge Hoffman had arguably
used the interest in order and dignity to bias the trial against the de-
fendants. By repeatedly punishing the defendants and their lawyers
for conduct which passed without comment when engaged in by the
government, Judge Hoffman effectively removed the defendants'
viewpoint from discourse in the trial; thus, what appeared on its face
to be a content-neutral regulation was in fact enforced in a discrimi-
natory manner.
For this reason, courts should take seriously the possibility that a
rule requiring dignified speech is not a modal regulation at all, but
impermissible viewpoint-discrimination."7 For example, local court
rules that prohibit speech that is "incivil" ' or "provoking or insult-
ing"449 may be used as a basis for sanctioning a lawyer who annoyed
the judge through persistent advocacy of an unpopular position. One
wonders whether the attorney in In re Maloney4  was referred to the
bar association for discipline because her words were genuinely likely
to interfere with the administration of justice, or because she had
been a persistent and vigorous advocate for a Democratic judicial
candidate against one of the Republican judges who considered the
case. Considering that the lawyer's comments were contained en-
tirely within a filed court document - a motion for reconsideration
445. LuKAS, supra note 232, at 93.
446. Id at 32.
447. Cf. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Schacht v. United
States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970) (reversing conviction of protester who had worn an Army uni-
form in a street skit, under statute prohibiting wearing military uniform in a portrayal that
tends to discredit the armed forces).
448. See U.S. DIST. Cr. M.D. FLA. R. 2.05(g).
449. See U.S. DIST. CT. D. ALASKA R. 39.5(d); cf U.S. DIST. Cr. N.D. OKLA. R.
83.2(14) (admonishing lawyers to "[a]void disparaging personal remarks or acrimony to-
ward opposing counsel"); see also U.S. DIST. Or. W.D. TEx. R. AT-5(b)(17).
450. 949 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997).
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
of the decision on the merits of a case - it is difficult to credit the
court's professed concern about the public's confidence in the judicial
process. 4 1 Instead, the decision smacks of retaliation by thin-skinned
judges. The history of persecution of lawyers representing unpopular
causes, under supposedly neutral contempt-of-court standards, is also
sobering.45 For this reason, the Supreme Court's decision in In re
Snyder453 should be borne in mind. The Court in that case said that
criticism of courts, although it may have been a bit rude or discourte-
ous, is not a constitutionally sufficient basis for disciplining a lawyer.4
As some lawyer-speech cases show, gratuitously abusive lan-
guage should carefully be distinguished from expression of political
dissent, which is entitled to stringent First Amendment protection.
"Fuck the draft"455 considered in isolation linguistically resembles
"fuck you," '456 but the two utterances are entirely different when
placed in context. For one thing, the slogan emblazoned on a jacket
is not directed at any individual.57 More importantly, Cohen's jacket
carries a powerful message of criticism and dissent, and as Justice
Harlan observed, conveys otherwise inexpressible emotions that
would not be expressed by less vulgar words s.4  As Rodney Smolla
notes, the impact of protests against the Vietnam-era draft would be
dramatically blunted if the government were able to demand that pro-
451. See id. at 388.
452. See, e.g., In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959) (reversing discipline against lawyer
who had criticized government's handling of Smith Act prosecutions); Sacher v. United
States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952) (affirming contempt convictions for defense attorneys who had
represented accused members of the Communist Party in Smith Act cases); Hallinan v.
United States, 182 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1950) (affirming contempt conviction for lawyer who
defended Harry Bridges, the labor activist); In re Schlesinger, 172 A.2d 835 (Pa. 1961)
(disbarment proceedings against same lawyer); Schlesinger v. Musmanno, 81 A.2d 316 (Pa.
1951) (writ of prohibition against trial judge who had found lawyer in contempt for refus-
ing to disclose whether or not he was a Communist); FRED RODELL, NINE TMEN (1955)
(recounting the Smith Act trial in Dennis, and contempt proceedings against defense law-
yers); Daniel H. Pollitt, Counselfor the Unpopular Cause: The "Hazard of Being Undone",
43 N.C. L. REV. 9, 10-13 (1964) (reviewing record of contempt proceedings brought
against civil rights lawyers challenging racial segregation).
453. 472 U.S. 634 (1985).
454. Some critics of campus hate-speech codes have expressed the concern that the
codes themselves will be enforced against out-of-power groups, who may find it necessary
to be provocative or even insulting to gain attention. See Minow, supra note 6, at 1264
n.39 (reporting comments of Regina Austin).
455. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
456. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Alison, 565 A.2d 660,663 (Md. 1989).
457. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20.
458. Id. at 26.
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testers confine themselves to genteel words like "oppose the draft.
459
Opening up public discourse to vulgar, passionate expressions of dis-
sent may also have encouraged participation by a segment of society
that otherwise may have been silenced.46  On the other hand, the
words as directed to opposing counsel, litigants, or court personnel
may be little more than a verbal blow, intended primarily to hurt or
humiliate, and not to deliver a powerful message of protest. The at-
torney in Alison was not engaged in anything so noble as protesting
an unjust war. Rather, he was involved in a messy divorce, repre-
senting himself in the divorce action and ancillary proceedings ("a
lawyer who represents himself has a fool for a client"), and he had an
unchecked temper."' His language was merely abusive, not an at-
tempt to persuade anyone of anything.4 62 I hesitate to endorse a sup-
posedly content-neutral modal restriction on attorneys' speech that
would require it to be "respectful" because I worry that courts would
use that rule to punish protesters like Cohen. Those who use abusive
language toward powerful officials are often the most alienated from
public life and "polite" forms of governance; punishing their speech
merely on the grounds of intemperance risks further marginalizing
and radicalizing these speakers. I would rather see lawyers curse, not
shoot, at each other. At the same time, the attorney's speech in
Alison is valueless, constitutionally speaking. The only reason to
prohibit courts from enforcing modal regulations against someone
like attorney Alison is the difficulty inherent in drawing lines between
political dissent and being a jerk. But this may be a conclusive rea-
459. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 27 (1992). The impact
of certain carefully chosen words is illustrated by San Antonio Community Hosp. v.
Southern Cal. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 125 F.3d 530, 1236 (9th Cir. 1997). In that case,
the court said that although "rat" has historical been understood to mean "workers em-
ployed by non-union contractors" in the context of labor disputes, a union may be en-
joined from displaying a sign in front of a hospital that says "THIS MEDICAL
FACILITY IS FULL OF RATS." I& Judge Kozinski dissented, arguing that the district
court's injunction sapped the union's protest of its vigor. See id. at 1239-40. The dissent
had the better argument here, since the meaning of the message cannot be divorced from
the emotion-laden language in which it was expressed. Cf. Old Dominion Branch No. 496,
Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974) (finding that the word "scab"
is protected expression in a labor dispute).
460. See Richard J. Arneson, Liberal Democratic Community, in NOMOS XXXV:
DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY 191, 217 (John W. Chapman & Ian Shapiro, eds., 1993).
461. See Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Alison, 565 A.2d 660, 661-64 (Md. Ct. App.
1989).
462. Cf. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 401 (White, J., concurring) ("Fighting words are not a
means of exchanging views, rallying supporters, or registering a protest; they are directed
against individuals to provoke violence or to inflict injury.").
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son, given the number of reported decisions in which courts overreact
to what they perceive to be disrespect by attorneys, and given the Su-
preme Court's tendency to define the category of content-neutral
regulations expansively."
Standing on completely different constitutional footing from
modal regulations are restrictions on speech that are content-based.'
These are subject to "the most exacting scrutiny," ' except for the
limited categories of speech restrictions that have traditionally been
subject to more extensive regulation, such as obscenity4" and defama-
tion. 67 In cases of content-based restrictions on speech, it is likely
that the government is acting based on animus against the message,
though we might share the government's ends.4 "[C]ontent-based
discriminations are subject to strict scrutiny because they place the
weight of government behind the disparagement or suppression of
some messages. 469
Consider, for example, a decision by a state highway department
that the Klan may not "adopt" a section of highway - agreeing to
clean up litter alongside the road in exchange for the display of a sign
commemorating the group. If the adopt-a-highway program is open
to all comers, as these programs usually are, the state could not per-
missibly deny permission to the Klan to adopt a stretch of road solely
463. SHIFFRIN, supra note 16, at 36-39.
464. See, e.g., R.A.V., 505 U.S. 377 (1991); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S.
92 (1972). The same is true of expressive conduct that is intended to communicate a par-
ticularized message, as opposed to conduct which is incidentally communicative. See
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (flag burning is the communication of a particular
message); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (particularized communica-
tion occurred by taping a peace symbol to an American flag); Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma
Chi Fraternity v. George Mason Univ., 993 F.2d 386, 391-92 (4th Cir. 1993) (even idiotic
fraternity "ugly woman" contest is "inherently expressive entertainment"); but see Young
v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 153 (2d Cir. 1990) (begging in the subway is
not the communication of a particularized message, even though it does effectively dem-
onstrate the plight of the homeless).
465. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,642 (1994).
466. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,
413 U.S. 49 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
467. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
468. It is important not to collapse two analytically distinct questions: (1) whether a
regulation is content-based and (2) whether it is motivated by government disagreement
with the content of the message. Steven Shiffrin, criticizing the Court's decision in Renton
v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), notes that a zoning measure prohibiting
adult movie theaters from locating within 1000 feet of a school is certainly based on the
content of the films, even though the ordinance may not be an attempt to suppress un-
popular views. See SHIFFRIN, supra note 16, at 38.
469. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703,735 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring).
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because of the viewpoint of the message communicated by the or-
ganization.470 In the Eighth Circuit's Cuffley case, there was ample
evidence that the state denied the Klan's application because it dis-
agreed with the Klan's message of white supremacy." Although the
state's position is laudable, it is a violation of the constitutional norm
of viewpoint-neutrality; thus, the state's action violated the First
Amendment.
As another example of the application of the content-neutrality
principle, consider the decision invalidating New York's "Son of
Sam" law, which would have required proceeds from the sale of
books about a crime written by the perpetrator to be paid to crime
victims.' The Court concluded that the statute was an impermissible
content-based regulation of speech, and subjected it to heightened
scrutiny, inquiring whether it was necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and narrowly tailored to achieve that end.4" (Notice the
increased threshold for the state's interest - from "significant" to
"compelling" - as compared with the test for permissible modal re-
strictions.) The Court found the state's interest in compensating
crime victims and ensuring that criminals do not profit from their
crimes compelling, but concluded that the statute was not narrowly
tailored to advance the government interest.474
470. Two federal appellate courts reached opposite results on these facts. See Cuffley
v. Mickes, 208 F.3d 702 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that the Klan could not be prohibited from
adopting highway); Texas v. Knights of Ku Klux Klan, 58 F.3d 1075 (5th Cir. 1995) (up-
holding denial of highway adoption). The Fifth Circuit's decision was influenced by the
proximity of a federal housing project which was under a desegregation order, and whose
black residents had been the target of frequent intimidating assaults by the Klan. See Cuf-
fley, 208 F.3d at 705 n.2 (distinguishing the Fifth Circuit case on this basis). The state in
Cuffley also did not help its case by granting permission to adopt stretches of highway to
other organizations, such as the Knights of Columbus, which restricted membership to cer-
tain classes - Catholic men in the case of the K.O.C. See 208 F.3d at 711. The state's de-
cision was thus an example of viewpoint discrimination, which is subject to even more
stringent constitutional scrutiny than content discrimination. (The difference between
content- and viewpoint-based discrimination can be brought out by imagining what the
state would have done with an application by the NAACP to adopt a stretch of highway.
In that case, the permit almost certainly would have been granted, showing that race - a
content-based category - is a permissible object of concern for organizations who wish to
adopt signs. Only a positive viewpoint on racial issues would be permitted, however.) I
am grateful to Ron Krotoszynski for pressing me to clarify the difference (which is often
muddled by courts) between content-based and viewpoint-based discrimination.
471. See Cuffley, 208 F.3d at 708.
472. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105
(1991).
473. See id. at 116-18.
474. See id. at 118-21.
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A great nurfiber of restrictions (often denominated "ethical"
rules, although they have little to do with ethics) on lawyers' speech
are content-based. The provision of the ABA Model Rules prohib-
iting extrajudicial comments on pending cases permits lawyers to dis-
cuss with the press details such as "the claim, offense or defense in-
volved" and the identity of the persons involved. 5 Lawyers may not,
however, make statements that a reasonable person would believe
would have a substantial likelihood of causing material prejudice in
the proceeding.476 Whether or not this rule strikes the correct balance,
it is undoubtedly content-based, just as the statute in the Son of Sam
case applied to books written about crimes differently than to books
about gardening or sports. The ban on pretrial comments to the press
has survived constitutional scrutiny, " and other restrictions on attor-
neys' speech designed to secure an impartial tribunal may similarly
pass muster, but it would be disingenuous for a court to deny that the
regulation is content-based and attempt to employ a less exacting
standard of review than the "strict" scrutiny mandated by First
Amendment doctrine.
In some cases, the project of selecting a "track" for speech re-
strictions is itself a substantive value judgment about the quality of
the underlying expression. (The Court ducked this issue in the Son of
Sam case, preferring to resolve the case on the question of narrow
tailoring.478) Consider a statute which prohibits the wearing of a mask
in public.479 Is this like the sound-truck ordinance, justified without
regard to the content of the communication? The history of the
Georgia legislation at issue in State v. Miller reveals that it was
adopted in response to harassment, intimidation, and violence perpe-
trated by the Klan against African Americans in the 1950s.' The
Georgia Supreme Court, however, held that the statute was not un-
constitutional, arguing that the anti-mask statute was content-neutral
(thus, on track two) because it was aimed at the non-speech elements
of hooded terrorism. The anti-mask statute is arguably in the nature
475. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr, Rule 3.6(b).
476. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr, Rule 3.6(a).
477. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1031 (1991) (holding that ex-
trajudicial speech by lawyers may be regulated on a showing of a "substantial likelihood of
material prejudice").
478. See Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 122.
479. See, e.g., American Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of Goshen, Indiana, 50 F.
Supp. 2d 825 (N.D. Ind. 1999); State v. Miller, 398 S.E.2d 547 (1990).
480. See State v. Miller, 398 S.E.2d547 (Ga. 1990); see also SMOLLA, supra note 166 §
11:25, at 11-41.
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of a modal regulation - Klansmen are free to appear in public in
their robes and hats, preaching racial hatred; they just cannot wear
masks to conceal their identity." Perhaps the statute could have sur-
vived strict scrutiny as a content-based regulation, given the impor-
tance of the government interest in protecting black citizens from
violence. If putting on masks was a prelude to "imminent lawless ac-
tion," the expression could be regulated under the Brandenburg stan-
dard.' The ordinance would have to be narrowly drawn to pass
Brandenburg scrutiny, however; a Klansman who is merely standing
around in a public square in the daytime wearing a mask is probably
not on the verge of committing violent acts. It appears that the court
selected the track of the non-meaning effects of speech for the regula-
tion because it had already decided that the speech of hooded Klans-
men was of low social value. We may agree with that value judgment,
but nevertheless be suspicious of a constitutional doctrine that is so
readily manipulated.
G. Offensiveness
It is absolutely clear that the offensiveness of an utterance, by it-
self, is not a valid basis for suppressing it, as long as the audience is
composed of adults who have consented to hear the speech.' "If
there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is
that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea sim-
ply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."4"
481. See Miller, 398 S.E.2d at 551. This aspect of the Miller case is difficult to square
with Supreme Court decisions that recognize a hybrid privacy and First Amendment in-
terest in speaking anonymously. See, eg., Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foun-
dation, 525 U.S. 182 (1999) (discussing Colorado ordinance requiring initiative-petition
circulators to wear identification badges unconstitutional); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (finding ban on anonymous campaign literature unconstitu-
tional). Anonymous publication of pamphlets and handbills has been crucial to the ability
of persecuted groups to get out their message. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64
(1960).
482- Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,449 (1969).
483. See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990); Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974); Papish v. Univer-
sity of Missouri, 410 U.S. 667 (1973); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Street v.
New York, 394 U.S. 576,592 (1969).
484. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989); American Booksellers Ass'n
v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985). One prominent First Amendment scholar argues
that refraining from banning offensive speech is an affirmative good for a pluralistic soci-
ety, because it teaches the virtue of tolerance. See LEE BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT
SOCIETY (1986); Lee Bollinger, The Tolerant Society: A Response to Critics, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 979 (1990).
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This principle is subject to some limitations established by the Su-
preme Court. For example, speech to a captive audience may be
regulated' and the fact that an audience is composed in part of chil-
dren may warrant restrictions on speech that would otherwise be un-
acceptable.6 Nevertheless, in most attorney-speech cases; pure emo-
tive harms do not justify regulations on speech. For example, a court
would not be constitutionally justified in punishing a lawyer for her
words merely because a judge was offended. Indeed, the Court has
specifically observed that protection of a judge's personal sense of
dignity is not a valid justification for holding an attorney in contempt
of court.' It further warned against conflating offense to a judge's
sensibilities with interference with judicial proceedings.4" In one of
its classic contempt precedents, the Court echoed Harry Truman's
advice that if you can't stand the heat, get out of the kitchen:
"[J]udges are supposed to be men of fortitude, able to survive in a
hardy climate."4"
As discussed above, however, it is a mistake to equate all emo-
tional harms with mere "offense", which cannot be a valid ground for
regulating speech. Just as obstruction of a trial is a valid ground for
contempt punishment, even though offense to the judge's sensibilities
485. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) (invalidating city
ordinance that deterred drive-in movie theaters from showing films containing nudity);
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298,302 (1974) (holding that city may prohibit
political advertising on buses, because viewers of bus signs have no choice but to observe
advertising); Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728,736 (1970) (noting that recipi-
ent of sexually explicit materials can instruct Postmaster to stop sending them).
486. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
487. See Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 13-14 (1954).
488. See Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 153 (1958); see also Dan B. Dobbs,
Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183,208 (1971).
489. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 576 (1947). Compare Old Dominion Branch No.
496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974), in which the Court said
that non-union letter carriers would have to put up with being called scabs. Labor dis-
putes are ugly, said the Court, and are "frequently characterized by bitter and extreme
charges, counter-charges, unfounded rumors, vituperations, personal accusations, misrep-
resentations and distortions." Id. at 272 (quoting Linn v. Plant Guard Workers Local 114,
383 U.S. 53, 58 (1966)). But that's what happens when we as a society subscribe to ideals
of "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate." Austin, 418 U.S. at 273. Progressive fed-
eral judges in the American South during the civil rights movement were constantly sub-
jected to death threats and other harassment - certainly a lot of heat to tolerate to remain
in the kitchen. These judges, however, persevered in the face of these attempts at intimi-
dation. See JACK W. PELTASON, FIFtY-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL
JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1961). Judges who are quick to discipline law-
yers for insulting their integrity should keep in mind the example of the civil rights judges,
who endured far more serious assaults without complaining.
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is not, some substantive injuries may justify restrictions on expressive
behavior. It is an important argument of some critical race scholars
that the harm from racist speech is not "mere" offense, but is akin to
the kind of severe emotional distress that forms the basis for tort re-
covery in other contexts.' 9 Non-speech behavior, such as racial seg-
regation, produces a harm that the legal system properly takes into
account; in both speech and non-speech cases, the injury is the cruel
message of being treated as inferior by the dominant culture.49" ' This
is an injury different in kind from an affront to taste, preferences, or
sensibilities, which are not harms that justify restrictions on speech 92
The harm resulting from sexual harassment, similarly, is not simply
offense, but is unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex.4'" There is
no reason why speech that creates a hostile work environment ought
not to be regarded as sex discrimination, if adverse employment ac-
tions based on sex are otherwise proscribed.494
The Court considered the line between mere offense and sub-
stantial harm in Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc. 495 which was some-
what anomalous in light of the Court's recent laissez-faire attitude
toward attorney advertising. In approving a state-imposed ban on di-
rect-mail solicitation of accident victims within thirty days of the acci-
dent, the Court accepted the state's argument in justification of the
restriction, that it was not concerned with the offense experienced by
the recipients of solicitations, but "with the demonstrable detrimental
effects that such 'offense' has on the profession. '",u The Court's qui-
490. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 5; Lawrence, supra note 270; Matsuda, supra note
270. On the contours of tort remedies for infliction of emotional distress, see generally
DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OFTORTS §§ 303-06 (2000).
491. This is, of course, the lesson of Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
492. See Lawrence, supra note 270, at 461. As Lawrence notes, discussing Pacifica and
Cohen v. California, words like "shit" and "fuck" do not carry connotations of the inferi-
ority or untouchability of an individual or group; indeed, it is the point of Carlin's Seven
Dirty Words monologue that our attitudes toward these words are silly.
493. See, e.g., Deborah Epstein, Free Speech at Work- Verbal Harassment as Gender-
based Discriminatory (Mis) Treatment, 85 GEO. LJ. 649 (1997).
494. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (rejecting First
Amendment free association argument which would have the effect of permitting sex dis-
crimination). As David Strauss argues, hostile or harassing speech addressed to one per-
son, who has been singled out for mistreatment on the basis of race or sex, does not at-
tempt to persuade; thus, the government can properly regulate it. See David A. Strauss,
Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 343 (1991).
Speech addressed to a broader audience, however, may be considered an attempt at per-
suasion and should not be subject to government regulation. See id.
495. 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
496. Id. at 631.
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escence in this case is surprising, given its general skepticism toward
state-asserted reasons for restricting speech. A bit more suspicion
would have been useful in Went For It. The detrimental effect the
state was targeting was the effect of offense, not some harm that can
be separated from the visceral revulsion that is experienced by the re-
cipients of letters from lawyers. As the Court argued, distinguishing
this case from others where the recipient of mailings ought simply to
avert her eyes, "[t]he purpose of the 30-day targeted direct-mail ban
is to forestall the outrage and irritation with the state-licensed legal
profession that the practice of direct solicitation only days after acci-
dents has engendered."4"
Dissenting, Justice Kennedy suggested that unwanted advertising
by lawyers should be dealt with in the same manner as undesired
messages from other speakers - the recipient should toss the letter in
the garbage,"' just as an offended user of the Los Angeles courthouse
should look away when Paul Cohen with his "Fuck the Draft" jacket
comes strolling down the corridor. Under existing First Amendment
precedents, including cases on advertising by lawyers,49 Justice Ken-
nedy's proposal was by far the better one. The majority's approval of
the direct mailing bans never surmounted the constitutional limitation
on regulating speech solely on the basis of the offense taken by audi-
ences.
5o
IV. Functional Analysis of First Amendment Cases
One of the initial rhetorical steps in First Amendment analysis is
to identify the reason or reasons why there should be a presumption
in favor of allowing speech to be free from state regulation.!' In
other words, what is the "free speech principle"? Why should gov-
ernment be required to supply a stronger reason for limiting speech
497. Id.(emphasis added).
498. See iL at 639 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods.
Corp. 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983) (proposing that unwanted mailings should take the "short,
though regular, journey from mail box to trash can")).
499. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 648 (1985)
(stating that "the mere possibility that some members of the population might find adver-
tising embarrassing or offensive cannot justify suppressing it.").
500. As Kathleen Sullivan rightly points out, the Court has never articulated a satisfac-
tory reason for subjecting restrictions on lawyers' speech to lesser scrutiny than the regula-
tion of expression by other regulated professionals, such as accountants and pharmacists.
See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Intersection of Free Speech and the Legal Profession: Con-
straints on Lawyers' First Amendment Rights, 67 FORD. L. REv. 569, 580 (199S).
501. See, e.g., RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 5 (1992).
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than for regulating other forms of conduct?5" It is not because speech
is less harmful than other kinds of regulated conduct; the profound
pain and fear generated in concentration camp survivors by a parade
of Nazis is surely a more serious matter than many crimes which are
routinely punished.' Matthew Hale's white supremacist Web site is
far more damaging than the indecent exposures and indecorous criti-
cisms of law school administrators that frequently justify exclusion of
an applicant from the bar, yet Hale's denial of an Illinois law license
attracted the attention of civil libertarians nationwide, while these
other cases scarcely merit a footnote in legal ethics treatises. The
heightened protection for speech is such a commonplace in our legal
culture that we no longer consider it remarkable that a person may be
prosecuted for stealing from the rich to give to the poor, but may not
be punished for advocating the replacement of capitalism with com-
munism, despite the grave risk of property damage and threat to hu-
man life posed by a revolution.
The search for a free speech principle is not a mere academic ex-
ercise because the First Amendment is not self-applying. On the ini-
tial categorization question - whether nude dancing, flag burning,
political campaign contributions, computer software, or some other
form of human activity falls within the protection of the Constitution
- the text of that document is notoriously unhelpful. The First
Amendment itself states only that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech."' For this reason, free speech
scholars generally attempt to understand the First Amendment func-
tionally. Their argument is that in deciding whether some communi-
cative activity warrants constitutional protection, courts should look
to the underlying interests, goals, or utilitarian calculations that
should be advanced by the constitutional value of "the freedom of
speech." ' There is no reason to assume that each suggested justifica-
tion for protecting speech must be exclusive of all the others.5" Pro-
ponents of some models of speech regulation often argue for privi-
leging one rationale absolutely over its competitors, thereby skewing
502. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 8
(1982).
503. See BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY, supra note 72, at 14-15.
504. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
505. See, e.g., James Boyle, Anachronism of the Moral Sentiments? Integrity, Postmod-
ernism, and Justice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 493, 505-06 (1999); Post, supra note 9, at 1255.
506. See GREENAWALT, SPEECH, supra note 264, at 13-14; SMOLLA, supra note 501, at
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the analysis of the desirability of proposed rules. The following social
functions of expressive liberties are complimentary rather than exclu-
sionary - different cases may implicate diverse rationales, and some
cases may touch on more than one constitutional value simultane-
ously. I will now briefly review those proffered rationales and exam-
ine their applicability to attorney-speech cases.
A. Discovery of Truth
The marketplace of ideas is perhaps the best-known metaphor in
First Amendment discourse. The image is taken from a stirring dis-
sent written by Justice Holmes, protesting the convictions under the
Espionage Act of five Russian-born pamphleteers who had circulated
leaflets critical of U.S. opposition to the Russian Revolution:
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe.., that the ultimate good de-
sired is better reached by free trade in ideas - that the best test
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground
upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.5
Holmes's dissent is animated by the recognition that government may
have reasons other than respect for truth for encouraging or sup-
pressing the expression of ideas. Moreover, as Mill pointed out, there
is no reason to think that government decision makers are better able
to discern the truth than private citizens.' Thus, the government
should not be allowed to influence the free trade in ideas, or to
"drown out" the voices of other speakers.' ° The proper remedy for
the ill effects of speech the government wishes to prevent is not sup-
pression of speech, but counter-speech - battling "evil counsels"
with good ones.51°
507. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see
also Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that
"[i]f in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be ac-
cepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that
they should be given their choice and have their way.").
508. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 20-21 (Stefan Collini, ed., 1989) (1859).
509. See YUDOF, supra note 359; Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legiti-
mizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 4-5; Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L.
REV. 565, 595-601 (1980). Judge Easterbrook's opinion in Hudnut was based on his un-
derstanding of the Indianapolis anti-pornography ordinance as government opposition to
a particular opinion about women. See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d
323 (7th Cir. 1985).
510. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Cf
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) (stating that "[hiowever perni-
cious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges
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The marketplace image is a powerful one, and courts often use
this rhetoric to justify invalidating restrictions on speech, even where
the expressive activities are far removed from reasoned discussion of
issues. For example, in a case arising out of protests at abortion clin-
ics, the Supreme Court struck down a "floating" buffer zone around
patients entering a clinic, reasoning that the floating buffers burdened
more speech than was necessary to ensure access to the clinic." The
district court's injunction had allowed two "counselors" to approach
women and carry on a non-threatening conversation,12 but Justice
Rehnquist said that the protesters must also be permitted to harangue
women who did not consent to the "conversation. 13 He quoted a
well known passage from Justice O'Connor's opinion in Boos v.
Barry, to the effect that citizens must tolerate insulting, even outra-
geous speech in public debate. 14 What this quotation shows is that,
for Justice Rehnquist, the paradigm of public debate is applicable to
violent protesters who scream obscenities in patients' faces as the
women try to obtain medical treatment, even though it is almost far-
cical to call some of the actions of the protesters a "debate," rather
than a blockade. However, once the Court deployed the metaphor of
a public debate, the conclusion followed naturally that restrictions on
that debate must be carefully tailored.
The marketplace of ideas image, despite its undeniable polemical
appeal, suffers from several well known weaknesses as a general justi-
fication for the protection of speech. For one thing, the market in
ideas, like any other market, is not perfectly free5 15 Concentration of
wealth can influence not only elections, as discussed in Buckley, but
other kinds of behavior - that, of course, is the reason corporations
and juries but on the competition of other ideas."); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 833-34 (2d ed. 1988) ("Whenever the harm feared could be
averted by a further exchange of ideas, government suppression is conclusively deemed
unnecessary").
511. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357, 377-79
(1997).
512. See iLd. at 366 n. 3.
513. See id. at 383-84.
514. See id. at 383 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312,322 (1988)).
515. See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (limiting the influence of wealth
on the electoral process violates First Amendment); Citizens Against Rent Con-
trol/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981) (invalidating contribution
limit to committees formed to support or oppose ballot measures); cf. Miami Herald Pub.
Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (striking down right-of-reply statute that would have
lessened the relative power of newspapers by giving political candidates an opportunity to
rebut attacks on the candidate's personal character).
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spend billions of dollars on advertising.1 6 Although the Court in
Buckley rejected the argument that the First Amendment requires
leveling the marketplace of ideas, the government may nonetheless
be tempted to intervene in the market to correct inefficiencies, just as
it might in the event of a failure in a more traditional economic mar-
ket.17 Government intervention then creates incentives for private
speakers to conform to favored views, either to avoid the govern-
ment's threatened penalty or to obtain the offered prize!" Or the
government may itself become a speaker, in which case a taboo view-
point may be suppressed or a favored viewpoint expressed with the
backing of the extraordinarily powerful, wealthy government."9 Fi-
nally, hate speech, which many urge should be protected on the mar-
ketplace rationale, may actually undermine the functioning of the
market by silencing or chilling the speech of its victims."' As Martha
Minow asks rhetorically, "Why participate if only to be demeaned?"521
The hate speech example shows that in some cases, the marketplace
metaphor contains internal contradictions.
516. See Stephen L. Carter, Technology, Democracy, and the Manipulation of Consent,
93 YALE L.J. 581 (1984) (reviewing YUDOF, supra note 359) (observing that commenta-
tors who worry about government speech do not pay sufficient attention to the market-
place-distorting effects of wealth in private hands). Cf Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762-64 (1976) (commercial speaker's
interest in promoting its product is entitled to constitutional protection).
517. See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 546-48 (1983)
(upholding regulations that grant tax deductions for veterans' groups, but not other
groups, engaged in lobbying). The favorable tax treatment for veterans' groups may not
be a response to a perceived market failure, but it is certainly a government decision to
favor one speaker in the marketplace of ideas. As the Court noted in Regan, the govern-
ment has a longstanding policy of compensating veterans for their past sacrifices by pro-
viding them with numerous advantages. See 461 U.S. at 551.
518. See Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671, 690 (9th Cir. 1996)
(Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (government funding for the arts tends to produce conformity).
519. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (upholding regulations that barred
recipients of federal family-planning funds from providing information on abortion). Af-
ter Rust, the greater the number of family-planning facilities that received federal funding,
the more severe the impact of the government's ban on abortion-related speech would be
on a great deal of abortion-related information in the marketplace. Thus, the great danger
of Rust is that the government will seek to suppress discussion of abortion by offering gen-
erous federal funding for family planning facilities, but restricting the speech of recipients
in return. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1413, 1496-97 (1989) (pre-Rust, arguing that government may not constitutionally
"buy out" ideas it considers dangerous); Geoffrey Stone, Content Regulation and the First
Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189,217-27 (1983).
520. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 13, at 16-21; Gilbert Paul Carrasco, Hate Speech and the
First Amendment: On a Collision Course?, 37 VILL. L. REV. 723 (1992).
521. Minow, supra note 6, at 1261.
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A second problem with the marketplace thesis is that it may be
false as an empirical matter. Plenty of silly beliefs have gained wide-
spread currency'5 2 Furthermore, speech is not without consequences
- false beliefs may lead to injury or social injustice. Consider, for
example, the vehement hatred that exists toward minority racial or
ethnic groups. Scholars of outsider jurisprudence have exhaustively
catalogued the recurrence of racist speech, which indicates underlying
attitudes of prejudice which have not been swept away by counter-
vailing ideas of tolerance in the marketplace."l Perhaps these ideas
don't deserve to compete for acceptance in the marketplace; perhaps
"the book is closed on some issues,"'52 like genocide, slavery, and
white supremacy. There is no point in letting neo-Nazis speak or
march through the streets of Skokie because their beliefs have al-
ready been proven false and horrifically dangerous. The problem, of
course, is that beyond a small core of beliefs universally recognized as
abhorrent, there is a broad penumbra of controversial positions that
some regard as having no debatable merit, but which others perceive
as being open issues." The marketplace rationale ceases to protect
speech if disputants can characterize the opposing position as being
completely out of bounds in a civilized community. Better to let
through the occasional truly aberrant idea for swift and decisive rejec-
tion in the marketplace. Otherwise the marketplace metaphor would
tend to vest too much authority in tradition and the status quo, in-
stead of cultivating the sense that conventional wisdom is always open
to challenge. 6
Furthermore, as Rodney Smolla has argued, the presence of false
ideas does not diminish the utility of the free trade in ideas - the
522. See, e.g., SCHAUER, supra note 502, at 15-33.
523. See, e.g., Matsuda, supra note 270, at 2327-30; Lawrence, supra note 270, at 431-
34; PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 80-96, 110-15 (1991).
Although not a jurisprudential work, Ellis Cose's book, THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED
CLASS (1993), is an excellent account of the effect of continuing subtle racism on black
professionals.
524. Harry H. Wellington, On Freedom of Expression 88 YALE L.J. 1105, 11332 (1979).
525. Consider the controversy over a moot court problem at NYU, which would have
required some students to argue that the child's best interests were not served by being
placed with a lesbian parent. Some student members of the moot court board argued that
the problem was inappropriate because "the issue of whether awarding custody to a ho-
mosexual parent is presumptively contrary to a child's best interests was not an open ques-
tion in a law school community." See DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD 460-66 (2d ed. 1998) (reprinting
newspaper article and responses by several NYU faculty members).
526. See SHIFFRIN, supra note 16, at 95.
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marketplace concept does not depend on the ultimate triumph of
truth.' It is the integrity of the process, particularly the freedom
from government interference in the market and the disposition not
to conform, that is central to the justification of the theory2 '8 Indeed,
the notion that the effectiveness of the marketplace can be demon-
strated by truthful outcomes is circular - the marketplace metaphor
depends on an attitude of epistemological skepticism.29 After all, if
truth were known a priori, there would be no need for a marketplace;
true beliefs could simply be promoted and false ones suppressed by
an all-knowing authority, without bothering with the intermediate
step of offering them on the market for acceptance or rejection.
Thirdly, the marketplace rationale leaves unprotected many
words and expressive acts that are unrelated to the discovery of truth,
even though those messages ought to be heard. In the New York
subway-begging case, for example, the court casually dismissed the
act of panhandling as unworthy of constitutional protection because it
is not "a means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political
truth.'"53 Putting aside the objection that the court may have been
wrong about the truth-enhancing effect of panhandling - how many
Yuppies are aware of the problem of homelessness only when it con-
fronts them literally in the face in the form of a beggar on the side-
walk or the subway? - the court ignored the other interests served
by communicating the plight of the homeless. Suppose everyone in
New York City was perfectly informed about the scope of the home-
lessness problem, so that panhandling could not communicate any
factual information relevant to the discovery of truth. Even so, the
act of begging conveys an emotive element missing from sociological
studies and all but the best journalism. "This problem is really awful,
for me, this person standing in front of you," is a different message
527. See SMOLLA, supra note 459, at 8.
528. See Wellington, supra note 524, at 1133. For Wellington the harm from sup-
pressing neo-Nazi speech is that a practice of government censorship of ideas will have
been established - some state body will have responsibility for determining the narrow
category of ideas on which the book has been closed.
529. See SMOLLA, supra note 459, at 8, (citing Benjamin S. Du Val, Free Communica-
tion of Ideas and the Quest for Truth: Toward a Teleological Approach to First Amendment
Adjudication, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 161, 190-91 (1972)). David Strauss disagrees with
Smolla on this matter. Strauss argues that the marketplace argument, by analogy with
economic markets, can succeed only if it is possible to specify what counts as a well-
functioning market, but we do not know what constitutes perfect competition in the realm
of ideas. See Strauss, supra note 494, at 349.
530. Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 154 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
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from the one communicated by dry statistics to New York Times
readers in their doorman-guarded apartments. Panhandling is an act
of political dissent whose value is independent of the state of commu-
nity knowledge about the social problem at issue.
The final objection to the marketplace argument is that it is in-
coherent. The free speech principle stipulates that some reason must
be offered to prefer unrestricted speech over regulation. The key
premise of the marketplace justification is that we don't know truth
with confidence. Today's "fighting faiths" might turn out to be just as
false as the belief that the earth is flat. Proponents of the market-
place argument confidently assert their belief that all truth is poten-
tially revisable, but they fail to apply this belief to their own argu-
ment. Perhaps the argument for free speech stands on no firmer
foundation than the argument for a flat earth. Of course, we have
good reasons to believe that the earth is round, and that free speech is
a good thing, but one cannot be a global skeptic about every argu-
ment except the argument currently being defended.5 '
The marketplace metaphor has limited application to the free
speech arguments as they are sometimes asserted by lawyers. It is dif-
ficult to see how calling one's adversary a "sheeny little Hebrew"532 or
"office help" '533 bears any conceivable relationship with the attempt to
discover truth. Steven Shiffrin is probably correct to argue that the
search for truth is incompatible with perfect civility.' Or, as Rob
Atkinson observes, sometimes the requirement of civility becomes
part of the means of oppression.35 Some unpleasant speech by law-
yers is a vital contribution to the search for truth; Yagman's diatribe
about biased judges did at least raise the issue of whether certain dis-
trict court judges in Los Angeles might be predisposed against civil
rights cases, even if most of his utterance was off the mark.536 On an
531. To be fair to the argument I am criticizing, one cannot be a global skeptic about
anything - that is the point of Neurath's boat metaphor. See W.V.O. QUINE, WORD AND
OBJECr 3-4 (1960) (describing Otto Neurath's argument that our epistemological situation
is like being a sailor at sea, forced to stand on some firm planks of the boat while making
repairs to other parts).
532. In re Williams, 414 N.W.2d 394,397 (Minn. 1987).
533. In re Plaza Hotel Corp., 111 B.R. 882,891-92 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1990).
534. See SHIFFRIN, supra note 16, at 94.
535. See Atkinson, supra note 177, at 148.
536. See supra notes 91 - 102 and accompanying text. See also In re Green, 11 P.3d
1078 (Colo. 2000). Unless the lawyer in Green was extraordinarily sensitive, he must have
had some basis for his charge that the judge was a racist - he repeated it in three separate
letters seeking recusal. In light of the persistence of racism on the bench, one should be
hesitant to condemn the letters in Green as constitutionally valueless.
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analogy with civil disobedience, disrespectful speech may be justified
insofar as it appeals to a conception of value that has been suppressed
by the dominant political order. But many cases involving abuse and
insults are difficult to fit even within Shiffrin's capaciously protective
model of dissenting speech. The only way to stretch the marketplace
metaphor to encompass these cases is to conceive of the value pro-
tected by the First Amendment as a kind of aggressive skepticism
about conventional wisdom - a disposition to rock the boat, slay the
sacred cows, upset the apple cart, or what have you. Perhaps can-
tankerousness is a constitutional virtue, as has sometimes been sug-
gested.537 Even so, racist and sexist insults, threats of violence, and at-
tempts at intimidation of opposing counsel fall outside the scope of
even this hypothetical constitutionally significant incivility. Disre-
spectful speech that appeals to some underlying political principle is
easily accommodated within the marketplace of ideas metaphor.
(Paradigmatic examples are Cohen's "Fuck the Draft" jacket and the
outbursts by the Chicago Seven defendants.) Speech that is utterly
divorced from any plausible alternative conception of political moral-
ity is, however, entitled to a significantly lessened degree of protec-
tion, at least under the marketplace rationale.
For this reason, a refinement of the marketplace image - the
"persuasion principle" - better illustrates when speech by lawyers
ought to be entitled to constitutional protection. There is one abso-
lutely excluded reason for government regulation of speech: expres-
sion may never be limited because it is too effective. "[T]yrants sup-
press speech because they fear it will be persuasive. '" The
persuasion principle assumes that speech is ultimately aimed at repre-
senting some vision of the right or the good. Undoubtedly this is true
of many lawyers' utterances, such as the criticism of the government's
handling of Smith Act cases in In re Sawyer.39 Punishing the lawyer
in Sawyer for her speech is absolutely ruled out by the Constitution, if
it appears that the restriction was aimed at preventing the lawyer's
comments from persuading others that the government was acting
unjustly. Again, however, the persuasion principle has difficulty ac-
commodating emotive speech such as insults, epithets, and other
kinds of communications that are not attempts at persuasion. Per-
haps this is the correct balance to strike; perhaps utterances like "I
537. See infra Section IV.C.
538. Strauss, supra note 494, at 337.
539. 360 U.S. 622 (1959).
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don't believe those chili-eating bastards" ought to be unprotected.
The danger in this position, however, is that a relatively small fraction
of speech by lawyers is aimed at persuading the listener of truth.
Lawyers are constantly derided as sophists - skilled rhetoricians who
aim to make the false seem true and the true false. 1 This criticism is
sometimes warranted, but in many cases lawyers are appealing to
some important political value other than truth to justify a position on
behalf of their clients. To take an easy example, lawyers who seek to
suppress evidence that is probative of factual truth but which was ob-
tained in an unconstitutional search rely on norms of fair law en-
forcement practices and procedural due process principles to justify
their actions. Extending that example, the lawyers who sought to
suppress evidence in the case before U.S. District Judge Harold Baer,
which erupted in calls for Judge Baer's impeachment,542 were at-
tempting to extend these process norms to take into account a robust
conception of racial equality, in which the suspects' flight from police
officers could be given a non-incriminating explanation. The factual
truth of the matter - whether the defendants possessed large quanti-
ties of heroin - would have been obscured by the lawyers' tactics,
but that does not mean the lawyers should be criticized in moral
terms as sophists. They were attempting to persuade their listener
not of factual truth about guilt or innocence, but about some plausible
alternative conception of justice in which broad social inequalities,
such as discriminatory policing practices, would be relevant to as-
sessing the propriety of warrantless searches. Similarly, Johnnie
Cochran's much-criticized "send-a-message" closing argument in the
O.J. Simpson criminal trial was an attempt to make understandable
the defense's theory that Simpson was framed by putting in issue the
history of racism on the LAPD. The argument was an attempt at per-
suasion, in David Strauss's terms, even though it was not directed at
resolving the case on the narrow factual merits.
B. Democratic Self-Government - The Meiklejohn Thesis
Without a broad sphere of expressive freedom, individuals would
not be able to participate in rational, democratic self-government.3
540. People v. Sharpe, 781 P.2d 659,660 (Colo. 1989).
541. See, e.g., JANET MALCOM, THE CRIME OF SHEILA MCGOUGH (1999); James
Boyd White, The Ethics of Argument: Plato's Gorgias and the Modern Lawyer, 50 U. CHI.
L. REV. 849 (1983).
542. See supra notes 126 - 133 and accompanying text.
543. This justification for protecting speech is associated most strongly with Alexander
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Popular sovereignty requires free exchange of opinions without dis-
tortion by government censorship. Individuals, not the state, ought to
be free to choose what opinions are expressed in public debate. This
debate may be "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," as the Supreme
Court said in Sullivan, and it may include "vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on public officials."' The Su-
preme Court has been especially protective of speech on "matters of
public concern," which suggests that the self-governance rationale
plays a large role in the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. 5
Under the strict Meiklejohn view, however, the scope of pro-
tected speech may be narrow. Expression is protected only where it
"bears, directly or indirectly, upon issues with which voters have to
deal - only therefore, to the consideration of matters of public inter-
est."''56 On the other hand, this definition may not be narrow at all;
rather, it may be potentially limitless. What subject does not bear, at
least indirectly, upon matters which can be affected by decisions
made by voters? 7 Since funding for the arts, education, and civil
rights are all issues of public importance, the Meiklejohn thesis, un-
Meiklejohn; see ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948), although numerous other prominent constitutional scholars have
appealed to it as well. See, e.g., ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 62
(1975); KALVEN, supra note 74; SMOLLA, supra note 459, at 12; Akhil Reed Amar, Com-
ment: The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 I-ARV. L. REV.
124, 141 (1992); Owen Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REX. 1405, 1411
(1986). Theoretically, the self-government principle is related to the discourse ethics of
Habermas. See JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION
(Thomas McCarthy, trans., 1987). On several occasions the Supreme Court and individual
justices have alluded to self-government as the basis for safeguarding freedom of expres-
sion. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587 (1980) (First
Amendment has structural role in guaranteeing republican form of government); Land-
mark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978) ("there is practically uni-
versal agreement that a major purpose of the First Amendment was to protect the free
discussion of government affairs"); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964)
("speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-
government."); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J.. concurring)
("freedom to think as you will and speak as you think are means indispensable to the dis-
covery and spread of political truth").
544. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,270 (1964).
545. See, e.g., Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, (1996). Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); cf El-
rod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356 (1976) ("political belief and association constitute the core
of those activities protected by the First Amendment").
546. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 543, at 94.
547. See, e.g., Robert Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous
Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARv. L. REV.
601, 681 (1990) ("all speech is potentially relevant to democratic self-governance").
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derstood broadly, implies protection for the right of gays and lesbians
to march in traditional Irish parades, "obscene" books, 49 and so on.
Harry Wellington states this criticism eloquently: "One learns much
about political behavior from Anthony Trollope and about social be-
havior from Jane Austen. Does this knowledge help the voter dis-
charges his obligation? The obscene teaches about the human condi-
tion. Is that not important to the voter as a voter?" 50
One response is to admit, as Meiklejohn subsequently did, that
speech pertaining to art, literature, philosophy, science, and education
is indeed "public" speech worthy of protection.' This redescriptive
strategy, however, tends to divorce the definition of political speech
from its underlying justification, which is furthering deliberation that
is pertinent to actions ultimately taken in the name of government.5 2
It is also difficult to know when speech actually facilitates democratic
self-government and when it is "pathological"553 or merely irrelevant
to concerns of government 5 4 What is one to make, for example, of
tobacco and liquor advertising?555 The other alternative is to seek to
narrow the definition of political speech so that it excludes more
troublesome categories of expression.
Constitutional protection should be accorded only to speech
that is explicitly political. There is no basis for judicial interven-
tion to protect any other form of expression, be it scientific, lit-
erary, or that variety of expression we call obscene or porno-
graphic. Moreover, within that category of speech we
ordinarily call political, there should be no constitutional ob-
548. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S.
557 (1995).
549. See, e.g., A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v.
Attorney General of Mass., 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
550. Wellington, supra note 524 at 1116.
551. See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. Cr.
REV. 245,255-57.
552. See Zechariah Chaffee, Book Review, 62 HARV. L. REV. 891,899-900 (1949).
553. See David AJ. Richards, Toleration and Free Speech, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 323,
326 (1988). Compare the quite different use of the term pathology to describe "certain
dynamics that increase the likelihood that people who hold unorthodox views will be pun-
ished for what they say or believe," in Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the
First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449,450 (1985).
554. It is difficult to defend advocacy of overthrow of a democratic government as be-
ing justifiable on the basis of facilitating self-government, but that is precisely the effect of
numerous Supreme Court decisions permitting citizens to join political parties which have
as their ultimate object the overthrow of the United States Government. See, e.g., Hem-
don v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
555. See Fallon, supra note 7, at 29-30.
Winter 20011 FREE SPEECH FOR LAWYERS
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
struction to laws making criminal any speech that advocates
forcible overthrow of the government or the violation of any
law.55
6
Judge Bork's approach eliminates many of the pesky line-drawing
problems inherent in the Meiklejohn thesis, and also resolves the
anomaly of protecting advocacy of overthrow of the government as a
means to enhancing democratic self-government. Furthermore,
Bork's argument shows another weakness of the self-government ra-
tionale for protecting free speech: if only "political" speech is worthy
of constitutional safeguards, a court intent on suppressing speech may
do so by paying lip service to the importance of political speech, and
then defining narrowly the scope of political speech to exclude the
challenged expression. Indeed, many of the Supreme Court's pro-
nouncements on the centrality of political discourse are uttered as a
prelude to a conclusion that the speech under consideration is not
core political speech and is, therefore, subject to regulation.57 The
Court in other cases has been unwilling to confine protection to po-
litical speech, however, suggesting that it is aware of the malleability
of the political speech concept and is reluctant to allow too much
weight to be placed on the determination that speech is or is not re-
lated to political matters.55 8
Courts also may err by too easily assuming that speech is "politi-
cal" and, therefore, protected more zealously than non-political
556. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1, 20 (1971).
557. For example, the Court in an early obscenity case conceded that "[Tihe protection
given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people." Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). It then proceeded to hold that obscenity is not within this
constitutionally protected area. Id. at 492. Similarly, in FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
744 (1978), the Court permitted federal regulation of a broadcast of George Carlin's Seven
Dirty Words monologue, but only after a tip of the hat to core political speech: "If there
were any reason to believe that the Commission's characterization of the Carlin mono-
logue as offensive could be traced to its political content. .. First Amendment protection
might be required." Id. at 746.
558. See, e.g., Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61,65 (1981) ("Entertainment, as well
as political and ideological speech, is protected; motion pictures, programs broadcast by
radio and television, and live entertainment, such as musical and dramatic works, fall
within the First Amendment guarantee."); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374. 388 (1967)
("[G]uarantees for speech and press are not the preserve of political expression or com-
ment upon public affairs."); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1957) ("[I]t is imma-
terial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced.., pertain to political, economic, relig-
ious, or cultural matters."); cf Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter
Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 288-89 & n.2 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring) (explicitly
rejecting Bork's view that only explicitly political speech is protected by First Amend-
ment).
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communication. The debate over hate speech is complicated by the
argument over whether it belongs to the protected core of political
speech or is beyond the purview of the First Amendment.59 Con-
sider, as another example, the debate whether sexual harassment is
merely the communication of ideas inconsistent with gender equality
or a discriminatory condition of employment5 O The civil libertarian
position in the debate over sexual harassment depends, in large part,
on the premise that sexual harassment is protected (political) expres-
sion - speech with a viewpoint that most find abhorrent, but an idea
that nevertheless must be allowed to seek acceptance in the market-
place.'61 The same characterization led the Supreme Court to protect
the activities of abortion protesters, even though their conduct re-
stricted access to medical facilities and caused severe distress to
women entering the clinics. ' The effort to label speech as "political"
is an effective tactic for the civil libertarian because it blunts the im-
pact of cases that limit access to the marketplace to that speech which
is "political." As a general rule, then, if one is determined to protect
as much speech as possible, the best approach is to seek to portray a
wide variety of expression as political.
Whether the political domain is defined broadly or narrowly,
there is a substantial universe of expression by lawyers which is indis-
putably political. Even Bork would concede that the lawyer who
speaks to a public gathering, criticizing the government's misuse of a
statute proscribing advocacy of violent overthrow of the United
States government, is addressing matters of public concern." In this
case, the premises of the lawyer's argument deserve to be heard be-
cause they are relevant to whether the state is abusing its power in
applying a statute. The lawyer's speech is not advocacy of overthrow
of the government, which Bork would find unprotected; it is, instead,
a critique of existing political structures which may contribute to the
559. See, e.g., R.A.V., 505 U.S. 377. Justice Scalia's opinion underscored the principle
that political discourse enjoys the greatest social value. See id. Justice Stevens' concurring
opinion agreed that "[c]ore political speech occupies the highest, most protected position."
Id. at 422. (Stevens, J., concurring). These pronouncements simply beg the question,
though, whether burning a cross in a black family's yard is political speech. For a discus-
sion of how the Court fragmented over how to frame the issues in R.A. V., see Amar, supra
note 543, at 147-51.
560. See supra note 151, and accompanying text.
561. Strossen, supra note 192, at 709.
562. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357 (1997).
563. This example is taken from In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959). For discussion in
more detail, see supra notes 103 - 105 and accompanying text.
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revision of unjust doctrines. As Harry Kalven has argued, the very
fact that the speech resonated with others in the community shows
that the lawyer's arguments touched on values that were widely
enough shared to be relevant to democratic deliberation.
If a man is seriously enough at odds with the society to advocate
violent overthrow, his speech has utility not because advocating
violence is useful but because the premises underlying his call to
action should be heard. He says something more than "Revolt!
Revolt!" He advances premises in support of that conclusion.
And those premises are worth protecting, for they are likely to
incorporate serious and radical criticism of the society and the
government.56
One might add that speech that is ineffective -- a call to arms that is
likely to be ignored - is not dangerous, because it does not resonate
with its audience. This is one of the paradoxes of the First Amend-
ment. Speech deserves protection insofar as it taps into currents of
political morality that are widely enough shared to be relevant to self-
government, but if these radical or critical beliefs are accepted by
enough of the populace, there is a real danger that action might fol-
low advocacy.
C. Dissent
Some commentators, most prominently Steven Shiffrin, have ex-
tended the argument for protecting critical speech, suggesting that the
central purpose of the First Amendment is to preserve the unortho-
dox views of the outcasts and rebels in a majoritarian society!6 5
If the first amendment is to have an organizing symbol, let it be
an Emersonian symbol, let it be the image of the dissenter. A
major purpose of the first amendment.., is to protect the ro-
564. KALVEN, supra note 74, at 120.
565. See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 300, at 84; STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN. DISSENT,
INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA (1999) [hereinafter SHIFFRIN. DISSENT];
SHIFFRIN, supra note 16. Shiffrin's approach has been criticized by Ron Krotoszynski,
who notes that Shiffrin's definition of "dissent" is a bit slippery; causes close to the politi-
cal left tend to be labeled as dissent by Shiffrin, while other kinds of unpopular speech,
like tobacco advertising, come in as candidates for extensive government regulation. See
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Dissent, Free Speech, and Continuing Search for the "Central
Meaning" of the First Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 701 (2000). Shiffrin also struggles
mightily to avoid protecting racist speech. See SHIFFRIN, supra note 16, at 77-78. Ulti-
mately this line-drawing is unpersuasive, because Shiffrin has to back away from his pure
dissent model, and argue that racist speech is not constitutionally protected because it si-
lences its victims. See id. at 62-65. While this may be true, it does not make the speech
any less an example of rebelliousness, nonconformity, and romanticism; it shows only that
other constitutional goals, like ensuring participation in public deliberation by marginal-
ized speakers, must also be taken into account in constructing a theory of free speech.
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mantics - those who would break out of classical forms: the
dissenters, the unorthodox, the outcasts. The first amendment's
purpose and function in the American polity is not merely to
protect negative liberty, but also affirmatively to sponsor the
individualism, the rebelliousness, the antiauthoritarianism, the
spirit of nonconformity within us all. 66
And indeed, countless First Amendment cases arise out of protests by
those dissatisfied with the present state of the government or other
powerful groups. The appeal in the flag-burning case, Texas v. John-
son, 67 followed the conviction of Johnson for his "expression of dis-
satisfaction with the policies of this country.. .. " The defendant in
Watts v. United States 69 was spared a conviction for threatening the
life of the President only because the Court recognized his words as
an expression of political opposition to the government and the war
in Vietnam.5 0 Schacht v. United Statese 1 arose out of a skit critical of
the American involvement in Vietnam, in which one of the actors
wore a military uniform. The Court in Terminiello v. City of Chicago
said: "[A] function of free speech under our system of government is
to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it
induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions
as they are, or even stirs people to anger."' Justice Marshall recog-
nized the importance of protecting dissent when he argued that the
most harmful effect of allowing prison officials to read inmates' mail
would be the chilling effect on criticism of the prison authorities.573
Finally, one of the indisputably canonical cases in First Amendment
jurisprudence, West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,.4 recog-
nized that compelling schoolchildren to salute the flag against their
religious scruples threatened a vital principle of our democracy.
566. SHIFFRIN, supra note 16, at 5. Any lingering hope that "affirmative sponsorship"
of individualism and nonconformity might extend to actual funding of expressive activities
was squelched by the Supreme Court's decision that the government may impose decency
restrictions on grants to artists. See National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S.
569 (1998).
567. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
568. Id. at 411.
569. 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam).
570. Watts had announced he would not report for a physical examination in connec-
tion with his conscription, and then said: "If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I
want to get in my sights is L.BJ. They are not going to make me kill my black brothers."
See id. at 706.
571. 398 U.S. 58 (1970).
572. 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
573. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,427 (Marshall, J., concurring).
574. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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The Shiffrin position may also be restated as a recognition that a
broad, unregulated sphere for free expression helps prevent the abuse
of power by the government.'5 The paradigmatic example of the
checking function of free speech is the role of journalists in exposing
the Watergate cover-up, 76 and the publication of the Pentagon Papers
can be viewed as another triumph for the right of an independent
press corps to reveal government secrets.5n Voters can act to correct
abuses of state power only if they are fully informed about the inner
workings of the government, without any censorship, prior restraints,
or other interference. Moreover, even where private citizens' expres-
sion causes harm, any response the government makes to this speech
is likely to make the situation worse, because of the government's sys-
tematic bias toward the position held by public officials. " Certainly
the government is likely to be biased against speech in favor of disfa-
vored beliefs or unlawful conduct, such as the trial antics of the Chi-
cago Seven defendants.79
The protection of dissent entails a great deal of latitude for law-
yers' speech when they represent unpopular or marginalized clients,
such as political dissidents or indigents. This First Amendment prin-
ciple is aptly illustrated by NAACP v. Button,"° in which the Supreme
Court struck down a state statute that would have prohibited the so-
licitation of legal representation by an organization, such as the
NAACP, that did not have any pecuniary stake in litigation. Justice
Brennan, writing for the Court, observed that southern blacks, unable
to achieve equality through the electoral process, were justified in
turning to the courts for redress of their grievances."' He then im-
puted the clients' First Amendment right of association to the law-
yers, since legal representation was necessary to secure relief from the
courts5s Because of the clients' strong expressive interest, the State
of Virginia was required to show a compelling interest in regulating
the lawyers' conduct, contrary to the ordinary presumption that states
575. The classic articulation of this thesis is Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First
Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521.
576. See, e.g., BOB WOODWARD AND CARL BERNSTEIN, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN
(1974).
577. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
578. See, e.g., BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY, supra note 72, at 76-103; Blasi,
supra note 575, at 538-44.
579. See Strauss, supra note 494, at 350.
580. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
581. See id. at 429-30.
582. See id. at 434.
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have plenary power of regulation over the legal profession."s Even
Justice Harlan, writing in dissent, agreed that litigation can have a
transformational value: "Litigation is often the desirable and orderly
way of resolving disputes of broad public significance, and of obtain-
ing vindication of fundamental rights. This is particularly so in the
sensitive area of racial relationships.""M  He disagreed with the ma-
jority only in his characterization of the NAACP's solicitation of cli-
ents, and the resulting litigation, as more conduct than pure speech."
Button shows that powerless litigants may be vulnerable to what seem
like viewpoint-neutral regulations, such as bans on in-person solicita-
tion of clients by organizations. The effect of that rule was to pre-
serve the existing power imbalance by making access to legal repre-
sentation difficult for challengers to segregation. Understanding the
function of free speech rights as protecting, or even encouraging, dis-
sent ought to have the effect of making courts skeptical about sup-
posedly evenhanded restrictions on lawyers' speech.
It is probably necessary to caution here that broad constitutional
solicitude for dissenting speech does not entail absolute protection for
any disruptive conduct that has an expressive element. I tend to view
contempt sanctions against political defendants warily, and believe
that the protection for dissenting speech ought to command restraint
in the face of the outbursts of someone like Bobby Seale, who was
protesting the denial of his choice of counsel."' I do not mean to sug-
gest, however, that courts are powerless to secure order. The latitude
for permissible dissent varies according to the context of the utter-
ance." In-court speech, which occurs in a non-public forum, is sub-
ject to reasonable, viewpoint-neutral regulations, while speech out-
side of a judicial proceeding (including court filings and depositions)
may be regulated only on a much more stringent showing, corre-
sponding to the clear and present danger standard from the Court's
contempt decisions. Finally, even where forbearance is not mandated
by the First Amendment, it may be the better part of prudence. Po-
litically charged trials are inevitably attended by protests against the
government's exercise of power, and overly enthusiastic attempts to
secure order will be portrayed as repressive by the dissenters. Judge
583. See id. at 438-39.
584. Id at 453 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
585. See id. at 455; cf. the discussion of the elusive speech/conduct distinction, supra
note 257 - 297, and accompanying text.
586. See United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972).
587. See SHIFFRIN, supra note 16, at 103.
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Hoffman's overreaction to the antics of the Chicago Seven defen-
dants played directly into the hands of the protesters, who sought to
discredit the government's claim of moral authority, both in its con-
duct of the Vietnam war and its response to domestic unrest.
D. Sef-Fulfillment
Speech may be protected not only instrumentally, as a means to
another end such as determining truth or maintaining democratic self-
government, but also because expressive freedom is valuable as an
end in itself." Speech as speech is so inextricably bound up with indi-
vidual autonomy and dignity that its suppression, especially by the
government, represents a rejection of the humanity of the speaker.'
The Supreme Court has hinted at this rationale," but has never ac-
cepted it as the primary basis for the guarantee of free expression.
Indeed, the Court has rejected First Amendment challenges to regu-
lation of conduct that is arguably highly self-expressive, but does not
serve other ends thought by the Court to be more central to the con-
stitutional guarantee of free speech. 9' Given the Court's flirtation
588. See Brian C. Murchison, Speech and the Self-Realization Value, 33 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 443 (1998); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv.
591 (1982); David A. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory
of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 45, 62 (1974). Scanlon emphasizes the inher-
ent value of individual autonomy, not self-expression, in Thomas M. Scanlon. A Theory of
Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 213-24 (1972). Protecting free expres-
sion helps prevent manipulation of an individual by government actors. Scanlon has modi-
fied his views to meet some objections to his so-called "Millian principle," in particular to
recognize that private, as well as state actors can violate autonomy by manipulating indi-
viduals. See Thomas M. Scanlon, Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40
U. Prrr. L. REV. 519 (1979).
589. See GREENAWALT, CRIME, supra note 264, at 33.
590. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,427 (1974) (Marshall, J.. concurring)
("The First Amendment serves not only the needs of the polity but also those of the hu-
man spirit - a spirit that demands self-expression."); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("Those who won our independence ... valued lib-
erty both as an end and as a means."). Cf. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc.,
466 U.S. 485, 503-04 (1984) (dicta) ("The First Amendment presupposes that the freedom
to speak one's mind is not only an aspect of individual liberty - and thus a good unto it-
self - but also is essential to the common quest for truth and the vitality of society as a
whole."). An unintentionally ironic appeal to this rationale can be found in Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980), in which the Court invalidated
an order of the Commission, which prohibited inclusion of inserts in utility bills discussing
issues of public policy. The Court referred to "the individual's interest in self-expression"
while defending the right of a gigantic corporation to extol the value and safety of nuclear
power plants. See 477 U.S. at 534 n.2.
591. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (nude dancing is
only "within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment," although all of the justices
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with the self-fulfillment rationale, and the criticism that has been lev-
eled against it,'92 it is probably safe to regard this value as not central
to First Amendment jurisprudence.
More importantly for the purposes of my argument, the self-
expression rationale has little relevance to attorney-speech cases, for
the simple reason that self-fulfillment has little application to the job
of attorney. Lawyers are fiduciaries of their clients - a fact which
has engendered considerable angst from legal ethicists, but a funda-
mental aspect of the job of attorney nonetheless. It is not the lawyer's
self that is expressed through the attorney-client relationship, but the
client's."s The disciplinary rules promulgated by the organized bar
repeatedly emphasize the lawyer's independence from her client's
substantive moral position and her concomitant obligation to repre-
sent the lawful objectives of her client with competence and alacrity."
I do not mean to deny the lawyer's moral agency; lawyers are still re-
sponsible to some extent for the clients they choose s95 and certainly
responsible for immoral actions they take in the course of their repre-
sentation of clients. But moral agency is not the same thing as an un-
fettered sphere of self-expressive freedom.
E. Spurious State Interests for Restricting Lawyers' Speech
Another way to analyze restrictions on speech is to invert the ar-
guments presented above - that is, instead of explaining why speech
should be protected, showing the damage that would result if the
agreed it was self-expressive); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 743 (1978) (George
Carlin Seven Dirty Words sketch "surely Iie[s] at the periphery of First Amendment con-
cern.").
592. See, e.g., ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL 194-99 (1993). George ar-
gues that speech is instrumentally, not intrinsically valuable. "Speech that fails to advance
any human good is valueless, for the value of speech is instrumental, not intrinsic....
Speech is valuable when it makes possible valuable co-operation; and co-operation is
valuable when it is for the sake of worthy ends." Id. at 195. Without this restriction,
speech may be protected where it inhibits the realization of worthwhile ends, or makes
possible the realization of immoral ends. See also FIss, supra note 13, at 5 (the self-
expression rationale for protecting speech fails to explain why the speaker's interest in
self-expression should trump listeners' interests in being protected from the speech).
593. Cf. Post, supra note 9, at 1273 ("No sane legal system would view the practice of
medicine as an occasion for physician self-realization.").
594. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT, Rules 1.2(a) (client has
authority over objectives of representation); 1.2(b) (lawyer's representation does not con-
stitute endorsement of client's ends); 1.1 (lawyer's obligation is to provide competent rep-
resentation).
595. See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, Ethical Ends and Ethical Means, 41 J. LEG.
EDUC. 55 (1991); Monroe H. Freedman, Personal Responsibility in a Professional System,
27 CArd. U. L. REV. 191 (1978).
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speech were permitted in the case under review. This strategy is
common in attorney-speech cases, with courts offering a myriad of
reasons why speech should be sanctioned. Not all of the suggested
justifications stand up under scrutiny, however.
1. Public Image of the Bar
The most familiar, but the least persuasive, reason offered by
courts for restricting the speech of lawyers is that attacks on judges,
courts, or other lawyers inevitably breeds public distrust for the judi-
cial system." Courts and commentators tend to be extremely conclu-
sory when making this argument, using it as a talisman that automati-
cally warrants restriction of speech. Sometimes the circularity of the
argument is obvious, as in this example: "[T]o permit unfettered criti-
cism regardless of the motive.., would foster unwarranted criticism
of the courts."'59 In other cases, courts present the argument as
though the soundness of the premises and the inevitability of the con-
clusion are so obvious that only a fool could disagree. Consider this
statement from a justice of the New York Court of Appeals: "[Erd-
mann's] widely publicized statement, couched in such scandalous
terms, is bound to have the effect of bringing discredit upon the ad-
ministration of justice amongst the citizenry, an act which ought not
596. See, e.g., Lloyd L. Weinreb, Speaking Out Outside the Courtroom, 47 EMORY LJ.
889, 893 (1998); Carl Selinger, The Public's Interest in Preserving the Dignity and Unity of
the Legal Profession, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 861 (1997); Went For It, 515 U.S. at 626-
27; United States v. Brown, 72 F.3d 25 (5th Cir. 1995); In re Converse, 602 N.W.2d 500,
508 (Neb. 1999) (turbulence, intemperance, and irresponsibility on the part of lawyers "se-
riously lower[s] the public respect for the bar"); Ramirez v. State Bar, 619 P.2d 399, 406
(Cal. 1980) ("Appropriate discipline must be imposed, if for no other reason than the pro-
tection of the public and preservation of respect for the courts"); In re Shimck, 284 So. 2d
686, 688 (Fla. 1973) ("Once the integrity of a judge is in doubt, the efficacy of his decisions
[is] more likely to be questioned"); In re Terry, 394 N.E.2d 94, 96 (Ind. 1979) ("Unwar-
ranted public suggestion by an attorney that a judicial officer is motivated by criminal pur-
poses and considerations does nothing but weaken and erode the public's confidence in an
impartial adjudicatory process."); Commission on Professional Ethics and Conduct v. Ho-
rak, 292 N.W.2d 129, 130 (Iowa 1980); In re Johnson, 729 P.2d 1175, 1178 (Kan. 1986);
Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Heleringer, 602 S.W.2d 165, 168 (Ky. 1980) ("Insolent, impudent,
and derogatory conduct can only serve to bring the judicial system into discredit in the
public mind."); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Alison, 565 A.2d 660, 666 (Md. 1989); In
re Westfall, 808 S.W.2d 829, 835 (Mo. 1991); Bar Ass'n of Greater Cleveland v. Carlin, 423
N.E.2d 477, 479 (Ohio 1981) ("This court will not tolerate an attorney's engaging in such
persistent, derogatory attacks on a judicial officer and, thus, on the decorum of the judicial
process itself.").
597. Commission on Professional Ethics and Conduct v. Horak, 292 N.W.2d 129, 130
(Iowa 1980).
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be permitted.""" The dissenting justice in Erdmann does not explain
why the public would pay attention to the lawyer's statement, rather
than simply conclude that the lawyer was a jerk who was unworthy of
belief!"9 Other courts could undoubtedly offer a more persuasive
constitutional justification for restricting speech, but tend to fall back
reflexively on the interest in elevating the public image of the legal
profession.6 Surely the worst example of this reasoning is to be
found in an opinion of the Florida Supreme Court:
Admitting, therefore, the human weaknesses of judges as indi-
viduals but affirming our belief in the essentiality of the chastity
of the goddess of justice we are impelled to the inescapable no-
tion that any conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn and
disrepute the administration of justice demands condemnation
and the application of appropriate penalties.6°
The court seems to have confused the common-law doctrine of libel
per se, in which imputation of unchastity to a woman was actionable
without proof of actual damages,6 with a valid justification for muz-
zling criticism of the judiciary.
Other courts have correctly realized the inadequacy of "affirming
the chastity of the goddess of justice" as a basis for restricting speech.
For instance, the Fifth Circuit pointed out the vacuity of the argu-
ments made by the disciplinary agency: "Neither in its brief nor at
oral argument was the Commission able to explain precisely how
Scott's public criticisms would impede the goals of promoting an effi-
cient and impartial judiciary .... 60 In a California case, the lawyer
had been disciplined for alleging in a brief that state appellate judges
had acted "unlawfully" and "illegally" by reversing a judgment in fa-
vor of the lawyer's client.6 Although the court upheld the discipline,
the dissenting justices questioned the majority's uncritical assumption
that the lawyer's comments would bring the judiciary into disrepute.
The press is constantly harping on judges, often in very strong lan-
598. In re Erdmann, 301 N.E.2d 426,430 (N.Y. 1973) (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
599. Justice Kennedy has argued that societal disapproval is the only sanction for ob-
noxious lawyers that does not violate the First Amendment. See Went For It, 515 U.S. at
643 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("this problem is largely self-policing: Potential clients will
not hire lawyers who offend them."); Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1058
(1991) (Kennedy, J.).
600. See, e.g., Carroll v. Jaques Admiralty Law Firm, 110 F.3d 290,294 (5th Cir. 1997).
601. Florida Bar v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604,608 (Fla. 1958).
602. See W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 112, at 792-
93 (5th ed. 1984).
603. Scott v. Flowers, 910 F.2d 201,213 (5th Cir. 1990).
604. See Ramirez v. State Bar of California, 619 P.2d 399 (Cal. 1980).
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guage, and no one suggests that this speech is unworthy of protec-
tion.6° Appellate courts and law professors spend much of their time
examining judicial decisions for flawed reasoning, and then exposing
these errors to the public, frequently employing provocative lan-
guage. If preserving respect for courts were a sufficient ground for
restricting lawyers' speech, or if speech critical of the judiciary actu-
ally had the effect of bringing judges into dishonor, then reviewing
courts, legal academics, and the press should also be potentially sub-
ject to discipline for creating contempt for judicial decisions.
Furthermore, the argument that the public image of the bar must
be protected through restrictions on speech is ethically repellent. It
suggests that respect may be won only through mystification - that
consumers of legal services would be aghast if they realized that law-
yers were paid for their services, or that the public would cease to
defer to the judgments of courts if they realized that judges were fal-
lible human beings instead of hierophants of justice. This reasoning
was demolished decades ago by the legal realists, who exposed the
rhetoric of "scientific" objectivity in judicial opinions as mere window
dressing for decisions reached on other grounds. Certainly in a time
of unprecedented media coverage of the legal profession, few non-
lawyers believe that lawyers are selfless public servants or that judi-
cial decisions are based in eternal, immutable truths. But even if it
were true that a smoke-and-mirrors campaign by the bar could prop
up the flagging public image of lawyers, it is hardly clear that pre-
serving respect for the bar and the judiciary counts as a state interest
sufficiently important to justify restrictions on speech.'
The Supreme Court has never extended this kind of public image
protection to politicians and other public figures, who are forced to
endure vilification without having resort to common-law tort reme-
dies. Jerry Falwell's public image was probably not enhanced by
Larry Flynt's caricature of him in Hustler magazine (although the
magazine probably does more harm to Flynt's image than to any of
his targets), but because he was a public figure the Court refused to
605. See id. at 412 (Newman, J., dissenting); see also Scott, 910 F.2d at 211 n.20 ("if
Scott were a private citizen, the state would have no justification for suppressing his criti-
cisms of the county justice system.").
606. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 368 (1977) ("[W]e find the pos-
tulated connection between advertising and the erosion of true professionalism to be se-
verely strained. At its core, the argument presumes that attorneys must conceal from
themselves and from their'clients the real-life fact that lawyers earn their livelihood at the
bar.").
607. See Sullivan, supra note 363, at 584.
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permit Falwell to recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress.6 For these reasons, as Justice Kennedy noted in dis-
sent in Went For It, promoting the public image of the bar through
speech restrictions sounds benign, but it is nevertheless impermissible
censorship - the government is suppressing speech that creates a
particular opinion in its listeners, in violation of the First Amendment
principle of viewpoint-neutrality.6 The putative interest in enhanc-
ing the public image of the bar hardly qualifies as a legitimate gov-
ernment interest at all, such as would pass deferential "rational basis"
review, much less as a significant state interest that would justify con-
tent-based restrictions on speech. 1'
2. Protecting Reputation
As many courts have observed, the interests served by defama-
tion law are different from those advanced by the law of professional
discipline.61' In defamation cases, a private plaintiff seeks to recover
for injury to her reputation .6 " Disciplinary cases, on the other hand,
do not seek to vindicate a private wrong - instead, they are brought
by the state, and are directed toward preserving a fair, impartial judi-
cial system.6 "3 A lawyer's conduct may create both civil liability for
defamation and liability for discipline, as in In re Eisenberg,614 where
the lawyer accused opposing counsel of committing perjury, obtaining
his license to practice law by fraud, and distributing cocaine at a
party. The opposing lawyer sued for defamation and recovered
$549,000 in compensatory and punitive damages; the state bar asso-
ciation then obtained Eisenberg's suspension for the same remarks.
Or, a judge may be the plaintiff in a libel case if the published state-
ment was susceptible of a defamatory meaning.15 In many attorney-
608. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
609. See Went For It, 515 U.S. at 639-40 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
610. Cf. Hornsby & Schimmel, supra note 150 (reviewing evidence indicating that ban-
ning advertising by lawyers would have little or no effect on the public's perception of the
legal profession).
611. See, e.g., In re Terry, 394 N.E.2d 94, 95 (Ind. 1979); In re Graham, 453 N.W.2d
313,322 (Minn. 1990); In re Holtzman, 577 N.E.2d 30,34 (N.Y. 1991).
612. See generally SMOLLA, supra note 459, at 117-19.
613. See Terry, 394 N.E.2d at 95.
614. 423 N.W.2d 867 (Wis. 1988).
615. See, e.g., Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 366 N.E.2d 1299 (N.Y. 1977).
In Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), the lawyer's comments were the basis of a
criminal defamation action, but the judges presumably could have brought a civil action as
well.
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speech cases, however, there is either no private plaintiff with stand-
ing to sue for defamation or no false statement which could harm the
reputation of its subject - consider some of the examples cited
above, such as referring to a woman lawyer as "little girl,"'  or calling
Latino defendants "chili-eating bastards. 61 7
A common analytic confusion therefore arises over whether the
constitutional protections available to media defendants in defama-
tion cases brought by public-figure or public-official plaintiffs may be
asserted by attorneys in disciplinary proceedings.618 Many courts have
declined to employ the Sullivan actual malice standard in discipline
cases,61 9 although others have adopted the constitutional framework
for those proceedings." Academic opinion seems to favor the appli-
cation of the actual malice standard in disciplinary actions. t The is-
sue is complicated by the fact that numerous states have adopted the
American Bar Association's Model Rule 8.2, which provides:
A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to
be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity con-
cerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory
616. Principe v. Assay Partners, 586 N.Y.S.2d 182, 184 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
617. People v. Sharpe, 781 P.2d 659,660 (Colo. 1989).
618. See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19 (1990) (statement not
actionable unless it contains a provably false statement of fact); Hustler Magazine v. Fal-
well, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) (emotional distress torts subject to Sullivan standard where
plaintiff is public figure); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986)
(plaintiff in defamation case bears burden of proving falsity); New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 285-86 (1964) (where plaintiff is a public figure, plaintiff must show
that defendant had knowledge of falsity or recklessly disregarded the truth or falsity of the
allegedly defamatory statement; plaintiff also must establish case with "convincing clar-
ity").
619. See, e.g., In re Terry, 394 N.E.2d 94, 95 (Ind. 1979); In re Westfall, 808 S.W.2d 829,
837 (Mo. 1991) ("because of the interest in protecting the public, the administration of jus-
tice, and the profession, a purely subjective standard is inappropriate"); In re Holtzman,
577 N.E.2d 30, 34 (N.Y. 1991) ("Neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has ever ex-
tended the Sullivan standard to lawyer discipline and we decline to do so here."); Justices
of the Appellate Division v. Erdmann, 301 N.E.2d 426, 429 (N.Y. 1973) ("The cases of
Garrison v. Louisiana ... and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan... are irrelex ant."); State
Bar v. Semaan, 508 S.W.2d 429,432-33 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1974).
620. See, e.g., In re Evans, 801 F.2d 703, 706 (4th Cir. 1986); Ramirez v. State Bar of
California, 619 P.2d 399, 404 (Cal. 1980); Carter v. Muka, 502 A.2d 327 (R.I. 1985); State
Bar of Texas v. Semaan, 508 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1974). See also In re Green,
11 P.3d 1087 (Colo. 2000).
621. See Chemerinsky, supra note 101, at 884-87; Elizabeth I. Kiovsky, Comment, First
Amendment Rights of Attorneys and Judges in Judicial Election Campaigns, 47 OHIO ST.
L.J. 201 (1986); Morris B. Chapman, Criticism - A Lawyer's Duty or Downfall? 1981 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 437; Note, In re Erdmann What Lawyers Can Say About Judges, 38 ALB. L.
REV. 600 (1974).
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officer or public legal officer, or of a candidate for election or
appointment to judicial or legal office."
Because Rule 8.2 incorporates the Sullivan test, courts sometimes as-
sume that disciplinary proceedings brought to enforce some other
norm, although not derived from Rule 8.2, should also incorporate
the constitutional law of defamation applicable to public officials.
There is some support in scattered cases for the proposition that
the Sullivan standard and other constitutional safeguards should ap-
ply to government-initiated proceedings to punish a lawyer whose
speech could be injurious to the reputation of a public official. In
Garrison v. Louisiana,623 the Orleans Parish District Attorney criti-
cized the judges of his parish for creating a large backlog of cases
through laziness, inefficiency, and a proclivity for taking vacations.
He also suggested that the judges were unwilling to approve funding
for the enforcement of vice laws, perhaps because of "racketeer influ-
ences."'6 4 Similarly, in the Yagman case, the district court found the
"impugn the integrity" portion of a local rule, under which the lawyer
was disciplined, to be facially overbroad, because it swept within its
ambit a great deal of constitutionally protected criticism of judges.' 2
In order to save the rule from overbreadth, the district court had read
the Sullivan malice standard into the rule, limiting liability for disci-
pline to attorneys who make false statements made with either
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth or falsity.26 The
court of appeals disagreed with this approach, determining that Sulli-
van does not apply lock, stock, and barrel to attorney disciplinary
proceedings:
Defamation actions seek to remedy an essentially private wrong
by compensating individuals for harm caused to their reputation
and standing in the community. Ethical rules that prohibit false
statements impugning the integrity of judges, by contrast, are
not designed to shield judges from unpleasant or offensive criti-
cism, but to preserve public confidence in the fairness and im-
partiality of our system of justice.627
But then Judge Kozinski concluded that Yagman is entitled to "other
First Amendment protections applicable in the defamation con-
622. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 8.2(a).
623. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
624. See iL at 66.
625. See Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1437 (citing Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus,
Inc., 482 U.S. 569,577 (1987)).
626. See iL (citing United States Dist. Ct. v. Sandlin, 12 F.3d 861 (9th Cir. 1993)).
627. Id at 1437.
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text." '  The court held that these constitutional principles, including
the rule that truth is an absolute defense629 and the rule that the plain-
tiff must prove falsity as part of a prima facie case,6° must govern the
discipline against Yagman.
Nowhere did the court explain why Sullivan is not implicated in
disciplinary actions, yet courts must observe other constitutional as-
pects of defamation law. Garrison and Hepps, no less than Sullivan,
are defamation cases. One would think that if Sullivan does not apply
in this context, because defamation law and the law of attorney disci-
pline protect different interests, then other constitutional libel rules
should be similarly inapposite. Nevertheless, Judge Kozinski ana-
lyzed the discipline against Yagman under the stringent constitutional
standards set forth for libel actions. Since only false statements are
actionable under the court's view, it follows that statements of opin-
ion may be the basis of discipline only if they imply a factual predi-
cate that is proven false.63  Thus, Judge Kozinski concluded that
Yagman could not be sanctioned for the majority of his diatribe: the
allegation of anti-Semitism included an assertion of fact - namely,
that Judge Keller had sanctioned several Jewish lawyers - coupled
with Yagman's personal belief that Judge Keller was an anti-Semite.
Because the statement did not imply the existence of additional, un-
disclosed facts, it is protected as an inference drawn from stated
facts.632 Yagman's allegation that Judge Keller was "dishonest" was
mere rhetorical hyperbole, conveying Yagman's contempt for Judge
628. Id.
629. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
630. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767,776-77 (1986).
631. See Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1439, citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1
(1990) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 556 cmt. b (1977).
632. See id. at 1438-40. Judge Kozinski drops a tantalizing suggestion in a footnote in
his discussion of the anti-Semitism comment. Even if Yagman's allegation was not based
on stated facts, such as previous sanctions meted out to Jewish lawyers, Judge Kozinski
suggested that it may nevertheless be protected as "name calling." See id. at 1440 n.17
(citing several cases in which words like "racist" and "fascist" were held not actionable).
These cases do not arise out of comments made by lawyers in connection wvith pending
litigation. See Stevens v. Tillman, 855 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1988) (Easterbrook, J.) (consid-
ering actionability of accusations of racism in a hotly contested struggle to replace a public
school principal); Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976) (libel action resulting from
a book calling William F. Buckley a fascist); Ward v. Zelikovsky, 643 A.2d 972 (N.J. 1994)
(statement that plaintiff "hates Jews" was made at a condominium association meeting).
But this may be a distinction without a difference, if a particular expression by a lawyer is
appropriately characterized as political commentary. (Comments by the lax-Tyers in the
Supreme Court's Snyder and Sawyer cases are functionally equivalent to the remarks at
issue in the political-speech cases cited by Judge Kozinski.)
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Keller, not a specific accusation of corruption." Alternatively, the
"dishonest" comment was equivalent to criticizing Judge Keller as
"intellectually dishonest," which is a commonplace expression of dis-
approval for judicial decisions.634 The "drunk on the bench" comment
did imply actual facts that are capable of verification, but the Stand-
ing Committee on Discipline had unconstitutionally presumed the fal-
sity of the statement. Under Hepps, the Committee was required to
prove falsity as part of its prima facie case for discipline.65 As soon as
the court of appeals determined to hold the Standing Committee on
Discipline to the burden required of a plaintiff in a public-figure libel
action, it was a foregone conclusion that Yagman would escape disci-
pline.
The importation of the Sullivan standard into disciplinary cases is
understandable. The actual malice test is highly protective of speech,
and effectively serves important interests, such as freeing attorneys
from the hazardous task of attempting to divine the circumstances
under which their speech will have a prejudicial impact on a pending
proceeding. 4 But similar benefits can be realized, without the cost of
additional doctrinal complexity, by analyzing lawyer-speech cases un-
der ordinary constitutional rules, such as those employed by the Su-
preme Court in Snyder, Sawyer, and Gentile. For example, content-
based regulations on speech are disfavored, and may be justified only
by substantial government interests.637 In a case like Yagman, the in-
terests that would support discipline for the lawyer do not justify the
infringement on his expressive rights. Yagman's ranting was inartful
and probably ill-advised (he certainly did not make many friends on
the federal bench in Los Angeles), but it did contain a core of pro-
tected political dissent. On the other side, the state's interests
amounted to little more than shielding the judge from unpleasant at-
tacks and propping up the public image of lawyers. Neither of these
interests are of sufficient magnitude to justify a content- or viewpoint-
based sanction against Yagman.638 Thus, although the result in that
case was correct, the defamation analysis created undue complica-
633. See Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1440.
634. See id. at 1441 n.19.
635. See id. at 1441-42 (citing Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767,
776-77 (1986)).
636. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 101, at 887.
637. See Section RI.F, supra notes 432 - 482 and accompanying text.
638. See SMOLLA, supra note 166, § 15:43 (citing Supreme Court's contempt-of-court
precedents for the proposition that concerns for judicial reputation are not sufficient to
justify infringement of First Amendment rights of critics).
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tions.
V. The Ethical Environment of Lawyering
An analysis of the free speech rights of lawyers which considered
only First Amendment norms would be incomplete, because lawyers
are also bound by an extensive system of regulation and by moral re-
straints which are not backed by state sanctions. Much of this regula-
tion has a constitutional dimension as well; consider, for example, the
fair trial and right to counsel guarantees of the Sixth Amendment.
The preceding section considered the principles of political morality
which undergird the constitutional protection for speech. It is the
task of this section to set out a similar analysis into the ethical princi-
ples, derived from the social function of lawyers, that ought to inform
lawyers' deliberation about their rights and responsibilities as profes-
sionals. My claim - which I can defend only briefly here, but which I
have considered at length elsewhere 9 - is that the role of lawyer is
inherently conflicted, because it encompasses duties that are occa-
sionally incompatible. "A lawyer is a representative of clients, an of-
ficer of the legal system, and a public citizen having special responsi-
bility for the quality of justice."'  It takes little imagination to
conceive of situations in which these obligations would stand in ten-
sion. What clients want and what the court system needs are fre-
quently antagonistic. In this Article, however, I will concentrate on
the implications of this conflict on the application of First Amend-
ment doctrine to lawyering activities.
A. The Officer of the Court Duty
Judges are inordinately fond of referring to lawyers as "officers
of the court,"'" but it is seldom entirely clear from these decisions
what this status entails. In other words, even if it is descriptively true
639. See W. Bradley Wendel, Value Pluralism in Legal Ethics, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1
(2000).
640. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr, Preamble 1.
641. See, e.g., Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1056 (Kennedy, J.); Id. at 1075 (Rehnquist, J.); In re
Snyder, 472 U.S. 634 (1985); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 601 n.27 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring); Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 124 (1961); In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622,
668 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Howell v. State Bar of Texas, 843 F.2d 205, 207
(5th Cir. 1988); Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 366 (4th Cir. 1979); In re Williams, 414
N.W.2d 394,397 (Minn. 1987) ("here respondent was ... an officer of the court engaged in
court business, and for his speech to be governed by appropriate rules of evidence, deco-
rum, and professional conduct does not offend the first amendment"); In re Johnson, 729
P.2d 1175, 1179 (Kan. 1986); Kaye, supra note 139, at 715. See also Hale Inq. Panel Opin-
ion, supra note 28, at 882.
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that lawyers are officers of the court, the normative implication of
that label is contestable.64 One state court, discussing the moral char-
acter requirement for admission to the bar, stated that character and
fitness inquiry was intended to ensure that the applicant, if admitted,
"will not obstruct the administration of justice or otherwise act un-
scrupulously in his capacity as an officer of the court.""6 3 This rea-
soning suggests that the officer of the court appellation simply under-
scores the lawyer's obligation, in common with other citizens, to obey
the law and not obstruct justice. Under this formulation of the duty,
there is nothing distinctive about being a lawyer, vis-d-vis the justice
system. (Lawyers are notorious for not recognizing that generally
applicable legal norms apply to them with equal force, so perhaps
even this minimal interpretation of the officer of the court duty is a
useful reminder.)
The lawyer's duty as officer of the court may, on the other hand,
be merely the flip side of the inherent power of courts to regulate the
conduct of attorneys who appear before them. This authority is well
established, and flows from the very nature of the court - in other
words, the inherent power is a necessary condition for the exercise of
the other powers possessed by the tribunal. Courts are empowered to
compel obedience to their orders,4s set aside judgments procured
through fraud, 6 6 regulate the admission of attorneys to practice be-
fore them,47 assess attorney fees against parties notwithstanding the
"American rule" generally prohibiting fee-shifting,648 and sanction
behavior that threatens to interfere with the orderly and expeditious
resolution of cases, such as discovery abuse.49 This conception of the
officer of the court duty is somewhat more robust than the duty to
comply with generally applicable law, because it recognizes that law-
yers acquire certain obligations specific to their profession upon prac-
ticing before courts. It is similar to the preceding duty, however, in
the sense that it is an obligation imposed by positive law.
642. See Chemerinsky, supra note 101, at 872-73.
643. Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 421 P.2d 76,87 (Cal. 1966).
644. See, e.g., United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.);
Wemark v. Iowa, 602 N.W.2d 810 (Iowa 1999); Leardi v. Brown, 474 N.E.2d 1094 (Mass.
1985); In re Giordano, 229 A.2d 524 (NJ. 1967); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyers and Cli-
ent Fraud: They Still Don't Get It, 6 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 701 (1993).
645. See, e.g., Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
646. See, e.g., Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944).
647. See, e.g., Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheat. 529,531,6 L.Ed. 152 (1824).
648. See, e.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980).
649. See, e.g., Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991).
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A different vision of the lawyer as officer of the court duty is
suggested by the Supreme Court's principal decision interpreting the
Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective assistance of counsel,
Strickland v. Washington.65 Justice O'Connor, writing for the major-
ity, said that a lawyer's representation is constitutionally deficient if it
"so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that
the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result."651 In
other words, the lawyer's role as advocate is derivative of the truth-
seeking function of criminal trials. A lawyer fails to act effectively as
a lawyer if the lawyer's participation, or lack thereof, contributes to a
breakdown of the process - that is, when the lawyer is no longer as-
sisting the court in the task of convicting the guilty and acquitting the
innocent. (There is, admittedly, a positive dimension to this role; the
obligation of lawyers to act as officers of the court prohibits certain
kinds of gamesmanship, such as attempting to secure a default judg-
ment without notifying opposing counsel. 2) This limited role for
lawyerly independence is reminiscent of Justice Rehnquists invoca-
tion of the right/privilege distinction in Gentile, and his argument that
First Amendment rights of lawyers must be subordinated to systemic
interests in the orderly processing of disputes.53 Judge Easterbrook
accepted a similar argument in Palmisano, ruling that the heightened
protection available to participants in political debates should not be
extended to a lawyer who, as an officer of the court, may be expected
"to speak with greater care and civility than is the norm in political
campaigns. '  On other occasions, however, the Supreme Court has
recognized that lawyers are officers of the court, not of the govern-
ment, suggesting that Justice Rehnquist overstated the lawyer's obli-
gation to facilitate the efficient functioning of the judicial system.655
Provided that the lawyer does not actually subvert the adversarial
process, she can be said to be acting as an officer of the court, in this
650. 466 U.S. 668 (1983).
651. Id. at 686.
652. Smith v. Johnston, 711 N.E.2d 1259, 1263-64 (Ind. 1999).
653. See supra notes 248 - 251 and accompanying text. Cf Gum v. Dudley, 505 S.E.2d
391 (W. Va. 1997) (lawyer, as officer of the court, has duty to inform court of settlement
agreement, notwithstanding duty of confidentiality owed to client).
654. Palmisano, 70 F.3d at 487.
655. See Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 378 (1866); Spevack v. Klein, 385
U.S. 511, 520 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring); Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 405
(1956). See also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947) (observing that the officer
of the court duty does not override attorney's need for independence and a sphere of pri-
vacy protection surrounding "work product").
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intermediate sense.
The strongest version of the officer of the court duty is one which
essentially requires the lawyer, through her representation of clients,
to vindicate the substantively just result in a given dispute or transac-
tion. William Simon, for example, argues that the basic maxim of le-
gal ethics is that lawyers ought to take those actions that, considering
the relevant circumstances of the particular case, seem likely to pro-
mote justice. 6 Of course, it may be the case that another actor - the
court, the jury, the legislature, or another lawyer - is in a better posi-
tion to promote justice. In this case, the lawyer is justified in merely
playing her role as an advocate for the client's point of view. But in
cases of institutional breakdown, where the procedural protections
that ordinarily assure just outcomes have been subverted, the lawyer
is herself morally responsible for ensuring a just result. "[T]he more
reliable the relevant procedures and institutions, the less direct re-
sponsibility the lawyer need assume for the substantive justice of the
resolution; the less reliable the procedures and institutions, the more
direct responsibility she needs to assume for substantive justice.""
This position may also be called a civic republican conception of the
lawyer's role, for it calls upon lawyers to discern the public good and
bring their clients' ends into conformity with this substantive value,
not merely with the norms stated in positive legal rules. As Robert
Gordon has argued in a pathbreaking paper, the officer of the court
maxim represents an ideal of independence from the parochial inter-
ests of clients, but it does not necessarily mean subordinating client
interests to those of the state.6- The lawyer's independence means
she has sufficient distance from both the client and the state to offer
detached, impartial advice about the legality, and morality, of the cli-
ent's ends. The lawyer therefore serves the function of safeguarding
and expressing public norms. Independence can be threatened not
only by state repression, but also by excessive power concentrated in
the hands of clients. Many commentators have maintained that the
lawyer's independence, in this sense, is compromised by the increas-
ingly competitive market for legal services, the prevalence of in-house
lawyers working for entity clients, and the possible alliance between
lawyers and other professionals in multidisciplinary practices. 9
656. See SIMON, supra note 229, at 138.
657. Id. at 140.
658. See Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988).
659. See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER (1993); David Luban,
Asking the Right Questions, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 839 (1999).
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B. Individual Autonomy and the Independence of Lawyers
It is clear from numerous pronouncements of the Supreme Court
that lawyers' ethical obligations to their clients cannot entirely be
subordinated to their duties as officers of the court. For example, the
Court has held that First Amendment association-freedom interests
set limits on the control states may exercise over advertising and so-
licitation by lawyers. In NAACP v. Button,& the Court reversed a
Virginia Supreme Court decision holding that civil-rights lawyers had
violated state rules on unlawful solicitation of clients by meeting with
concerned parents to explain the ramifications of the Brown v. Board
of Education decision and to offer to represent local plaintiffs in
school-desegregation litigation. The Court characterized the efforts
of the NAACP lawyers as protected expression and association under
the First Amendment. Similarly, the Court held that labor unions
could maintain lawyer-referral services, or keep lawyers available on
a salaried basis, to assist members in pursuing tort claims against em-
ployers, notwithstanding state bar association rules against soliciting
clients for damage suits.01 Cases like these suggest an additional di-
mension, of constitutional significance, to the lawyer's role.
This further constitutionally recognized aspect of the lawyer's
role is to safeguard individual liberty against unjustified restrictions
on autonomy. In the clearest case --- the defense of a criminal ac-
cused --- the lawyer's duties are derived in part from the defendant's
procedural due process rights, such as the presumption of innocence,
the prosecution's "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for proving
guilt, and the right to refuse to testify. These entitlements create
ethical permissions in the defense lawyer, such as the right to "put the
prosecution to its proof," by requiring that all elements of the crime
be established by the government. 2 (Compare this right to the obli-
gation of lawyers in civil proceedings to verify that all claims and de-
fenses are adequately supported by law and the factual record. 3)
The vision of lawyering contemplated by these procedural rights is
one of independent representatives of clients, whose professional
norms are not subordinated to the efficient functioning of the adver-
sary system of justice. Justice Marshall's dissent in Strickland ap-
660. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
661. See United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576 (1971); United
Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
662. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 3.1.
663. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
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pealed to this vision, which was strongly at odds with Justice
O'Connor's. "[T]he assumption on which the Court's holding rests is
that the only purpose of the constitutional guarantee of effective as-
sistance of counsel is to reduce the chances that innocent persons will
be convicted." '' For Justice Marshall, the attorney's role is not de-
rivative of the state's - rather, the lawyer is charged with protecting
the intrinsic rights of accused persons, and with ensuring that defen-
dants are treated fairly, regardless of whether that representation re-
suits in the acquittal of guilty persons. Justice Marshall's under-
standing of the lawyer's ethical responsibilities in criminal trials is
certainly supported by other liberty-enhancing creations of the Court,
such as the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule'5 and the related
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine.6 Marshall's vision of auton-
omy-enhancing agents for clients was recently echoed in Justice Ken-
nedy's dissent in the Florida direct-mail solicitation case. He recog-
nized that the assistance of an attorney is often necessary for an
accident victim to begin rationally assessing her legal and financial
position, particularly when the victim lacks the experience and famili-
arity with the legal system necessary to find legal assistance on her
own. 667 Moreover, the autonomy of accident victims is threatened by
a unilateral ban on contact with injured parties - representatives of
the tortfeasor or insurer are free to talk with unrepresented victims,
in an attempt to negotiate an early settlement.66 A decision to give
up legal rights, made in the absence of full information, is not an ex-
ercise of the client's unconstrained free will. Since lawyers provide
information and the ability to resist the badgering of the representa-
tives of defendants and insurance companies, they are necessary to
safeguard the autonomy of accident victims.
C. Political Conflict and Lawyers' Ideals
Whether one's vision of lawyering is dominated by the principle
of loyalty to clients or by the obligation of serving as an officer of the
court, either vision is impossible to realize in a pure form in practice
because of the plurality of moral principles that underlie the scheme
of legal rules. Consider a recent example - the case of Stropnicky v.
Nathanson, in which a Massachusetts civil rights agency disciplined a
664. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,711 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
665. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
666. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
667. See Went For It, 515 U.S. at 642-43 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
668. See it at 643-44.
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lawyer for limiting her divorce practice only to women.69 The lawyer
testified she sought to "devote her expertise to eliminating gender
bias in the court system," and that she was able to function effectively
as an advocate only on behalf of those clients to whose cause she felt
a personal commitment.67 Her argument was based on the client's
autonomy - the protection of the rights of women clients in divorce
actions - as well as a substantive vision of equality which required
the lawyer to represent only out-of-power clients. The agency, on the
other hand, based its decision on a formalist anti-discrimination
norm, in which the long-term strategy of eliminating sexism was sub-
ordinated to the short-term requirement that lawyers refrain from
discriminating in client selection. The agency's statutory interpreta-
tion was reasonable: there is no exemption for lawyers from the pub-
lic accommodation statute, and lawyers are generally free to discrimi-
nate on other grounds, such as against representing defendants in
personal injury cases or working for management in labor disputes, as
long as the discrimination does not impinge upon a statutorily pro-
tected class.67' But its vision of lawyers as officers of the court, who
are not permitted to engage in sex-based discrimination, is directly in
conflict with the lawyer's attempt to protect the economic equality
(and thus, the autonomy) of her women clients.
Whether or not the agency decision in Stropnicky was correct, it
aptly illustrates the problem of value pluralism in legal ethics. A
given legal institution, doctrine, or principle may serve a variety of
ends, and in some cases, these ends may stand in conflict. Consider
the attorney-client privilege, famously excoriated by Jeremy Bentham
as an impediment to the discovery of truth.6n Bentham's critique has
force only if one assumes that the only goal of the judicial system is
the determination of truth. Contemporary judicial defenders of the
attorney-client privilege justify it on other grounds, such as the pro-
tection of a sphere of individual privacy, free from government intru-
669. See Stropnicky v. Nathanson, 19 Mass. Discrimination L. Rep. 39 (1997); see also
Martha Minow, Foreword: Of Legal Ethics, Taxis, and Doing the Right Thing. 20 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 5 (1998); Steve Berenson, Politics and Plurality in a Lawyer's Choice of Cli-
ents: The Case of Stropnicky v. Nathanson, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (1998).
670. See Bruce K. Miller, Lawyers' Identities, Client Selection and the Antidiscriminati-
on Principle: Thoughts on the Sanctioning of Judith Nathanson, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REV.
93, 94-95 (1998).
671. See id. at 96. For another analysis of these issues, see Robert T. Begg, Revoking
the Lawyers' License to Discriminate in New York. The Demise of a Traditional Profes-
sional Prerogative, 7 GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 275 (1993).
672. See Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, in 7 THE WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM 473 (1827).
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sion, and as an encouragement for persons and entities to seek legal
advice, make candid disclosures to their lawyers, and bring their con-
duct into compliance with the law.673 These reasons are not depend-
ent upon the ultimate discovery of truth in a judicial proceeding; in
fact, they may frustrate that objective.
The attorney-client privilege example shows that lawyers pre-
serve order and also challenge it; they assist their clients in complying
with legal norms but also interpose themselves between individuals
and the state seeking to enforce its laws; they apply law to their cli-
ents but also engage in what might be called nullification, by opposing
non-legal values to positive law, in furtherance of substantive justice.
The attorney disciplinary codes admit that lawyers serve potentially
conflicting functions, but ambitiously (and unrealistically) suggest
that conflicts are rare:
While it is a lawyer's duty, when necessary, to challenge the rec-
titude of official action, it is also a lawyer's duty to uphold legal
process.... A lawyer's responsibilities as a representative of
clients, an officer of the legal system, and a public citizen are
usually harmonious.... In the nature of law practice, however,
conflicting responsibilities are encountered.... Within the
framework of these Rules, many difficult issues of professional
discretion can arise. Such issues must be resolved through the
exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by
the basic principles underlying the Rules.674
As the phrase "sensitive professional and moral judgment" in the
Model Rules shows, the plurality of values underlying the lawyer's
role makes it exceedingly difficult to construct a simple, formalistic,
easily applied theory of legal ethics or, for the purposes of these ar-
guments, a theory of justifiable restraints on the expressive rights of
lawyers. For in some cases, the value of preserving order may be
paramount, while in others, it may be essential that lawyers be per-
mitted to oppose the exercise of government power. Concepts like
discretion and judgment, as used in philosophy, are the very antonym
of theoretical neatness.67 Instead of resting easy in the assurance that
a simple solution is theoretically possible, lawyers are fated to muddle
through First Amendment cases, as well as other ethical dilemmas,
reasoning by analogy with precedents and making principled distinc-
673. See, e.g., Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998); Upjohn Corp. v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
674. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr, Preamble 4,7-8.
675. See, e.g., W.D. Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 20-47 (1930) (when prima facie
duties conflict, "the decision rests with perception").
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tions. This kind of incrementalism in legal reasoning resists systema-
tizing, but there are nevertheless some bedrock principles that
emerge from a consideration of constitutional and ethical norms as
they apply to lawyers. The final section summarizes these founda-
tional principles.
VI. Toward a Synthesis of Constitutional, Ethical, and
Regulatory Norms
This concluding section draws together the strands of First
Amendment theory and doctrine that have been developed in this
Article, as applied to problems in the regulation of expression by law-
yers. I hope to defend a few basic propositions that are clear and ca-
pable of application by courts, despite the dizzying complexity of First
Amendment law and the inherent conflicts in the ethical tradition of
lawyering.
Political speech and dissent. At a minimum, the First Amend-
ment ought to be interpreted to protect lawyers who engage in speech
or expressive conduct that is "reasonably designed or intended to
contribute to reasoned debate on issues of public concern." '676 The
natural rejoinder to this principle is that a great deal of speech for
which lawyers are sanctioned has nothing whatsoever to do with rea-
soned debate or issues of public concern. But the constitution does
not apply only to sober, carefully reasoned discussion. There may be
at least some value in permitting cranky, obstreperous, defiant con-
duct by lawyers on the ground that it encourages a public culture of
skepticism, anti-authoritarianism, pluralism, and openness. It is im-
portant to remember that the social function of lawyers is not only to
preserve order, but also to permit challenges to the status quo. The
difficult question then becomes setting the limits of permissible dis-
sent.
Perhaps the best that can be done here is to recognize that dis-
senting speech gets a little extra weight in constitutional adjudica-
tion,67 but that to be worthy of protection, speech must also appeal to
some other value of public significance. Clear cases of protected
speech include even the most vitriolic criticism of judges and applica-
tions for bar admission from candidates who belong to the Commu-
nist Party. A harder case is presented by a bar applicant whose value
676. Fallon, supra note 7, at 47.
677. See SHIFFRIN, supra note 16, at 106 ("Dissenting speech gets a plus, and the fail-
ure to get a plus may prove decisive on some issues .... ).
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system is one on which "the book is closed," so to speak. Matthew
Hale's ideology of racial superiority is not arguable at all by thought-
ful people, unlike the justice of the Communist cause. As disgusting
as Hale's beliefs are, however, the prospect of giving bar associations,
court committees, or other state actors power to weed out applicants
on the basis of the social acceptability of their value commitments is
frightening. History has shown that restrictions that are enforced
against the bad guys can easily be turned around and used against the
good guys - witness the use of anti-pornography statutes in Canada
as a basis for demanding that bookstores remove the works of An-
drea Dworkin,68 and the disciplinary action against the Massachusetts
judge who attended a gay rights rally." A decision permitting Illinois
to exclude Hale from the bar seems ripe for abuse the next time a
flamboyant lawyer for a marginalized group applies for a law license.
For this reason, racist speech by someone like Matthew Hale
paradoxically warrants an extra measure of protection under the First
Amendment, but this protection may be limited by other constitu-
tional or regulatory norms, such as the principle of racial equality.
Although I doubt that a rule of professional conduct preventing dis-
crimination by lawyers can be drafted to avoid vagueness and over-
breadth concerns, if a reviewing court were to hold such a rule consti-
tutional, it may be enforced against Hale, notwithstanding the
protection afforded dissenting speech. In other cases, such as Yag-
man and Palmisano, there is no principle of similar constitutional sig-
nificance that would permit the state to restrict the dissenting speech
of these lawyers. The extra degree of protection for dissent would
carry the day.
Criticism of the law. A necessary corollary to the protection of
political speech and dissent is that lawyers must be free to criticize the
law. Moreover, judges must be careful not to interpret criticism of
the law as an attack on their integrity, fairness, or moral character.
The speech made by a defense lawyer criticizing the unfairness of
Smith Act trials against alleged members of the Communist Party was
a paradigmatic incidence of permissible criticism of the law and the
state officials who administer it." Justice Frankfurter's position that
the defense lawyer, as an officer of the court, was precluded from
drawing public attention to abuses of government power by meeting
with union members is indefensible. The more recent position of the
678. See Krotoszynski, supra note 565.
679. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
680. See In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959).
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Supreme Court, that an attorney's criticism of the judiciary may on
occasion be rude or uncivil without thereby being contumacious, is
the better one, particularly in light of the development of defamation
rules that are highly protective of vigorous public debate."
A much more difficult case is presented by criticism of the law
that takes the form of acting out in a trial, or otherwise violating
norms of respect and civility, in order to show a proceeding as a farce.
Because state-established forums like courtrooms and pleadings are
not ordinarily available for private citizens' expressive activities, the
speech and conduct of lawyers in these arenas may be subject to rea-
sonable, viewpoint-neutral government regulations. As long as the
judge is even-handed with respect to disruptions by the prosecution
and defense lawyers, she may act to enforce order in the courtroom.
However, as previously noted, high-profile political trials require pa-
tience and restraint by the judge, since any muzzling of disruption
may be portrayed as repression by the defense.
Respect, civility, and decency. There is nothing constitutionally
improper about requiring lawyers to make objections, motions, com-
ments, and criticisms in a respectful, non-abusive manner, on pain of
some kind of judicially imposed sanctions. This is the kind of reason-
able regulation that may be enforced in a non-public forum such as a
courtroom, deposition, or affidavit. Prohibitions on expressions of
non-germane racial or gender bias may also be excluded, for although
they are content-based restrictions on speech, they are viewpoint neu-
tral.6n The crucial distinction is not between biased and non-biased
references to race or gender (which would amount to prohibited
viewpoint discrimination), but to germane and non-germane speech.
In a deposition in a personal injury action, the statement to a woman
attorney, "you should be at home making babies," is prohibited be-
cause it has nothing to do with the subject matter of the deposition.
A long-winded speech praising the accomplishments of women attor-
neys would also be subject to sanctions, because it disrupted the ex-
amination of the witness, although the disruptive effect would proba-
bly be less than a sexist diatribe inflicted on a woman lawyer.
As Richard Fallon argues, a sensible accommodation of First
681. See In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634 (1985).
682. See SMOLLA, supra note 166, § 8:8. Viewpoint discrimination is prohibited, even
in a non-public forum. See id. § 3:9.
683. In re Schiff, 599 N.Y.S.2d 242 (App. Div. 1993) and Hearing Pancl Report, re-
printed in STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND
ETHICs 775 (5th ed. 1998).
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Amendment and anti-discrimination principles might require an em-
ployee to refrain from using terms like "dumb-ass woman" to make
political arguments; it is surely possible to rephrase such a statement
in respectful, non-harassing terms if the speaker wishes to communi-
cate an underlying political message.' Thus, in a non-public forum,
courts are free to exercise their contempt power to punish lawyers
who disrupt the proceedings by gratuitous comments, objections, ar-
guments, and speeches. This is a matter for judgment, and may be
misapplied by overzealous courts. Judge Hoffman clearly overre-
acted in the Chicago Seven trial, by charging the participants with
contempt for such innocuous behavior as smirking and laughing, and
calling him "Mr. Hoffman" instead of "Your Honor." ' To repeat
one of the principles above, judges should not interpret isolated, rea-
soned criticism as disrespect, even if it is made heatedly or out of frus-
tration by a lawyer. Furthermore, because of the necessity of pro-
viding breathing room for valuable speech, courts and regulators must
err well on the side of protecting speech, in marginal cases. And cer-
tainly the latitude that is given to judges to regulate undignified
speech in their presence, where there is a real possibility for disrup-
tion of court proceedings (so-called "direct" contempt), is much re-
duced in cases where the speech is removed from pending proceed-
ings. In those situations, lawyers should have considerably more
freedom to employ shocking or offensive language -"fluck the draft"
instead of "I'm against the draft," for example. Although the law-
yer's speech in the Snyder case is not as vehement as Cohen's jacket,
the Supreme Court has nevertheless shown a willingness to counte-
nance a bit of strong language from lawyers as part of their criticism
of the judicial system. 6"
Right/privilege distinction. When individuals are admitted to the
bar, they do not lose expressive rights that they had possessed as pri-
vate citizens - they are still entitled to criticize the law, write letters
to the editor, engage in vitriolic debate, or even spend their spare
time working as white supremacist advocates. In contexts in which
they would not have had the right to speak as non-lawyers, however,
their expressive rights may be restricted to further goals related to the
judicial system, consistent with the Court's non-public forum doc-
trine. Thus, lawyers' speech in trials, depositions, formal and infor-
mal pretrial proceedings (such as letters to other lawyers), and court
684. Cf Fallon, supra note 7, at 47-48.
685. See LUKAS, supra note 232, at 62, 93.
686. See In re Synder, 472 U.S. 634 (1985).
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filings may be subject to reasonable regulations. It bears emphasizing
that this principle is not a consequence of the lawyer surrendering
speech rights that she would have enjoyed as a private citizen, in ex-
change for a state-granted license to practice law. Instead, it is an or-
dinary application of the doctrine that speech in government venues
may be subject to reasonable limitations, provided that alternative
channels of communication are available.
